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AN EXAMINATION OF BANK EXPANSION BY DIRECT MERGER AND
THE HOLDING COMPANY ROUTE IN VIRGINIA— 19G2-1966
This study examines the management considerations in-
volved in selecting between direct merger and the holding
company as an organization for commercial bank expansion. The
setting of the study is Virginia; the period 1962-1966, when
a "revolution" in the state banking structure began.
The focus of this study is on two banks-—First and
Merchants National Bank of Richmond, which expanded by direct
merger; and United Virginia Bankshares of Richmond, which
expanded by the holding company route. Their expansion expe-
riences were investigated to determine, in so far as possible
from the management point-of-view, the advantages and disad-
vantages of each form of organization. The objective of this
study was to develop information which might be useful to
managements when choosing between the two forms, and to leg-
islators in states where changes to unit or limited branching
statutes could result in expansion by both direct merger and
holding company.
The examination of the experiences of the two organi-
zations points to the fact that the choice of a particular method
of expansion turns on considerations which are largely parti-
cular to a given situation. Therefore, there seem to be no
"right" or "wrong" answers in the normative sense. However,
there are certain considerations—operational and organiza-
tional, financial, marketing and legal--which can be important
in the selection of a form of expansion. When these considera-
tions are measured against an explicit set of criteria, the
strength of the holding company in Virginia is greater profit
and growth potential due to more extensive de novo branching
opportunities, lower reserve ratios applied against total
system deposits, and greater flexibility in raising capital
and use of debt. By the way of contrast, the strength of the
merged form in Virginia is the possibility cf tighter manage-
ment control and the potential for greater organizational
efficiency
.
Regarding the ability of both forms to adapt in the
future to environmental and technical change, the conclusion
is that the merged form
—
given equal legislative opportunities
for growth and profit--probably will become the more viable
form of banking in Virginia. This is because the merged form
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This study deals with the mechanism of commercial bank
expansion. The setting is Virginia; the period is 1962-1966,
when a "revolution" in the banking structure of the State
began. The primary focus is on two prominent banking organi-
zations in Virginia: First and Merchants National Bank and
United Virginia Bankshares, both of Richmond.
In 1962, the state banking code was changed to permit
statewide branching by merger. This dissertation examines the
management decisions which resulted in First and Merchants
National Bank choosing to expand by direct merger and United
Virginia Bankshares choosing to expand by the holding company
route.
' The purpose, scope and limitations of this research are
described in Chapter II. This includes a discussion of the
various phases of the research plan: (1) data collection, (2)
selection of the organizations studied, (3) timing of the
study, and (4) data analysis.
Chapter III presents historical background concerning
important events influencing the structure of banking in Vir-
ginia and Chapter IV describes significant changes that took
place in the Virginia banking structure, during the 1962-1966
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period of expansion. Together, these chapters are intended
to provide an historical perspective of important environ-
mental factors that influenced Virginia bankers and legis-
lators in their deliberations regarding the appropriate type
of banking structure for the state.
Chapter V reviews the literature concerned with advan-
tages and disadvantages of expansion by way of direct merger
and the holding company route. This chapter provides a de-
parture point for subsequent examination of the factors con-
sidered by First and Merchants National Bank and United Vir-
ginia Bankshares in their selection of a method of expansion.
The findings, analysis and conclusions of this study
are presented in the last five chapters. The findings are
primarily based on an examination of the expansion experiences
of the organizations studied. Chapter VI addresses itself to
the background events concerning the decision of First and
Merchants National Bank and United Virginia Bankshares to
choose a method of expansion. Chapter VII deals with opera-
tional and organizational considerations which were thought
to be significant by both managements; Chapter VIII with the
financial considerations; Chapter IX with the marketing con-
siderations; and Chapter X with the legal considerations.
Chapter XI draws together and relates in summary form the
important findings and conclusions from the previous chapters.
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Eight appendicies are included at the end of the dis-
sertation. These appendicies contain: (1) excerpts from the
Virginia legislation regulating branching, (2) transcripts of




PURPOSE AND RESEARCH PLAN
With enactment in 1962 of liberalized branching legis-
lation, Virginia became a state where bank management could
choose either direct merger, the holding company or a combina-
tion of the two, as a method of expansion. For this reason,
legislative conditions in Virginia provide a unique opportunity
to study the circumstances involved in selecting a method of
bank expansion.
Two banking systems in Virginia--First and Merchants
National Bank and United Virginia Bankshares—were chosen for
this study. Management in each organization was presumed to
have been influenced by similar legislative and economic con-
ditions, and to have considered basically the same factors in
deciding on a form of organization for expansion. Nevertheless,
the managements of these two organizations made different de-
cisions. In as much as each sought to achieve the same gen-
eral goal of statewide expansion, the following research
question provides the focus to this study:
"What were the central issues con-
sidered by the managements in their de-
cisions to expand by the way of direct
merger or the holding company route?
Or, in other words, how were these issues
assessed by the managements in terms of
the advantages and disadvantages of one




PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The principal objective of this study is to examine:
(1) the advantages and disadvantages of direct merger and the
holding company as drawn from the literature, (2) the direct
merger experiences of First and Merchants National Bank, and
(3) the holding company experiences of United Virginia Bank-
shares, with a view toward evaluating these areas as guides
for management action. Where an apparent conflict existed
between the literature and management or between the two
managements, then the objective shifts to an attempt to deter-
mine if this conflict provided a basis for an improved under-
standing of, or insights into, the issues involved in the
selection of a method of expansion.
Banking history in Virginia was discussed with a view
toward identifying significant forces and events that influenced
the banking structure of the state. Bankers' attitudes toward
branching and consumer credit, and the legislation regulating
bank expansion were among the more important considerations
examined.
The literature was examined with the aim of identifying
the advantages and disadvantages of expansion by direct merger
as opposed to the holding company route. Information thus
derived provided a part of a theoretical construct which was
subsequently applied to actuality, i.e., it was used to examine
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the management decisions of the two banks studied. This ex-
amination, however, was not intended to judge whether manage-
ment's actions were "right" or "wrong" in the normative sense,
but to determine where differences, if any, existed between
the advantages and disadvantages ascribed to the two forms in
the literature and those considered by management.
Significance
An underlying hypothesis of this study is that some of
the advantages and disadvantages of the two forms, alleged in
the literature, actually do not apply in practice. In this
context, the individual circumstances of each organization
seemingly account for the differences between the literature
and actuality. If this hypothesis proved to be correct, then
apparently the examination of the experiences of the organi-
zations studied might result in information which may be use-
ful to other managements in choosing between the two forms of
expansion. s
Similarly, the findings here may be relevant to legis-
lators in other states where changes to unit or limited branch-
ing statutes could result in expansion by both direct merger
and holding company. In 1966, there were 33 states in this
category including Ohio, Texas, Illinois, and Wisconsin.
In 1966 the 33 states with unit and limited branching
statutes accounted for 88 percent of the 13,785 banks and 79
percent of the $410 billion of total deposits in the United States
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II. SCOPE AND RESEARCH PLAN
Scope
The study embodies four general areas. The first is
the historical background of bank expansion in Virginia during
the period 1920 to 1966. This includes identification of
various economic and political factors leading to passage of
legislation in 1928, 1948 and 1962, which regulated the expan-
sion of banks by merger and branching. These factors were
examined in terms of their impact on the development of multi-
ple office banking in Virginia.
The second area is the Virginia banking structure.
This involves an examination of the evolution of the struc-
ture between 1962-1966, focusing on those changes resulting
from the growth of statewide banking systems.
The third area is the literature. There the advantages
and disadvantages of direct merger and the holding company
were developed as a frame of reference, or point-of-departure
,
for evaluating the expansion experiences of the two organiza-
tions studied.
The fourth and last area is the expansion experiences
of First and Merchants National Bank, a merged system, and
United Virginia Bankshares, a holding company. The focus of
this area is on the central issues considered by the manage-
ments in their selection of the most appropriate form of ex-






There were five aspects of the research plan: (1) data
collection, (2) selection of the organizations studied, (3)
point-of-view, (4) timing, and (5) analysis.
Data Collection . Material for this study was gathered
in three phases. The first was directed at obtaining histori-
cal information and background regarding the expansion of banks
in Virginia. The second dealt with an examination of the
literature .in order to develop a frame of reference, or point-
of-departure, for investigation of the research question. The
third, and most important phase, involved field research in
order to obtain material on the two organizations studied.
Here management's decision to expand and the expansion experi-
ences of the two banking organizations were investigated.
Selection of the Systems Studied . From among the six
major Virginia banking organizations involved in statewide
expansion during the period 1962-1966, two were selected for
study: First and Merchants National Bank, a merged system
2
and United Virginia Bankshares, a holding company. The
2 ...The major systems involved in statewide expansion
during the period 1962 to 1966 were:
By Merger
1. First and Merchants National Bank of Richmond




selection of these two organizations provided a basis for
sharpening the issues being investigated:
A. Among the four holding companies that could have
been used, United Virginia Bankshares [hereafter referred to
as Bankshares] had the clearest option to select either method
of expansion. Bankshares had not filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission to form its holding company prior to the
introduction of legislation, in January 1962, which authorized
3
expansion by direct merger. By way of contrast, First Virginia
and Financial General, both holding companies, were in opera-
tion in Virginia before the 1962 legislation. Consequently,
they were already committed to a particular method of expan-
sion. The remaining organization, Virginia Commonwealth, had
already decided to form a holding company before the January
4
10, 1962 opening of the General Assembly. Liberalized branch-
ing legislation was introduced in the General Assembly on
January 18, 1962 and became effective July 1, 1962.
1. Financial General Corporation of Washington, D. C.
2. First Virginia Bankshares Corporation of Arlington
3. United Virginia Bankshares, Incorporated of Richmond
4. Virginia Commonwealth Bankshares Corporation of Richmond
NOTE: First National Exchange Bank of Roanoke is not included
because it served only the southwestern region of the
state. With Metropolitan National Bank of Richmond it
formed a new holding company in 1967--Dominion Bankshares
Corporation.
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B. First and Merchants National Bank [hereafter called
First and Merchants] , like Bankshares, also had the opportunity
to select either method of expansion. It had not made a final
decision on a method of expansion prior to enactment of the
51962 legislation.
C. In addition to the fact that Bankshares and First
and Merchants were free to choose either form of expansion,
both organizations made their decisions to expand during ap-
proximately the same period of time. Consequently, their
decisions were made under similar external environmental con-
ditions. Furthermore, both organizations were alike with
regard to location, size, and expansion strategy; both were
large Richmond organizations with extensive correspondent
systems; both had worked actively for the liberalization of
branching legislation in 1962.
By way of contrast, Virginia National Bank of Norfolk,
the second major merged system, did not offer as valid a com-
parison to Bankshares, as did First and Merchants. Its loca-
tion and expansion strategy were different from that of Bank-
shares in that Virginia National—home office in Norfolk--had







whereas Bankshares—home office in Richmond--had concentrated
on the metropolitan areas.
Point -of -View . The field research was conducted from
the management point-of-view. It focused on the management
decision-making problem of selecting either direct merger or
the holding company as a method of expansion.
Timing . It was clearly advantageous to conduct this
study while the top managements responsible for planning and
executing the expansion decisions were still active in their
organizations. Conducting the study only five years after the
decision was made, and while expansion was still an active
program, served to examine the important issues when they
were still relatively current in time. Clearly, any substan-
tial delay in conducting the field research would have reduced
the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information collected.
With regard to the changes taking place in the Vir-
ginia banking structure it was thought— for two reasons--that
the period 1962-1966 was sufficiently long to reflect many of
the underlying trends. First, the wave of mergers and holding
company acquisitions was not likely to continue for an ex-
tended length of time since the supply of acquisition eligible
Interview with Mr. R. Cosby Moore, Chairman of the
Board, Virginia National Bank on July 31, 1967.
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banks was being reduced. Second, as the merger and holding
company movement matured, banks expanding on a statewide
basis were likely to approach the geographic limits of their
expansion plans.
Analysis . The analysis was designed to use the material
drawn from the literature as a frame of reference, or point-
of-departure , for the evaluation of the expansion experiences
of the organizations studied. First, similarities and dif-
ferences were explored between the literature and the point-
of-view of the two managements in their selection of a form
of organization for expansion. Next, the expansion strategy
and results of expansion were examined to investigate further
the relevancy of the information drawn from the literature. In
this manner, the structure of the analysis tested the consis-
tency between these positions with a view toward evaluating the
relative merits of expansion by direct merger and holding com-
pany.
Quantitative data such as deposits, earnings and select-
ed operating results were used for two purposes. First, this
information was used to describe the results of expansion and,
second, as evidence in examination of certain of the alleged






This research has several major limitations. First,
the study did not encompass all of the major statewide banking
systems in Virginia. Second , the focus of the field research
was limited to a single point-of-view-~that of management.
Consequently, the scope of the field research did not investi-
gate management considerations or actions in the context of
standards of "public welfare" or "public benefit", except in
so far as management considered them. However, this limita-
tion of scope did not apply to the analysis of management's
expansion experiences. Here, for instance, the points-of-
view of other interested parties—such as stockholders or
customers—were considered.
A third limitation was that the findings and conclu-
sions may require modification as the passage of time provides
more experience. For example, the advantages and disadvan-
tages of one form of banking organization may change as the
result of future state or national legislation, or after the
merger and holding company movement in Virginia has slowed
down.
A fourth limitation of this research concerned the use
of quantitative data primarily for descriptive purposes. The
study did not include in-depth analysis supporting or contra-
dicting previous research findings in areas such as: (1) eco-
nomies of scale, (2) performance to structure relationships,




A controversy underlying changes to state legislation
regulating expansion has involved the "unit" versus "branch"
banking issue.
"Probably there is no older or
deeper banking controversy than that
between the proponents of unit banking,
who believe such a system is essential
to the maintenance of competition and
the preservation of small banks, and the
proponents of branch banks, who insist
that efficiency and stability require
multi-office institutions . "1
The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to judge the re-
lative merits of "unit" versus "branch" banking per se
,
and
the diversity of state legislation which reflects the many
attitudes on this issue. But, rather, the purpose is to
develop an historical perspective of the environmental factors
and forces that influenced Virginia bankers in their delibera-
tions concerning the appropriate banking structure for the
state
.
The discussion is divided into six parts: (1) the 1922-
1928 period, (2) the 1928 legislation, (3) the 1929-1948 period,
(4) the 1948 legislation, (5) the 1949-1962 period, and (6)
Commission on Money and Credit. Private Financial In-
stitutions




the 1962 legislation. The developments of the 1962-1966
period of expansion are dealt with separately in Chapter IV.
I. THE 1922-1928 PERIOD
The events of 1922-1928 culminated in the passage of
restrictive branching legislation in 1928. Three salient
features stood out in this period. First, state chartered
banks in Virginia could establish de novo branches in areas
2throughout the state. On the other hand, National banks
were prohibited from branching under previous interpretations
3
of the National Bank Act of 1864.
The second and third salient features centered on the
situation of The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond, now The Bank
of Virginia. This was the only bank in the state which had
established de novo branches in large cities other than its
home office in Richmond. Furthermore , this bank operated
under a Morris Plan franchise. The fact that it did not oper-
ate as a regular commercial bank and that it established
2
De novo refers to expansion by the opening of new
branches
.
3Gerald C. Fischer, American Banking Structure (New
York: Columbia University Press, r9"6 8) . See
-
Chapter II for
a historical discussion of the development of unit and branch
banking, including legislative aspects. National Banks were
not permitted to branch under Federal law until passage of
the McFadden Act in 1927. This lav/ limited branches of na-
tional or state member banks to. their home city.
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branches may have deterred other banks from branching on an
area wide basis.
The Role and Influence of The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond
The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond had been founded in
1922 by Thomas C. Boushall, formerly an officer of the then
4National City Bank of New York. Interested in starting a
Morris Plan Bank in Richmond, Boushall received a franchise
and financial backing from Arthur J. Morris, who was expanding
5the plan throughout the country.
The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond was unusual in that
it had a regular commercial bank charter, even though it oper-
ated a Morris Plan franchise; it did not, however, take demand
4 Cf . Appendix (B) . Background on The Bank of Virginia
was obtained through interviews with Mr. Thomas C. Boushall,
Honorary Chairman of the Board and founder of The Bank of
Virginia, and Mr. Frederick Deane, Jr., current President of
The Bank of Virginia. The bank has had only two chief execu-
tive officers since its founding in 1922. The current chief




p. B-2. A Morris Plan Bank was a financial
institution which accepted as deposits only savings accounts
and which made only instalment loans to individuals. This
system of Morris Plan lending was devised by Arthur J. Morris,
who is still a director of The Bank of Virginia. In 1910
when Mr. Morris opened the first Morris Plan Bank in Norfolk,
the availability of credit to average wage earning individuals
was almost nonexistent. The original approach to the Morris
Plan Bank was designed to fill the need for credit facilities
for wage earners throughout the United States who, generally
speaking, were not receiving this service from commercial
banks of the day.
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deposits or provide other commercial services. Activities
were limited to savings accounts and instalment loans to
individuals and small businesses. Late in 1922, the bank
opened a branch in Petersburg. In 19 25 another branch was
opened in Newport News, by merger with the Merchants and
Mechanics Savings Association. In 1928, a third branch was
opened in Roanoke. Also, that same year, merger of The Morris
Plan Bank of Norfolk made that bank a branch of The Morris Plan
Bank of Richmond.
Reaction of Virginia ' s Commercial Bankers to The Morris
Plan Bank of Richmond . The branching activities of The Morris
Plan Bank of Richmond and its business in consumer instalment
loans were not in consonance with the tradition of commercial
7bankers in Virginia. These deviations from tradition were
such an unusual step away from the norm that The Morris Plan
Bank of Richmond was said to be an anathema to many bankers
o
in the State.
Virginia commercial bankers 1 attitudes were described
as being "steeped in tradition", and this description helps
Ibid
. ,
p. B-3. The Morris Plan Bank of Norfolk was
the original Morris Plan Bank founded by Arthur J. Morris in
1910 under the name of Fidelity Loan and Trust Company.
7 Ibid





to explain why only one bank in Virginia was branching on an
area wide basis during the 1920 's. For instance, typical
comments of commercial bankers to the chief officer of The
Morris Plan Bank of Richmond were that it was poor banking
practice and an unnecessary risk to have "someone else lend
your money" in branches distant from Richmond; that consumer
lending was a dangerous practice since it was not a reliable
or desirable business, and; that the consumer loan would likely
9have an unacceptably high default rate. This lack of enthu-
siasm for branching on the part of Virginia bankers, however,
was typical of the general attitude of commercial bankers else-
where. In 1922, the American Bankers Association, in apparent
response to various proposals to permit branching by national
banks, adopted a resolution which stated:
"We regard branch banking or the
establishment of additional offices by
banks as detrimental to the best interest
of the people of the United States.
Branch banking is contrary to public
policy, violates the basic principles
of our government and concentrates the
credits of the Nation and the power of
money in the hands of a few. "10
9 Ibid . On the question of "someone else lending your
money", Boushall said that bankers failed to recognize a
branch was not "someone else", but it was an extension of the
main bank.





And it was not until 1930 that the American Bankers Association
modified its position on branching.
The geographic and economic character of the state also
serves to explain v/hy only one bank in Virginia was branching
in the 1920' s. Virginia was divided into distinct regions:
(1) Tidewater Virginia—Norfolk, Newport News, Portsmouth--was
maritime oriented, (2) Richmond was tobacco oriented, and (3)
Northern Virginia was closely associated with the Federal
Government. Furthermore, some areas in Virginia had closer
association with neighboring states, and in some cases still
do today: (1) Bristol in the far southwestern corner of the
State had closer ties with Tennessee, and (2) the isolated
Eastern Shore had closer ties with Maryland. Because these
separate areas of Virginia had few economic, political or
social ties, branching across geographic boundaries was unat-
tractive to commercial bankers. However, to The Morris Plan
Bank of Richmond branching was an essential element of strategy
Management in this bank believed that it was necessary to serve
the major population centers, where the majority of the con-
12
sumers were located. In contrast to this, the lack of in- .
terest in branching on the part of commercial bankers in Vir-










quo, to continue to serve commercial customers within their
individual marketing areas.
Developing Response of Virginia' s Commercial Bankers
to The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond . "Friction" was develop-
ing between The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond and some of the
other commercial banks in Virginia. This situation came into
the open early in 192 8 when the Virginia Bankers Association
prepared a revision to the existing banking code, to be sub-
mitted to the Virginia General Assembly. This revision was
to restrict the authority of banks to branch or merge outside
of the home area of the parent bank, and to limit to 4 percent
per annum the maximum amount of interest s bank could pay on
savings deposits. The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond, a member
of the Association, had not been advised of this proposal
during the time it was being prepared by the Virginia Bankers
Association.
Actually, the revision was contrary to many of the basic
policies of this bank and, in fact, appeared to be specifically
13
aimed at restricting its activities. For instance, The
Morris Plan Bank of Richmond had paid 5 percent interest since
13Thomas C. Boushall, "A Statement on Behalf of The Bank
of Virginia," to the Special Committee Appointed by the Pre-
sident of The Virginia Bankers Association to Study the Cur-
rent Branch Banking Statutes as well as suggestions for their
revision, April 24, 1948.
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its founding in 1922. The 5 percent savings rate was seen
by the commercial banks as a threat to drain away their savings
deposits, since their rates were generally 3 percent in the
14Richmond area and 4 percent elsewhere. For this reason, it
appeared that the 4 percent rate limitation was a move to re-
strict competition from The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond for
saving accounts by bringing its rate in line with that paid by
15the commercial banks.
This effort of the Virginia Bankers Association to limit
branching and saving deposit interest was also related to
legislative developments on the national scene. In the period
1910-1930 a great number of states passed legislation pro-
hibiting branch banking or restricting the location of branches
to limited areas. In 1910 there were 8 states with legislation






The difference in viewpoints between The Morris Plan
Bank of Richmond and the commercial bankers in Virginia is forci-
bly demonstrated by the Virginia Bankers Association proposed
new statute to restrict further expansion of that bank and to
render less effective its competition for savings accounts by
setting a ceiling on savings interest. This action suggests
commercial banks generally were not concerned with the "public
welfare" and that they had no evolving "concept" or "scheme"
of what the commercial banking industry should be--it appears
to work against the "public welfare" since it was aimed at re -
ducing interest paid on savings and constraining the growth of
a new developing segment of banking which was intended to pro-




its historical high. Two three-year periods, 1921-1923
and 1927-1929, account for approximately one-half of the anti-
branching legislation enacted by the states between 1910-
171930. This concentration of antibranching legislation in
these periods was attributed to activity of the Comptroller of
the Currency and national banks to permit national bank branch-
ing. In the 1921-1923 period:
"... Comptroller of the Currency
Crissinger requested that Congress pass
a limited branch bill for national banks,
and when this was not done he began to
authorize some of the institutions under
his jurisdiction to establish limited
service branches in their head-office
cities. The impetus these and other
actions gave to the antibranch movement
in the early 1920 's was quite apparent
by 1923 in the trial of the St. Louis
case. This was the first clear test of
the branching power of national banks,
and the opponents of branching were so
effective in convincing their state of-
ficials of the importance of this litiga-
tion that eleven state attorneys general
filed briefs as amici curiae , supporting
the position of those opposed to national
bank branching ."18
The action by the Virginia Bankers Association to re-
strict branching, in 192 8, came at the peak of antibranching
sentiment at the national level. This sentiment again had
I r








resulted from an effort on the part of national banks to obtain
equal branching privileges with state banks:
"The second interval in which a
large number of states prohibited branch
banking began with passage of the McFadden
Act in 1927 and terminated in 1929. In
the 1927 legislation the antibranch forces
had won a considerable but not complete
victory. Branching by national banks
was limited to the head-office city (town,
village) and it was allowed only if the
relevant state law also permitted state ,
qbanks to establish and operate branches."
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the passage of
the McFadden Act influenced the Virginia legislation; this
supposition is supported by the fact that provisions of the
McFadden Act were reflected in the amendment to the statutes
proposed by the Virginia Bankers Association. Moreover, the
announced expansion plans of The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond
to branch into new areas gave specific meaning to the legisla-
tion in Virginia.
However, during the 1928 session of the General Assembly,
the Chairman of the Legislative Committee and the Secretary
of the Virginia Bankers Association called on the President
of The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond. In this meeting it was
suggested that if the bank's representatives would support
the proposed code change limiting savings interest to 4 per-
cent, the Legislative Committee of the Association would
19 Ibid . pp. 63-64.
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undertake to have the code amended specifically to permit
branches in other cities than that of a bank's head office,
provided the cities would have a minimum population of
2050,000. This compromise was accepted by The Morris Plan
Bank; it was subsequently incorporated into the 192 8 banking
code, which established legislative framework for "limited
21branching" in Virginia.
II. THE 1928 LEGISLATION
The legislation approved in 1928 was more restrictive
22
of branching activities than the previous legislation.
Specifically it restricted expansion by de novo branches,






p. B-6. An ironic twist to this power play
by the commercial banks was that The Morris Plan Bank of
Richmond wanted to reduce its 5 percent savings rate, yet
could not for fear of losing depositors. It so happened that
the bank was having a difficult time attracting savings even
though 5 percent was paid and most commercial banks paid 3 to
4 percent. A large segment of the saving public shared the
feeling that "something must be wrong" if the prestigious com-
mercial banks are paying only 3 to 4 percent and this new bank
5 percent. The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond was looking for
a way to solve the "5 percent rate problem" and, at the same
time, continue to expand in the more populated areas of the
state; therefore, the compromise of rate reduction for limited
branching was readily accepted.
22
As was noted earlier, bankers in many places in the
country in the 1920 's and 1930 's, not just Virginia, were able
to affect the course of legislation and thus influence the




Corporation Commission was permitted to authorize banks having
paid-up and unimpaired capital and surplus of $50,000 or more
23
to branch:
a) within the limits of the city, town or
village in which the parent bank was located.
b) in any city having a population of not less
than fifty thousand inhabitants; and
to merge or purchase a bank:
a) within the same or adjoining counties or
banks within a distance of twenty-five
miles of a parent bank, provided that the
banks involved had been in actual operation
for a period of two years or more, except
that the State Corporation Commission under
certain conditions could waive this time
requirement.
The effect of this legislation was to restrict bank
expansion to the geographic area immediately surrounding the
home office and to population centers of 50,000 and more.
Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth, Richmond, and
Roanoke met the population criteria for de novo branches in
the period 1929-1948.
23
Cf. Appendix (D) , Branching Provision of the 1928





III. THE 1929-1948 PERIOD
During the years 1929-1948, commercial banks began to
expand into the area of consumer finance and, in turn, The
. . . 24Morris Plan Bank of Virginia into commercial accounts. There-
fore, "head to head" competition in addition to branching were
issues which contributed to the enactment of even more restric-
tive branching legislation in 1948.
The Early Image of The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia
During the years 1920-1940 commercial bankers considered
The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia, operating in the instalment
25loan area, nothing more than a high-class small loan company.
This attitude was aggravated by the fact that historically com-
mercial bankers had not considered it ethical to advertise
for loans--and this continued into the 1930 ' s--whereas Morris
Plan banks engaged in extensive advertising. They were char-
acterized as "sort of razzle-dazzle promoters from the begin-
ning," i.e., merchandise was given away to get accounts.
While such practices are acceptable today, the Morris
Plan banks were doing this at a time when it was considered
24Name changed from The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond
to The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia, July 1, 192 8.









most improper. These circumstances reinforced the view of
the commercial bankers in Virginia that the small Morris Plan
Bank of Richmond was not really a bank at all, and certainly
2 8
not of the same stature as a commercial bank.
Commercial Banks—Consumer Finance
During the years 1920-1939 and on through World War II,
the volume of commercial bank loans strongly tended downward.
In the decade of the 1920 's total commercial loans of all
national banks decreased from just over 10 billion dollars to
29
approximately 7.5 billion dollars. This decrease was at-
tributed to a general "role back" of commercial borrowing from
banks
:
"Business, influenced among other
i factors by the cheapness and abundance
of long term funds, turned more and more
in this period to the securities mar-
kets for its capital requirements, and
relied less and less upon the banking
structure, so that commercial loans
declined as bond--and stock--prices
increased. "30
27
Ibid. There were no other Morris Plan banks m Vir-
ginia after the conversion of The Morris Plan Bank of Ports-
mouth into the Commercial Exchange Bank around 194 0.
Ibid .
29Albert R. Koch, The Financing Of Large Corporations
1920-1939 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
69.









By the end of the 1930 's the total of commercial loans
of all national banks was down to just over 4 billion dollars,
31
a decrease of approximately 6 billion dollars since 1920.
The depression in the 1930 's accounted for this continuing
downward trend. And this trend continued through World War
II--corporations were highly liquid from war contracting pro-
fits; the non-essential segments of the business sector found
it difficult to replace depleted inventories; capital outlays
were generally limited to war industries, for war essential
new capacity. Consequently, commercial bank loans were further
liquidated and banks shifted heavily into the government
securities market, where the government was deficit financing
the war effort.
Therefore, during the whole period from 1920-1945, there
was every reason for commercial banks to look for new outlets
for loans. However, most commercial bankers were slow in re-
cognizing and responding to the opportunities in the area of
consumer finance. As a result of this, the large-scale entry
of banks into the field of direct consumer lending is a compar-
atively recent development in the history of commercial banking
There Was a Slow Shift in the Attitude of Commercial




Prior to the 19 00 ' s direct consumer lending by commercial
banks was conducted on a highly selective basis. Most banks
were engaged in the occasional extension of direct consumer
loans, but the practice was most generally confined to the
accommodation of established bank customers; as a general
rule, it was looked upon as an exception to established bank
lending policy. The shift in bank attitudes came slowly and
not uniformly among individual banks, and by the end of the
1920' s a number of large banks in the nation had established
personal loan departments.
"The National City Bank of New York
was the first major commercial bank in the
United States to establish a separate de-
partment for making small loans, when it
inaugurated its Personal Loan Department
on May 4, 1928. The general pattern of
i its initial program was modeled on the
Morris Plan, which was inaugurated by
Arthur J. Morris as early as 1910 in
Norfolk, Virginia. Our bank, however,
developed its own forms and internal pro-
cedures. Its general objective was to
provide loans in modest amounts at reason-
able rates, repayable in monthly instal-
ments to wage earners, small merchants and
others who, at that time, had little or
no credit standing in commercial banks.
The extension of such credit facilities
was a logical outlet for deposits re-
sulting from savings accounts, another
service which commercial banks adopted
in the twenties . "-^




In the 1930 's, growth in demand for consumer credit
associated with the mass appeal of the automobile, favorable
experience of banks in consumer lending under programs of
government loan insurance, the combination of low interest
rates, large excess reserves and recognition of amortization
principles to consumer goods, served to stimulate bank interest
33m consumer lending.
Also, the economic impact of the depression altered
attitudes toward consumer credit. Commercial banks were not
making many loans because the national economy was stagnant
and commercial customers were reluctant to borrow. At the
same time, the depression affected consumer lending, but not
quite to the same extent. Therefore, there was relatively
34
more demand for consumer credit than commercial credit.
Virginia Commercial Banks—Consumer Finance
In Virginia, The American Bank and Trust Company of
35Richmond opened a consumer loan department in 1927. This
was said to have had a startling impact on the banking
33Commission on Money and Credit, op. cit







, n. 3. Also it was noted that The National
City Bank of New York (now the First National City Bank)
visited The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia to study the proce-
dures and forms prior to establishment of its own consumer
instalment loan operations in 1928.
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community in the state and elsewhere. Yet, two points sug-
gest a continuing lack of interest in the consumer area by
this bank and by other commercial banks in Virginia. First,
American Bank and Trust located its consumer loan department
in the basement of its building, probably to separate its
37
"working man" business from its "carriage trade." And,
five years later when the bank did not reopen after the bank
holiday, "paper" from its consumer loan department offered to
The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia totaled approximately $116,000.
This amount was negligible when compared to The Morris Plan
3 8Bank of Virginia's $7 1/2 million. Second, The Morris Plan
Bank of Virginia, in 1937, held more consumer instalment loans







37 Interview with Mr. A. Halsey Cook, Executive Vice Pre-
sident, First National City Bank of New York, on October 3, 1968.
The supposition that the basement location was to separate the
"working man" and "carriage trade" is supported by the fact that
the First National City Bank of New York-~when establishing its
consumer loan department—also chose to operate this department
apart from its commercial business for this reason.
3 8Appendix (B) , B-9.
39
Ibid. Another example of a commercial bank's attitude
toward consumer credit was the effort on the part of a New York
correspondent bank to drop The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia's
$300,000 line of credit unless auto loans and new office con-
struction were stopped. In 1928 the Morris Plan Bank of Vir-
ginia was the first bank in the state to buy dealer automobile
paper and in 1935 the first to do extensive direct (over-the-
counter) collateral auto loans to consumers.
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An article on banking in Virginia, published in 1965,
termed the expansion of commercial banks into consumer credit
"the revolution of service". It confirms the "tradition
bound" attitude of Virginia's commercial bankers, which has
been described in the earlier paragraphs:
"The commercial bank of today is
indeed the department store of finance-
but it has not always been so. Throughout
the 19th Century and in the early years of
the 20th Century, Virginia bankers, along
with their fraternity brothers in other
parts of the nation, were steeped in the
banking principle of note and deposit issue
based upon short-term, self-liquidating
business credit. True, some loans were
made to individuals, for home purchase
or for other reasons, but the credit rating
had to be of the highest quality. In the
early 1920' s, Virginia bankers still con-
sidered the active promotion of banking
services for the average individual as
outside the area of active competitive
pursuit. However, a change was already
under way which, although more than two
decades were to pass before its fruition,
was destined to change the patterns of
accepted banking practices more drastically
than any previous change in banking's
history. This emerging change acknowledged
the fact that commercial banking had much
to offer to the average individual and
that the individual, in large numbers,
could make a substantial contribution to
bank profits. 40
The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia Becomes a Full Service Bank
In the 1930 's, policy changes were initiated at The
Morris Plan Bank of Virginia to broaden the scope of its
40
R. Pierce Lumpkin, "Virginia Banking Today: The Quiet
Revolution," The Commonwealth, March 1965, p. 27..
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services. These changes were in response to the entry of
41
commercial banks into the area of consumer credit. Initially,
The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia took only checking accounts
of individuals. Later commercial checking accounts were
taken and just before World War II, the bank entered the com-
mercial lending field in active competition with the other
42
commercial banks. However, The Bank of Virginia's commercial
growth and development phase did not really start until after
43World War II. Before that time the bank had commercial ac-
counts, but in a modest amount.
The Branching Issue Arises Again
By 1948 The Bank of Virginia had successfully implemented
its strategy of expanding into the commercial area in direct
competition with commercial banks. It had grown to be the
44
sixth largest bank in Virginia. It was still the only bank
in the State which had developed a branch system in cities




p. B-9 , n. 5. Boushall noted that
government insured FHA Home Improvement Loans in 19 3 4 were a






Ibid., p. B-10. The bank's name was changed from The
Morris Plan Bank of Virginia to The Bank of Virginia, January
1, 1946 in order to qualify more specifically for commercial
accounts
.
Cf. Appendix (E) , Table E-I.
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new areas when they met the population provisions of the
45branching laws. Thus, the move of The Bank of Virginia
into commercial accounts, the anticipated expansion of the
bank into Alexandria and the request for approval of a third
branch in Norfolk were circumstances which rekindled the




Another matter of concern to some of the bankers in
Virginia was the question of "out-of-state control." Since
its founding the major stockholder in The Bank of Virginia
had been the holding company established to franchise Morris
Plan banks throughout the United States. As late as 1953,
when the control of The Bank of Virginia was sold, the hold-
ing company still owned 57 percent. This out-of-state owner-
ship compounded the unfriendly feeling of the other commercial
banks in Virginia towards The Bank of Virginia; it was used by
the opponents of branching to argue the "alleged dangers" of
47




p. B-10. The Bank of Virginia ex-
pected that Alexandria would meet the 50,000 population re-




, pp. B-10-11. Dean stated that The Bank of Vir-
ginia had grown up "relatively unnoticed" by the other commer-
cial bankers because it was not until after World War II that
it became an active and aggressive competitor in the commer-
cial accounts area and because it had not been considered a






The Bank of Virginia, as a major proponent for expansion, was
about to play a central role in a controversy over legisla-
tion to curb branching.
Press Coverage of the Branching Issue
In February 1948 an editorial reported the issues being
discussed in the following terms:
"It is regrettable that the question
of the advisability of placing stricter
limits on branch banking in Virginia has
been raised in a way that makes it dif-
ficult for the General Assembly to decide
the issue strictly on its merits and from
the standpoint of the welfare of the
people of Virginia rather than on rival
banking interests. 48
The present status of the matter
is that of a fight for advantage between
The Bank of Virginia and the members of
i the Virginia Bankers Association. They
are alarmed by the growth of the former
and by its apparent inclination to ex-
tend its operations into new localities,
and they want a law to protect them. "49
The "main contenders" in the branching controversy were
the Virginia Bankers Association, the advocate for a ban on
48
It is noted that the "welfare of the people" in the
1920 's and 1930 's was nowhere nearly as well accepted as a
useful criterion for judging the impact of banking legislation
on the structure of banking. For example, before the enactment
of The Bank Holding Company Act of 195 6 and The Bank Merger Act
of 1960 Federal statutes provided relatively few guidelines re-
gulating expansion of commercial banks. These statutes now
include explicit public interest considerations.





branching, and The Bank of Virginia, whose operations were
singled out as typical of the problems inherent in statewide
50branch banking. Arguments aired m the press against branch
banking were that:
a) branch banking created a most dangerous monopoly
51
which must be guarded against;
b) the number of banks in a community must be limited
so that each one will be strong enough to protect the
, 52people;
c) branch banking created a much greater opportunity
53for out-of-state control of Virginia financial institutions;
d) the "unit bank" system was "most consonant with
the genius of the American people" and was protection against
54
chain or branch monopolies.
50Richmond Times Dispatch
,
February 9, 1948. Fears of
banking monopoly were not a new issue. This argument can be
traced back to the 1830' s; it involved questions of banks or




, Note there appears to be a conflict between a)
and b)
,
yet both were cited in the same article as arguments
against branching.
53
Ibid. , Many references were made to the out-of-state
control of The Bank of Virginia. Control was traced through
the Morris Plan Corporation, The American General Corporation,
The Equity Corporation of New York to the Oceanic Trading Com-
pany, Inc., A Panama Corporation.
54 Richmond Times Dispatch, February 6, 1948.
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Arguments aired in the press for branch banking were
that:
a) branch banking encouraged unfettered competition
55
and avoided "closed shop for the bankers union";
56b) banking service to the people was improved;
c) legislation should not be passed to limit competi-
57
tion, but to encourage it;
d) no legislation should ever be passed in Virginia
which was leveled at an individual or specific corporation.
58Legislation should be aimed at principles.
One observer offered the opinion that the outcome of
the 1948 controversy over branch banking was never really in
doubt. The contest between The Bank of Virginia and the Vir-
ginia Bankers Association was described as a mismatch:
"The contest appears as uneven as
any possibly could be. Not only is the
Virginia Bankers Association a powerful
organization in its own right, but many
members of the General Assembly are most
certain to be sympathetic with the intent
of the legislation. Checking the member-
ship of the Senate, it appears that a
majority of the senators are bank attorneys,
bank directors, or bank officials. In the
55 Ibid
.
, February 18, 1948.
56Richmond Times Dispatch , February 9, 194 8, op. cit .




House of Delegates, about one-quarter
of the members are either officers or
directors of banks. Not one member of
either the Senate or House, however, is
known to be an officer, director, or
attorney of The Bank of Virginia. "59
The anti-branching bill was passed by both the Virginia Senate
and House by wide margins and de_ novo branching or merger on
a statewide basis was prohibited.
With regard to the reporting of the branching issue in
the press two points require comment. First, while both the
pros and cons of branch banking were aired, the great prepon-
derance of editorials supported The Bank of Virginia. Second,
it was clear that the great majority of the arguments cited
in the press for and against branch banking were oversimplified.
IV. THE 1948 LEGISLATION
Changes to the Virginia Code enacted in 194 8, which
remained in effect until 1962, eliminated de novo branching
in cities having a population of 50,000 or more. De_ novo
branches were restricted to the parent-bank city, town, or
59Richmond Times Dispatch , January 23, 1948.
Richmond Times Dispatch , February 17, 1948. The bill
passed the House by a vote of 70 to 22.
, February 26, 1948. The bill




p. B-ll, n. 6. According to the re-
cords of The Bank of Virginia there were 22 editorials for and
none against the position of the proponents of branching.
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village; merger or purchase to the same or adjoining
county of the parent bank, or of banks located within 25
miles of a parent bank. The net result of this legislation
was to eliminate opportunities for expansion of banks outside
of their home areas.
The legislation specified that the State Corporation
Commission was permitted to authorize banks having paid-up and
64
unimpaired capital and surplus of $50,000 or more to branch:
a) within the limits of the city, town
or village in which the parent bank is
located;
to merge or purchase a bank:
a) within same or adjoining counties or
a bank located within a distance of
twenty-five miles of a parent bank,
provided that the banks shall have
been in operation for a period of
five years or more, except that the
"Town or village" is considered the same as being in
the county for definition of location under the Virginia bank-




Under Federal and Virginia codes there is no real dis-
tinction between merger, purchase, or consolidation of assets.
64
Cf. Appendix (F) , Branching Provision of the 1948




State Corporation Commission under
certain conditions may waive this time
• requirement.
The 1948 legislation contained a "grandfather" clause
specifying that the restrictions did not apply to branch banks
established prior to June 29, 1948; nor to branches already
authorized by the Commission, but not yet opened. The effect
was to allow all of the branches of The Bank of Virginia in
the cities of Newport News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Portsmouth
and Roanoke to continue in operation.
In addition the 1948 legislation required that bank
expansion meet certain conditions not included under the pre-
vious legislation. Specifically, the State Corporation Com-
mission was permitted to authorize de novo branches and mergers,
"when satisfied that public convenience and necessity will
thereby be served." Thus, for the first time, the state law
contained an explicit public service requirement for expansion.
V. THE 1949-1962 PERIOD
In the 14 years following the 1948 legislation there
were efforts to liberalize branching. In July 1961, the
Richmond Times Dispatch carried the headline: "Curbs on Bank






Laws." Six months later it carried another headline reading:
"Virginia Banks Hamstrung~~Laws Curb Expansion." As implied
by these headlines, Virginia bankers were finding it increas-
ingly difficult to control their own destiny. This resulted
from a number of developments which were causing some bankers
to reappraise the branching issue. Specifically, the develop-
ments in question were industrial and urban growth throughout
the state, growing competition from large out-of-state banks
to the north and south and growing concern over the expansion
of bank holding companies in the state.
Industrial and Urban Growth
During the years 1948-1962 the state was making a rapid
transition from a rural economy to an industrial and urban
economy. For instance, in 1950 more than 50 percent of the
population of Virginia lived outside metropolitan areas, but
by 1960 more than 56 percent lived in urban centers. During
this period population in the metropolitan areas increased
seven times faster than the remainder of the state, and wages
and salary income far out-stripped farm income. This rapid
growth of Virginia's urban and industrial communities was
placing increasing pressures on banks in the state, whose own
growth was restricted.
fi ft







In the early 1960 's banks in North Carolina, Maryland,
and the District of Columbia were larger than banks in Vir-
ginia. The greater lending ability of these banks was alleged
to be the reason for the increasing frequency of the financing
of large commercial and industrial projects in Virginia by out-
of-state banking institutions. For instance, the construction
of The H. H. Porter Company, $2,650,000 electrical transformer
plant at Lynchburg, and its $1,500,000 to $2,000,000 Disston
Saw Division in Danville were financed by a North Carolina
Bank.
To compete for these larger lines of credit, Virginia's
bankers saw the need to become larger banking units. In sup-
port of this position the presidents of three large Richmond
banks were quoted as saying:
"Large industries need large credit
lines. The biggest bank in Virginia can
offer only $1,550,000. Or consider this:
Richmond has four of the six largest banks
in the state. Yet all four combined can
offer an industry no more than $4,950,000.
By contrast, in any of 15 North Carolina
cities an industry can obtain five mil-
lion dollars from a single bank. "6°
ft 7
Richmond Times Dispatch , July 2, 1961.
Richmond Times Dispatch, January 14, 1962, op.cit.
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Growing Holding Company Competition
Virginia bankers also were faced with increasing com-
petition from a new source, bank holding companies. Expansion
of these institutions was not regulated under the Virginia
banking code. They were extending their operations, primarily
69in Northern Virginia, by acquiring banks as affiliates. In
this manner the acquired banks did not become branches, but
remained separate units of the holding company under Federal
Laws and under the supervision of the Federal Reserve System.
Consequently, holding companies had a competitive advantage
over banks with regard to expansion:
"The two biggest banks in Winchester
will be acquired by holding companies,
if present negotiations are successful,
and Virginia bankers will have another
reason to ponder their course for the
future. .
.
Group banking—or holding company
banking--is increasing in Virginia and
many bankers believed there will be more
important acquisitions by the holding
companies in the months ahead.
This growth is occurring while many
Virginia banks are in a straitjacket
.
The big commercial banks, which are
69Two holding companies were becoming quite active in
Virginia
:
(1) Financial General Corporation . Financial General
was originally established in Virginia in 1925 under the name
of The Morris Plan Corporation of America: this was the ori-
ginal Morris Plan holding company.
(2) The First Virginia Corporation . First Virginia
was incorporated under the laws of Virginia on October 21, 1949
as Mt. Vernon Insurance Agency, Inc. Its name was changed to
The First Virginia Corporation on December 7, 1956.
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closely associated with the Virginia
economy and vital to it, are unable
to expand because of the highly re-
strictive branch banking law in Vir-
ginia. "70
In addition holding companies were able to pool their lending
resources, thereby, providing larger lines of credit for the
expanding industrial base of the state.
The Virginia Metropolitan Plan
In early 1961, spurred by competitive pressures and a
changing environment seven banks cooperated in formulating
71
"The Virginia Metropolitan Plan:" (1) First and Merchants
National Bank of Richmond, (2) State-Planters Bank of Commerce
and Trust of Richmond, (3) Central National Bank of Richmond,
(4) National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, (5) First National
Exchange Bank of Roanoke, (6) Peoples National Bank of Char-
72lottesville, (7) Shenandoah Valley National Bank. This was
an attempt to acquire the support of other bankers throughout
the state for a change to the restrictive branching legisla-
tion. The plan envisioned merger between banks having head
offices in metropolitan areas, defined as cities of not less
70Richmond Times Dispatch , November 1, 1961.
71






73than 15,000. Prior to the convention of the Virginia Bankers
Association in June, 1961, sponsors of this plan visited
bankers throughout the state to generate support for changing
the law. Their objective was to gain endorsement of the plan
at the convention for subsequent presentation to the General
Assembly in January 1962.
The Kramer Committee
. • , , 74Opposition to the plan was strong. At the June 1961
meeting of the Virginia Bankers Association the branching issue
was referred to a special committee of the Association, The
73This plan proposing a form of limited branching is
an example of a lack of a "conceptual scheme" of what banking
as an industry should be, i.e., given a "conceptual scheme"
implementing legislation should logically follow. This history
of the branching issue in Virginia shows no evidence that this
concept was debated; therefore, this "key" to the solution of
the problem seems to have been overlooked.
74One reason for the failure of Virginia bankers to
support the Virginia Metropolitan Plan was advanced by Mr. Green,
Vice President of First and Merchants, and a member of a group
appointed to generate support for the plan throughout the state.
The Virginia Metropolitan Plan was primarily sponsored by the
larger banks in Richmond. To be accepted as a resolution by
the Virginia Bankers Association it needed support of the large
number of small banks in the state. It was hard to gain this
support because the small banks felt there were dangers in-
herent in statewide branching systems. Many small bankers
were reluctant to give up marketing area protection enjoyed
under the 1948 legislation, regardless of the broader economic
benefits to the state. Another reason was that the sponsoring
bankers did not have sufficient time before the June convention
to gather supporters throughout the state.

111-33
75Kramer Committee. This committee was to report its findings
to a special convention s>f the Virginia Bankers Association in
November, 1961 so that the issue could be brought before the
1962 General Assembly. But the special convention provision
was voted down under a motion by Mr. Harry Nichols, President
of the Southern Bank of Norfolk, and the report was scheduled
for the convention the following June. Because of this change
any Virginia Bankers Association sponsored action to ease ex-
pansion restrictions would be delayed two years, to January
1964, when the Virginia General Assembly would again meet.
Meeting in the late fall and winter of 1961, the Kramer
Committee encountered difficulty obtaining a concensus on its
recommendations for changes to the branching legislation. A
77
number of alternatives were considered:
75American Banker , August 31, 1961. The committee was
appointed by the Virginia Bankers Association President, H. E.
Wall, to consist of the following: C. A. Kramer, President,
Farmers and Merchants State Bank, Fredericksburg, Chairman;
R. Cosby Moore, President, National Bank of Commerce, Norfolk;
H. Hiter Harris, Jr., President, Southern Bank and Trust, Rich-
mond; Giles H. Miller, Jr., President, First National Bank,
Danville; John S. Fulcher, President, Carroll County Bank,
Hillsville; Herbert I. Lewis, President, Bank of Gloucester;
and Dr. Charles C. Abbott, Dean of the Graduate School of
Business Administration of the University of Virginia.
Cf. Appendix (B)
,
p. B-13, n. 7. Rather than wait two or
more years for possible resolution of the branching issue The
Bank of Virginia formed a holding company as a means of avoiding
the expansion restrictions.
7 7Virginia Bankers Association letter of December 13,
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1. The Virginia Metropolitan Plan.
2. Removal of all legal restrictions on statewide
branch banking.
3. Authorization of statewide mergers.
4. Regulation of holding companies under Virginia state
law to limit their expansion to the same degree as unit banks
were limited, i. e., to eliminate the current expansion advan-
7 8 Ri 7 9
tage enjoyed by the holding companies in Virginia.
The Buck-Holland Bill
On January 18, 1962 a bill favoring statewide branching
was introduced in both houses of the General Assembly. It
was a complete surprise to the Virginia banking community,
1961. The "impression" of Mr. R. F. Daniel on the basic ap-
proaches to bank expansion which were being considered by the
Kramer Committee.
7 8Letter--copy--dated September 8, 1951, to Mr. R. F.
Daniel, Executive Vice President of The Virginia Bankers As-
sociation, from Mr. David I. Mays, Law Officer of Tucker, Mays,
Moore, and Reed. This letter said that legislation to re-
gulate expansion of holding companies in Virginia was not a
clear-cut alternative; the present state of the law was that
a State may pass legislation more restrictive than the Federal
Act in the area of holding companies, but until the issue was
decided in the Federal Courts it could not be considered
absolute
.
79Bank Holding Company Facts 1966 , Association of Re-
gistered Bank Holding Companies, Washington, D. C, p. 32.




since it came about as the result of independent action of
8
two legislators, Messrs. Buck and Holland.
The Kramer Committee had not reached any conclusions
or made any (useful) report to the Virginia Bankers Associa-
tion prior to the introduction of the Buck-Holland Bill. How-
ever, on February 1, 1962, the committee recommended that "in
the best interest of the public and banking, the Association
support legislation which would provide for permissive state-
wide merger of banks subject to all other restrictions on
8
1
branches as are now contained in the existing statutes."
This recommendation was apparently intended to remove any
major opposition to the Buck-Holland Bill, which with several
amendments became law on July 1, 1962. This legislation opened
a new era of banking in Virginia. The bankers in Virginia
interested in statewide expansion now had three methods to
achieve their objective:
8
Mr. Buck, of Abingdon, Virginia, was the representa-
tive of his area in the House of Delegates. Mr. Holland, of
Isle of Wight, was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Insurance. They both were presidents of relatively small
banks in Virginia. Interviews with several bank officers who
were closely involved with the legislation indicates that Mr.
Buck and Mr. Holland acted on their own, independent of the
study being made by the Virginia Bankers Association. In parti-
cular, Mr. Holland's motivation was said to be based on the
recognition of long run needs of the State of Virginia, and
also to give banks a choice between merger and joining a hold-
ing company group, Cf . Appendix (B)
,
p. B-14.
81Kramer Committee, copy of Minutes of Meetings of
Special Committee on Branch Banking, February 1, 1962.
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1. Expansion by merger.
2. Expansion by holding company.
3. Expansion by both holding company and merger.
VI. THE 1962 LEGISLATION
Changes in the statutory situation brought by the Vir-
ginia Banking Act in 1962 provided an opportunity for statewide
expansion of banks. For the first time since 1927 banks could
expand into any community in Virginia by merger, regardless of
population. Under this legislation, however, additional de
novo branches could not be established after a merger in areas
outside the area of the parent bank.
The State Corporation Commission, when satisfied that
public convenience and necessity would be served, was permitted
to authorize banks having paid-up and unimpaired capital and
82 & 8 3
surplus of $50,000 or more to branch:
a) within the limits of the city, town or county in
which the parent bank was located;
82 Cf . Appendix (H) , Branching Provisions of the 1962




A further change in the 1962 legislation was the fact
that public necessity for additional banking facilities need
not be proved on application to the State Corporation Com-
mission when the proposed new bank will be located in a poli-
tical subdivision where all banks are owned or controlled by
holding companies, or merged systems, or merged systems and




b) in cities contiguous to the county or city in which
the parent bank was located and in counties contiguous to the
city in which the parent bank was located; but if the parent
bank was located in a city, branches in the contiguous county
could not be established more than five miles outside the city
limits
;
and to merge or purchase a bank:
a) elsewhere in any other county, city or town, pro-
vided that the banks had been in operation for a period of
five years or more, except that the State Corporation Com-
mission under certain conditions could waive this time require-
ment; but if the parent bank was located in a city, branches
in the contiguous county could not be established more than
five miles outside of the city limits.
VII. SUMMARY
During the period 1928-1962 the banking system in Vir-
ginia was regulated under three different legislative acts
governing expansion by de novo branches and merger:
1928 through 1947 - Branches and mergers were
authorized in the immediate geographic area of
the parent bank and de novo branches in cities
having a population of not less than 50,000.
1948 through 1961 - Branches and mergers were




1962 to date - Branches and mergers were authorized
in the immediate area of the parent bank and
mergers elsewhere in the State. Within five
years after the 1962 legislation there were two
large merged systems and four large bank hold-
ing companies operating throughout the state.
Other signiiicant changes that took place in
Virginia during the years 1962-1966 were: (1)
more banking offices, (2) fewer banks, (3)
larger banks, and (4) higher deposit concen-
tration among the large banks. These develop-
ments will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter IV, "The 1962-1966 Period of Expansion."
Banker's attitudes toward branching, their views of
The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond and consumer finance, the
economic and geographic structure of Virginia, together with
the thinking of bankers at the national level were factors
which influenced the development of banking in Virginia. The
period 1929-1948 saw commercial banks in Virginia enter the
field of consumer credit and The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond
enter* the field of commercial accounts. Yet the commercial
banks in Virginia continued to show no interest in branching,
while The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond (now The Bank of Vir-
ginia) announced plans to continue its inter-city branching
program. Thus, "head to head" competition between those for
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and against branching was a reason for the passage of legis-
lation in 1948 which restricted expansion of banks to their
home office area.
Between 1949-1962 Virginia bankers found it increasingly
difficult to control their own destiny. Industrial and urban
growth, competition from large out-of-state banks and expan-
sion of bank holding companies in Virginia, were developments
causing a reappraisal of the branching restrictions. Recogni-
tion of the need for expansion of the Virginia banking system
resulted in the enactment of the 1962 legislation permitting
statewide mergers.
These developments suggest certain conclusions and gen-
eralizations :
A. Until after World War II commercial bankers in Vir-
ginia were generally not innovators. Throughout this period
they tended to maintain the status quo and resist change. In
fact, it was the result of external factors (the depression
in the 1930' s, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, competi-
tion and a changing environment in the 1960 's) that forced
bankers in Virginia away from their traditional posture into
branching and the field of consumer credit. Seemingly, the
opportunities for public service and profit were not created
by Virginia bankers themselves.
B. In order to put the proper perspective on the con-
clusion that bankers in Virginia were not innovators until
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after World War II., it is noted that this same comment was
made regarding the banking industry as a whole by George
W. Mitchell, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
"Some firms and industries have
created a product or service, built up
public awareness and acceptance for it,
and, using generative, adaptive, and
innovative forces from within, have
established a role and importance for
their own enterprise. The result is a
de novo industrial-commercial business
or complex.
Banking is not such an enterprise or
industry. It has a pattern of traditional
services, an imposed molecular structure,
and a pedestrian operating technology,
none of which it could call its own. It
has not innovated its service products nor
shown much adaptive ingenuity in their
promotion. Its favorite image has been
a passive conformity to the mores of its
better customers. Its competitive ag-
gressiveness has been schizophrenic,
with large sectors of the industry ad-
vocating or supporting publicly admin-
istered price ceilings for time deposits,
public prohibitions against the absorp-
tion of exchange, and a variety of re-
gulatory devices or postures that by
sanction or promise dilute competitive in-
genuity. "84
C. There is no evidence that commercial bankers, as
a group, developed (or desired to develop) a "conceptual scheme"
of what the commercial banking industry could or should be.
84George W. Mitchell, "Exogenous Forces In The Develop-
ment of Our Banking System," Law and Contemporary Problems
,
Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (Winter 1967), p. 3.
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The legislation in 1962 was the result of the action of two
legislators, independent of the Virginia Bankers Association,
which was at that time commonly thought to be the authorized
channel for the banking industry. This is further evidence
that Virginia bankers were presented with opportunities for
profit and growth which they themselves had not created. In
fact, if they had not been so provincial in 1948, they probably
would not have had to reverse their policies in 1962.

CHAPTER IV
THE 1962-1966 PERIOD OF EXPANSION
This chapter describes significant changes that took
place in the structure of Virginia banking in the five years
after enactment of the Buck-Holland Bill, in 1962. Generally
these changes were:
-- Evolution of six statewide banking systems
— More banking offices
-- Fewer banks
— Larger banks
-- Higher deposit concentration among the larger
banks in Virginia
I. STATEWIDE BANKING SYSTEMS
In 1962 only three banking organizations in the state
participated in area wide branching to any extent. The Bank
of Virginia with its main office in Richmond operated branches
in Petersburg, Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Roanoke.
The First Virginia Corporation, a bank holding company in
Arlington, and Financial General, a holding company in Wash-
ington, D. C, operated affiliates in several communities in
Northern Virginia. Only the Bank of Virginia, however, with
Financial General was a holding company registered
under the Investments Act of 1940.
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branch offices in major population centers in the southeastern,
central and southwestern sections of the state had statewide
coverage
.
By the end of 1966 two merged systems and four holding
companies were operating in most of the state's metropolitan
areas, regional population centers and some rural communities.
The banking systems serving these areas are shown on Table E-II,
Appendix (E) . The six metropolitan areas, with the exception
of Roanoke, were served by at least three systems each; Arling-
ton and Norfolk were each served by five. A holding company,
. . 2Virginia Commonwealth, served all six.
The four secondary population centers--Charlottesville,
Danville, Harrisonburg, Waynesboro-Staunton--and their sur-
rounding counties were not as well covered by the large banking
systems. Virginia National Bank operated in all four, but no
other system was active in more than one of these centers.
Waynesboro-Staunton and Augusta County seemingly had the most
system competition with three.
By 1966 statewide banking systems served areas containing
more than 62.5 percent of Virginia's population. The six
2 ...Roanoke and the southwestern region of Virginia, as of
the end of 1966, were served by the First National Exchange
Bank--a large regional banking system. In August 1967 First
National Exchange formed what was then Virginia's newest hold-




metropolitan areas contained 56.3 percent of Virginia's
population of 4,525,976; the four regional population centers
3
contained 6.3 percent. In addition, the six statev/ide systems
served many smaller cities, towns, and counties.
The significance of the evolution of statewide systems
may be put in even better perspective when it it recognized
that Virginia is one of only six states where branching is
found on an area wide basis:
"In discussing the operations of
branch banks, it would be most con-
venient to contrast local branching
with branch systems which serve very
wide areas. But, unfortunately, for
over a century America has had little
general experience with even relatively
broad branching. In fact, of the 2,797
commercial bank branches, located in
counties which were noncontiguous to
the head-office county at the end of
1966, four-fifths of them were found
in only six states--three adjoining
West Coast States: California (47%),
Oregon (50%) , and Washington (4%) , and
three adjacent east coast states: North
Carolina (14%) , South Carolina (5%) ,
and Virginia (5%) . On the other hand,
there were 33 states which had only ten
branches or less in this noncontiguous
county category. "4
3The Bureau of Population and Economic Research,
"Estimates of the Population of Virginia Counties and Cities:
July 1, 1967," (Charlottesville, Virginia: Bureau of Population
and Economic Research, Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion, University of Virginia, August 1967), pp. 1-15.
Fischer, American Banking Structure, op.cit. , p. 41.
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Thus, the development of system banking on a statewide basis
in Virginia was unique. It appears to have been the result
of the branching legislation which prohibited de novo branches
or merger more than five miles into a contiguous county, if
5the expanding bank had a home office in the contiguous city.
The "five mile" limit seemingly influenced some of the larger
city banks to expand statewide rather than on a regional basis.
However, it is not clear from the historical record of the
1962 legislation that consideration was given to the advan-
tages of statewide versus regional expansion. In fact, the
branching controversy in the Virginia Bankers Association and
the clear lack of any plan by any of the interested parties
for the development of banking in Virginia, prior to the Buck-
Holland Bill, suggests that the evolution of Virginia as one
of six states with any measure of statewide banking was more
by chance than by design.
II. MERGERS
The acceleration in the trend toward fewer banks in
Virginia was caused by the wave of mergers following the 1962
legislation—between July 1, 1962 and December 31, 1966 there
were 70. These involved one of every four of the 302 banks
5Cf . Appendix (H)
.
c




in Virginia in 1962. Thirty different banks acquired other
banks by merger. Figure IV- 1 illustrates the increase in















NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS IN
VIRGINIA 1948-1962 7
The decrease in the number of banks would have been
greater except for an offsetting increase in the number of
new bank formations. During the period 1962-1966, 31 new banks
were established compared to 21 for the previous 14 year period.
According to bank executives interviewed, this increase was to
Banking Survey For Years of 1947, 1961 through 1966," unpublished
statistics (Charlottesville, Virginia: Bureau of Population and
Economic Research, Graduate School of Business Administration,
University of Virginia, 1966).
7Data for Figure IV-1 from Banking Markets Unit, Divi-
sion of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Numbe r of Commercial Banks and Branches
by States, 1936-1964 and Annual Supplements.
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be attributed to: (1) the liberal attitude of the then Comp-
troller of the Currency (Saxon) toward bank expansion, (2) the
need for additional banking facilities in Virginia's fast
growing urban areas, and (3) speculation on bank location in
anticipation of a later merger. In addition, 27 holding com-
pany acquisitions--when viewed as a substitute for merger-
worked to keep the total number of banks in Virginia higher
than it otherwise might have been in that holding company ac-
quisitions continue as separate banks.
Merger Characteristics
Location . Both metropolitan and non-metropolitan banks
were active as the acquiring bank. Three out of four of the
banks acquired were in non-metropolitan areas. Figure IV-
2
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FIGURE IV-2
PROFILE OF ACQUIRING AND ACQUIRED BANKS BY LOCATION IN VIRGINIA,
JULY 19 62 TO DECEMBER 31, 19 6 6 e




Type and Size of Bank . Individual banks accounted for
63 percent of the mergers; holding companies accounted for 7
9percent; statewide merged systems, 30 percent. Generally the
size of the acquiring bank was considerably larger than the
acquired bank. This result was not unusual since three out of
four of the merged banks were in non-metropolitan areas. Table




RANGE, AVERAGE, AND MEDIAN DEPOSIT SIZE OF ACQUIRING AND ACQUIRED
BANKS IN VIRGINIA, JULY 1, 1962 TO DECEMBER 31, 1966
Acquiring Merged
Bank (millions) Bank (millions)
Average $ 81 $ 11
Median $ 28 $ 8
Range $1.6 to 536 $ . 5 to 187
NOTE: Bureau of Population and Economic Research, "Vir-
ginia Banking Survey For Years of 1947, 1961 through 1966,"
unpublished statistics (Charlottesville, Virginia: Bureau of
Population and Economic Research, Graduate School of Business
Administration, University of Virginia, 1966.)
Economic Research, "Virginia Banking Survey For Years of 1947,
1961 through 1966," unpublished statistics, Charlottesville,
Virginia: Bureau of Population and Economic Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, University of Virginia, 1966
9Bureau of Population and Economic Research, "Virginia




III. HOLDING COMPANY ACQUISITIONS
In Appendix (E) a comparison of Tables E-III and E-IV
shows that during the years 1962-1966:
a) the number of holding companies doubled;
b) the number of banks affiliated with holding companies
grew from nine to 38;
c) the number of banks affiliated with holding companies
increased from 2.9 percent to 15.1 percent of the total number
of banks in Virginia;
d) by December 31, 1966, holding company affiliates and
their branches accounted for approximately 27 percent of the
total banking offices in the state;
e) between December 31, 1961 and December 31, 1966 hold-
ing company deposits, as a percentage of total state deposits,
increased from 5.91 percent to 28.11 percent.
Appendix (E) , Table E-V shews that because of the rapid
growth of holding companies four such organizations were among
the ten largest banking organizations in Virginia, as of December'
31, 1966. These were United Virginia Bankshares, Virginia Com-
monwealth Bankshares, First Virginia Corporation, and Financial
General Corporation—respectively number one, four, five, and
seven.
This growth of both holding companies and merged systems
into statewide banking organizations was a unique aspect of

IV-9
the 1962-1966 period of banking expansion in Virginia. One
author has cited several benefits stemming from this: (1) Vir-
ginia banks are now better able to compete with banks in
neighboring states for large loans, (2) more of the state's
business can be financed from sources within the state, and
(3) statewide branching has resulted in greater mobility of
funds, diversification, a large number of better qualified
management personnel, and management personnel with special
skills
.
IV. FEWER BANKS—MORE BANKING OFFICES
During the years 1962-1966 changes in the banking
structure in Virginia resulted in a reduction in the number of
banks, an increase in the number of branches and a steady
growth in the number of total banking offices. With one ex-
ception, these were consistent with the trends in the national
banking system. The sole divergence was in the number of
banks. Figure IV- 3 illustrates a 16.89 percent decrease of
banks in Virginia, whereas the number of banks in the U. S.
increased 2.57 percent. On the other hand, branches in Vir-
ginia increased 91.25 percent, more than three times the in-
crease of branches for the nation as a whole.
Harmon H. Haynes and Charles F. Phillips, Jr., "The
Banking Structure of Virginia," Washington and Lee Law Review ,





































CHANGES IN BANKS AND BRANCHES IN VIRGINIA AND U. S. 1962-1966
(FROM APPENDIX (E) , TABLES E-VI AND E-VIl)
The effect of the 1962 legislation on the rate of change
in the number of banks and of branches was substantial. The
average annual rate at which the number of banks decreased was
10.2 per year for the period 1962-1966, compared to .8 per
year for the prior 15 years--more than a ten fold increase.
The average annual rate at which branches increased was 49
per year compared to 18 per year for the prior 15 years--ap-
proximately a 2 1/2 fold increase. Figure IV- 4 illustrates






CHANGES IN BANKS AND BRANCHES IN VIRGINIA 1948-1966
(FROM APPENDIX (E) , TABLES E-VI AND E-VII)
V. LARGER BANKS
As discussed in Chapter III, Virginia bankers—during
the latter 1950 's and early 1960's--had seen a need for larger
banking organizations with larger lines of credit to meet out-
of-state competition, and to serve better the growing indus-
trial community in Virginia. By 1966 these objectives had
been met.
The relative size of Virginia's largest banks increased
compared to banks in neighboring states and the District of
Columbia. For instance, in 1961 no banks in Virginia were
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among the nation's largest 100, but by June 30, 1966 there
were' two: First and Merchants and Virginia National.
In 1961, Wachovia Bank and Trust Company had deposits
approximately 2.8 times larger than First and Merchants, Vir-
ginia's largest bank; Riggs National Bank and Maryland National
Bank were 1.9 times larger in terms of deposits. However, by
the end of 1966 Virginia's largest bank had gained in deposit
size: Wachovia was only 1.8 times larger; Maryland National 1.5
and Riggs 1.3 larger in terms of deposits. Consequently, the
largest banks and banking organizations in Virginia, by 1966,
12had gamed substantially against their regional competitors.
Higher Deposit Concentration In The Larger Banks
From 1962-1966 deposit concentration among the larger
banks in Virginia increased. By December 30, 1966, the largest
five banks held 36 percent of total state deposits, up from
1325 percent five years earlier. Thus, the 1962 legislation
American Banker , August 1, 1966, "300 Largest Com-
mercial Banks in the United States June 30, 1966." First and
Merchants ranked 85th in deposit size and Virginia National
ranked 90th.
12
Cf. Appendix (E) , Table E-V. Considering banking
organizations holding companies operating in Virginia at the
end of 1966 rank in size of deposits: first, fourth, fifth,
and seventh.
13Cf. Appendix (E) , Table E-I, E-VIII, and IX show:
(1) ranking of banks in Virginia by deposit size for 1947-
1961-1966; (2) percentage of deposits held by the largest five,
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reversed a 1948-1961 trend toward lower concentration, which
had been the consequence of the restrictive legislation enacted
1 4in 1948.
Compared to other states, Virginia has a relatively
small amount of deposit concentration. In 1965 in California,
Rhode Island, New York and Oregon, what Fischer defines as
"large commercial banks" held over 80 percent of the state's
deposits, whereas the large banks in Virginia held only 41.9
15percent. Though deposit concentration in Virginia is still
considerably less than in these states, a further increase has
been viewed by some bankers as a constraint on the future
growth of banks. Size and concentration, rightly or wrongly,
have thus become important considerations for management in
its planning of future expansion.
ten, and twenty banks for 1947-1961-1966. Table E-V shows the
ranking of banking organizations in Virginia by deposit si^e
and percentage of deposits held for 1966.
14
The Bank of Virginia, said to be the object of the
1948 branching restrictions, grew faster during the period of
restricted branching 1948-1961, than any of the five larger
banks. By the end of 1961, The Bank of Virginia had moved up
from sixth to fourth largest in the state. The Bank of Vir-
ginia's higher growth rate may be attributed, in part, to r.he
fact that the 1948 legislation left it with the only branch
organization in five of Virginia's six major population cen-
ters .




"Now after a five year wave of
mergers and acquisitions Federal re-
gulators seem to be signaling the con-
centration among larger banks here has
gone just about far enough.... Most
bankers seem resigned to the fact that
regulatory authorities will not allow
any new formation of banking giants,
nor allow any of the big ones now
existing to make any really sizable
acquisitions. What constitutes "giant"
or "sizable" are, of course, matters of
conjecture. But the interpretation is
of considerable interest to bankers here
and elsewhere who must try and fathom the
Federal Reserve's ruling on "potential
competition," a concept first spelled
out in a ruling this spring against a new ,
,
acquisition by a Virginia holding company."
IV. INFLUENCE OF THE 19 62 LEGISLATION
A significant aspect of the 1962 legislation was that
it worked with the changing economic climate in Virginia, as
against the 1948 legislation which obstructed the on-coming eco-
nomic developments of the 1950' s and early 1960's. In 1962 the
economic pressures finally "burst" the legislative constraint,
which clearly was not in accordance with the needs or desires
of the economy. Consequently with the change in the legisla-
tion in 1962 several results could be anticipated. First--in
the short run--there would be "abnormal" or even "revolutionary"
speed in the changes to the banking structure, from a great
1 /r
American Banker, July 24, 1967.
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rush to acquire banks in satisfaction of a pent-up demand.
Second--in the long run--acquisitions would be governed by
"normal" forces of expansion and competition, presumably mostly
related to the growth of the state. Third, the "advantages"
and "disadvantages" of each form of expansion—direct merger
and holding company--will not necessarily remain the same in
the short run and long run.

CHAPTER V
THE LITERATURE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EXPANSION
BY WAY OF THE HOLDING COMPANY AND DIRECT MERGER
This chapter draws on the literature to develop a
"theoretical framework" of the alleged advantages and disad-
vantages of expansion by way of the holding company and direct
merger. In subsequent chapters this framework will be used to
examine management's choice of the form of organization by
comparing those specific points management thought important
with the literature.
Throughout this chapter, as each characteristic is iden-
tified, one or more sources are cited. In cases where there
appear to be conflict, disagreement, or uncertainty concerning
particular characteristics, opposing views are identified.
Where possible a generalized summary of the "weight of the
evidence or arguments" is made to indicate the concensus.
The literature contains no consistent or systematic
method for grouping the alleged advantages and disadvantages.
Consequently, these are organized into four functional areas
for the purpose of discussion: (1) operational and organiza-
tional, (2) financial, (3) marketing, and (4) legal. Some
characteristics apply to two or more of the functional areas
and, where significant, they are discussed under each. For
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example, an operational and organizational characteristic may
result in, or stem from, marketing or legal considerations.
Comparisons commonly made in the literature are between
a holding company and a unit bank, or between a merged system
and a unit bank. There are relatively few direct and compre -
hensive comparisons between the two forms. For this reason,
numerous advantages are cited as common to both forms of organi-
zation, on the basis of a comparison of each to a common stan-
dard--a unit bank.
I. OPERATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
In the literature operational and organizational char-
acteristics of holding companies and merged systems were nor-
mally discussed with regard to the production functions of a
bank.
Economies of Scale
The general opinion was that benefits from economies
of scale exist in both the holding company and merged form of
2banking organization. Economies of scale were commonly defined
Lewis B. Flinn, Jr., "Holding Company Versus Branch
Banking in Virginia" (unpublished thesis, The Stonier Graduate
School of Banking, Rutgers, New Brunswick, June 1967) , pp. 1-122
Flinn 's thesis is an example of an exception to this finding.
Gerald C. Fischer, Bank Holding Companies (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 87, 119 and 128; Palmer
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as a reduction in the cost of various functions— loans, check-
ing accounts— as the number of units increase. One statement,
on which most commentators agreed, was that close integration
of the typical branch operation makes greater economies possible
3than those achieved in a holding company. Yet, seemingly a
holding company having affiliates with a large branch system
might achieve economies comparable with those of a similar
sized merged system.
Research in economies of scale includes size to output
4
studies, and size to performance variable studies. Findings
in each category generally supported the view that economies
of scale do in fact exist.
T. Hogenson, The Economies of Group Banking (Washington, D.C.
:
Public Affairs Press, 1955) pp. 142-43; Frederick W. Bell and
Neil B. Murphy, "Returns to Scale in Commercial Banking," Bank
Structure and Competition (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, 1967), pp. 118-76; Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
"Economies of Scale in Commercial Banking," Business Review,
March 1967, pp. 3-11; April, 1967, pp. 2-10; June 1967, pp.
13-19; July 1967, pp. 12-19; David A. Alhadeff, Monopoly and
Competition in Banking
,
(Berkely: University of California Press,
1954), Chapter VI; and George J. Benston, "Branch Banking and
Economies of Scale," Journal of Finance , Vol. XX No. 2, May 1965,
pp. 312-31.
3
W. Ralph Lamb, Group Banking A Form of Banking Concen-
tration and Control in th_e United St ates" (New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961), pp. 236-37.
4
"Size to output studies" relate to output in terms of
the production functions of banks, i.e., loans, checking accounts,
savings accounts.
"Size to performance variables" relate to performance
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Size to Output Studies . The validity of "size to out-
put studies" was said in the literature to suffer from the
failure of research to measure bank output with a common yard-
stick. As reported by a recent survey of banking research,
conflicting results, inadequate data, and imperfect methodology
of studies make it difficult to determine what size of bank is
5
most efficient. In all probability, economies of scale "will
depend on the composition of the services rendered so that
at best there may be only an optimal distribution of size of
banks rather than a single optimal size."
One conflicting piece of evidence was the view that
diseconomies tend to offset any economies of scale, which might
be less important than diseconomies in the branch structure.
Therefore, this view held that branching might not be supported
7
solely on a cost advantage basis. However, a later study re-
ported that diseconomies in branching could be overcome by
variables in terms of commonly used measures of bank operating
performance, i.e., ratio of earnings to assets.
5Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, "Competition in Bank-
ing: What is Known? What is the Evidence?" Business Conditions
,





Paul M. Horvitz , "Economies of Scale in Banking,"
Private Financi al Institutions (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:





growth as long as fairly wide branching was permitted, per-
o
haps on a statewide basis.
Size to Performance Studies
.
Research findings in
•'size to performance variable studies" also supported economies
of scale. Larger banks were said to have higher earnings to
assets and capital although they tend to: (1) pay higher average
rates on savings, (2) charge lower average rates on loans, and
(3) have a higher ratio of time to total deposits. Also, eco-
nomies of scale were supported in group banking by evidence
"that their rate of return on total capital funds for 1957
was 10 percent higher than the reported net profits for all
9
commercial banks." Nevertheless, findings regarding size to
performance variables were said to be biased in that the greater
earnings of larger banks result, in part, from the different
nature of their operations aside from scale. For instance,
larger banks may serve large commercial accounts with smaller
unit administrative costs.
The weight of the evidence suggests that economies of
scale exist in large banks of both forms. However, economies
of scale may be greater in a branch system because closer in-
tegration of operations is possible. As an example, trust
o
Paul M. Horvitz and Bernard Shull, "The Impact of Branch
Banking on Bank Performance," Studies in Banking Competition and
The Banking Structure , Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(Washington, D. C. : U. S. Treasury Department, 1966), pp. 141-86
9Lamb, op.cit., p. 236.
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, "Competition in Bank-
ing: What is Known? What is the Evidence?," op.cit., p. 15.
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departments and loan and investment portfolios in holding
company affiliates cannot be integrated; nor is it likely
that holding company affiliates can obtain comparable inte-
gration in the checking account area because they remain sep-
arate banks. However, measurement of this apparent advantage
is difficult, if not impossible, given the limitations of
current research methodology.
Organizational Characteristics
The concensus of the literature was that certain organi-
zational characteristics of both the holding company and
merged form facilitate efficiency in operations. Efficiencies
were specifically attributed to the benefits of centralization
and specialization; others were attributed to greater organi-
12
zational flexibility. However, there was no evidence which
clearly pointed to the relative importance of these contributing
elements
.
Robert J. Lawrence, The Performance of Bank Holding
Companies (Washington, D. C. : Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, June 1967), pp. 5-6; Marcus Nadler and Jules I.
Bogen , The Bank Holding Company (New York University: Graduate
School of~Business Administration, 1959), pp. 18-19 and 24-29;
and Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, "Economies of Scale in Com-
mercial Banking," loc . cit .
12
In this sense efficiency stems from centralization
and specialization as opposed to economies of scale, i.e., an
organization can achieve benefits from these factors without
an increase in the size of its operations.
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Reasons typically cited for attaining efficient opera-
tions are grouped for the purpose of this discussion into the
following categories: (1) centralization of common functions,
(2) improved quality of management, (3) extension of specialized
services to members of the system, (4) the adoption of iden-
tifiable operating improvements uniformly throughout the system,
(5) greater organizational flexibility, and (6) better or im-
proved management control.
Centralization of Common Functions . Operating effi-
13
ciencies stem from centralization of certain activities.
For instance, centralized purchasing of supplies and equipment,
both consumables and capital items, may result in greater
quantity discounts and lower administrative cost per unit of
purchase. Economies may also result from centralization of
services, such as: (1) audit, (2) legal counsel, (3) accounting,
(4) tax assistance, (5) operations assistance, and (6) adver-
tising. On the basis of the literature it is thought that
tangible and measurable efficiencies are possible in both the
holding company and merged system, as contrasted to a unit
bank. However, centralization of functions in a merged system
which cannot be combined in a holding company may lead to
greater economies in the merged system.
13







Improved Quality of Management . An often cited advan-
tage of both forms is that these larger organizations are
better able to attract and hold superior managerial talent
than smaller unit banks. With few exceptions, this advantage
is discussed in the context of banking's acute problem of
"management succession". For instance, it is argued that of
all of the difficulties facing bank management in the United
States today, the personnel problem is one of the most signi-
ficant. To illustrate this point, the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has said that the failure of
bankers to prepare younger men for succession is a prime reason
14for bank mergers. But, to combat this problem large banks--
of both forms--benef it from their superior managerial "drawing
power" , which is generally attributed to more opportunities
for advancement, more job responsibilities, better salary
scales and wider benefits. Also, they have a greater capability
to employ specialists in areas such as: (1) legal, (2) tax,
(3) accounting, and (4) personnel. However, the literature
does not indicate that either form is superior with respect
to hiring and holding first class management talent or special-
ists .
Extension of Sepcialized Services Throughout the System .
Another widely cited advantage of both the holding company and







merged system was that these larger banking organizations have
greater opportunities to extend, or share, services and special
skills among all units of the organization. Services ordi-
narily cited were: (1) auditing, (2) appraising, (3) invest-
ment counseling, (4) safe deposit, (5) trust, (6) legal, (7)
accounting, (8) purchasing, (9) research, (10) credit services,
(11) tax, (12) employee compensation and benefit plans, and
15(13) institutional advertising. Here again, however, the
literature provides no basis for concluding that either form
was better able to extend specialized services throughout its
system.
The Adoption of Identifiable Operating Improvements
Uniformly Throughout the System . An important, but less widely
discussed advantage is that units in both forms might benefit
from the successes and mistakes of other units. Executives
throughout "a system" have opportunities to exchange ideas
and discuss common problems. This results in a beneficial
cross-fertilization of ideas concerning operating improvements,
as well as solutions to general operating problems.
In addition, the audit of operating units--by a holding
company, lead bank, or home office--is often said to contribute
15Fischer, Bank Holding Companies , op.cit.. , p. 87; and








to operating efficiencies. Through internal performance
evaluation like units can be compared and unit managements en-
couraged to improve their performance. In this way the less
active or progressive banks or branches may be identified and,
hopefully, moved along at a faster and more efficient pace.
From what the literature says the holding company and merged
system seem equally capable of sharing operating improvements
throughout their systems. However, performance evaluation
may be less difficult in the holding company because each af-
filiate r as a separate corporation, is operated and reported
as an individual "profit center". By the way of contrast, the
merged system would have to make internal accounting provisions
to report each branch as a profit center, in addition to re-
porting on the system as a whole.
Organizational Flexibility . The holding company is
said to have more possibilities for organizing the production
of banking services than an independent bank, that is, the
"produce versus buy" alternative gives them greater flexi-
18bility. An affiliate may produce its own banking services,
buy from the lead bank in the holding company, buy from a non-





18 T '4- CLawrence, op.cit. p. 5.
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Management Control . A fundamental difference between
the holding company and the merged system was alleged to be
in the area of management control. This stems from the special
relationship that exists between the holding company and its
affiliate. "By its very nature, this parent-subsidiary rela-
tion can exist only in holding company banking, and not in either
19
unit or branch banking." Each affiliate in a holding com-
pany system retains independent bank status with a board of
directors and a president. Here, however, a distinction needs
to be made between affiliates that are 100 percent owned and
affiliates less than 100 percent owned. Where 100 percent
ownership exists, management relationships are probably not
much different than in a merged system, even though the legal
structure is different. Where less than 100 percent ownership
exists, the separate legal status of affiliate directors can
and probably does, from time to time, affect management rela-
tionships and operating policies. By the way of contrast, a
branch system has only one board of directors and one president
for the entire system, and does not face the problem of "minority
interests" in units throughout the system.
The literature does not indicate that one form of bank-
ing organization is clearly superior to the other in terms of
management control. A recent unpublished thesis indicates that
19Nadler and Bogen, op.cit., p. 21
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effective use of decentralization in merged systems is pos-
20
si'ble and desirable. This thesis cites the advantages and
disadvantages of decentralization.
Generally, the conclusions were that: (1) good organi-
zation is essential to good management, (2) behind an organi-
zation there must be a philosophy of management, (3) manage-
ment must choose and balance the advantages and disadvantages
of centralization versus decentralization, but that (4) decen-
tralization is the better way to organize because it stimulates
managers, gets better results, and develops initiative and
creativity.
The view that merged systems can also make effective use
of decentralization is contrasted to the argument that a
basic advantage of the holding company is its decentralized
corporate structure. Here it is argued that the holding
company has the opportunity to decentralize management to
a greater extent than is posssible under a branch system,
where the tendency is to concentrate authority in the head
21
office. However, management organization and policies may .
22
tend to minimize the effects of this basic characteristic.
For instance, centralized management control is possible if
20Schmitz, Michael J., "Centralization versus Decentra-
lization in a Branch Banking Organization" (unpublished thesis,




. , pp. 77 and 82.
22Nadler and Bogen, op. cit .
, pp. 30-31. The authors
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management policy is to restrict the operational autonomy of
affiliates. On the other hand, a high degree of decentraliza-
tion is possible where the affiliates have broad policy and
operating responsibilities.
"Group banking permits a wide
variety of organization patterns since
each affiliated bank must have its own
board of directors and officers who are
charged by law with the responsibility
for operating their own banks. As a
result, the member banks may be run as
independent institutions, policies may
be set through consultation with the
holding company management or the
parent's officers may exert a very large
measure of influence over management of
the subsidiary . "23
From the arguments in the literature it seems that the
only clear difference between the holding company and merged
form is that the independent corporate structure of the hold-
ing company assures, at least in theory, more autonomy for its
affiliates than does the branch organization for its branches.
And to the extent holding company affiliates are not 100 per-
cent owned their separate legal status can and probably does
distinctly affect management control.
III. FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Larger Lines of Credit
The amount of credit extended to any single customer
is limited by banking laws. The limit is set at 10 percent
preface this point with the statement that decentralization is








of the capital and surplus and undivided profits for indivi-
dual national banks and 15 percent of capital and surplus for
24
state chartered banks in Virginia. Expansion of the size
of individual banking systems inevitably provides an increased
capital base necessary for the extension of larger lines of
credit.
Mobility of Credit
The critical question is whether the two forms of organi-
zation provide equal mobility of credit. On this the litera-
ture suggests—understandably--that both have greater mobility
than an independent bank. For example, in the holding company
the combined lending power of all affiliated banks is avail-
able to any local member institution to accommodate the fi-
nancing requirements of large customers.
In the merged system the credit line of any branch, re-
gardless of size, is considered to be the same as the system
as a whole. The full lending power of the home office is
theoretically available at any branch office.
"The branch system provides for
mobility of funds and can shift excess
reserves for lending through other
24
The Bureau of Banking of the State Corporation Com-
mission, Laws of Virginia Relating to Banking and Finance ,
(Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1966), p. 27.
The 15 percent limit for state chartered banks in Virginia is
specified in Article 7, Section 6.1-61.
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outlets of the system. Thus,
there are offices of some branch
banks which have loan-deposit
ratios of over 100 percent. "25
In an independent unit bank, credit mobility is less
because similar arrangements made through correspondents de-
pend on the closeness of the correspondent relationship, and
it may vary so much as to limit the extent of this form of
lending.
When comparing the two forms the mobility of funds
seemingly is potentially greater in the merged system because
of certain legal and operating constraints on the holding com-
pany. For instance, until repealed in 1966, Section 6 of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 limited credit mobility by
requiring loan participation within the holding company to
be made "at the outset" of the loan transaction. Now, however,
it appears this restriction is eliminated.
"But Section 23a of the Federal Re-
serve Act was amended so that its restric-
tions on banking affiliates were also
applied to the subsidiaries of bank holding
companies. These restrictions state that
a banking affiliate may not loan or other-
wise extend credit to another affiliate or
to the holding company if the total amount
of loans or extension of credit to the other
affiliate exceeds 10 percent of the lending
affiliate's capital and surplus or if the
2 5Bernard Shull and Paul M. Horvitz, "Branch Banking
and The Structure of Competition," Studies in Banking Competi-
tion and The Banking Structure , Office of the Comptroller of









total amount of loans or extensions of
credit to all affiliates (including the
holding company) exceeds 2 percent of
the lending affiliate's capital and sur-
plus. (Under the original act, loans
from one banking subsidiary to another
or to the holding company, that is,
"cross-stream" and "up-stream" loans,
were prohibited.) However, because the
purchase of loan paper without recourse
is not considered an extension of credit,
it appears no significant restrictions
now exist on the purchase of loan paper
by one subsidiary from another or loan
participation between subsidiaries . "27
Yet, even with the elimination of the "outset" restriction,
the holding company has the operating problem of arranging
loan participation among affiliates, all of which are separate
banks and all of which may not be wholly owned. This differs
from the situation in the branch system, where any branch office
may lend the legal maximum to any single customer. Conse-
quently, the extention of large lines of credit beyond the
loan limits of a single holding company unit can be arranged,
in practice, more easily in the branch system. Here, however,
a distinction needs to be drawn between what a branch can
legally do and what it actually does in practice. For instance,
the idea that any branch can commit the full bank line of
credit requires modification to the extent that operating
limits may be placed on the lending authority of branch managers
27Lawrence, op.cit., p. 10.
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If the lending authority of branch managers is limited, then
they also require a type of "participation" from the home
office for loans larger than their authorization.
Yet, one clear difference remains between the holding
company and merged organization—the mobility of funds in the
holding company involves the role of the directors in each
affiliated bank. The legal responsibilities of these directors
exists irrespective of participation agreements or the lend-
ing policies of the holding company. Where affiliates are
not 100 percent owned directors have a clear responsibility to
all stockholders in resolution of issues involving movement of
funds, dividends, up and down stream loans, rates on such
loans, and other matters involving the profitability of the
individual bank.
Increased Financial Strength
Numerous sources cited increased financial strength as
2 8
a characteristic of both forms. Typically, these organiza-
tions have larger capital bases and, with few exceptions,
serve more extensive marketing areas through their affiliates
and branches. Larger size and more extensive market areas




p. 234; Hogenson, op. cit . , pp. 139,
142, 144; Lawrence, op. cit . , p. 6; and Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, "The New Look in Banking Structure," Monthly Review
,
July 1963, p. 3.
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portfolio and, thus, spread the risk over a larger operating
bas"e. As pointed out in one paper, a branch system as well
as a unit bank must limit its loan-to-asset ratio, but it need
not do so at any one office.
"Its overall ratio will depend
on loan demand in many areas, not just
one. Some offices may have loan ratios
that would be too low to be profitable
for a unit bank; others may have ratios
too high to be safe for a unit bank. In
aggregate, the ratio may be higher than
the average of a group of unit banks
similarly situated because funds are more
efficiently transferred from office to
office in a branch system, and because
the risks of illiquidity associated with
deposit withdrawals are spread over a
larger base and thereby reduced. "^9
Flexibility in Acquiring Capital
Today, both commercial banks and holding companies may
use equity and debt financing. This was not always the case.
"The sale of debentures by com-
mercial banks is a relatively recent
development. Before 1933, banks re-
lied upon common stock and retained
earnings for capital funds. Indeed,
neither national nor state bank legis-
lation authorized the issuance of either
preferred stock or debt securities." 30
Up until 1962, when new regulations were issued by the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the brief history of debenture
29Horvitz and Shull, op.cit.
, p. 150.
30George W. McKinney, Jr., "New Sources of Bank Funds
Certificate of Deposit and Debt Securities," Law and Contem-
porary Problems, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, Winter 1967, p. 85.
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financing by American banks was said to have been dominated
by the adverse attitude of bank regulatory authorities at both
31
the national and state levels. The Comptroller's regulation
permitted national banks to issue convertible or nonconvertible
capital debentures up to 100 percent of unimpaired paid-in
capital stock plus 50 percent of unimpaired surplus funds.
Similar regulations permitted national banks to issue preferred
stock, convertible or nonconvertible, without limitations as
to capital and surplus. By June 1964, most state regulatory
agencies had followed the lead of the Comptroller, and "all
but fourteen states had authorized the use of debentures, and
only four prohibited the use of both preferred stock and de-
32bentures
.
In view of these recent developments in bank debt fi-
nancing, the critical question is whether the two forms have
the same flexibility in acquiring capital. Here the literature
suggests that both forms enjoy greater flexibility as the result
of increased size, because major banks and holding companies--
to a greater extent than formally--are traded on regional and
33
national exchanges and reported by certain security dealers.
31 Ibid, pp. 86-87.
32 Ibid
. , p. 90.
33
See: Bank Stock Quarterly , a publication of M. A.
Schapiro and Company, Inc. Underwriters, brokers and dealers




One author states, "Economists who have analyzed bank
holding companies have consistently concluded that the sub-
sidiaries of bank holding companies have significant advan-
34tages over independent banks in acquiring capital." Another
author argues that one of the strongest reasons for the hold-
ing company as an organizational form is that the parent usually
has the capacity to supply affiliated banks with additional
35
capital as its growing volume of business requires. And,
one study found that a "billion dollar" holding company may
sell its stock at rates often competitive with even the largest
independent banks in the area, but a small group system ap-
parently has little advantage since affiliates usually raise
their own capital. However, "a small bank which is the member
of a very large group system finds it possible to secure added
funds via the group at a substantial saving." Moreover,
Fischer found small banks were able to attract large amounts
of equity funds from new investors as well as from their own
shareholders. He concluded that no small bank is necessarily
prevented from selling stock as a result of size alone. The
two reasons why small banks raise equity capital infrequently
Lawrence, op. cit . , p. 7. One reason is that the shares
are usually traded on national or regional markets.
35
Lamb, op. cit .
,
p. 148.







are: (1) it usually must be offered at a discount from book;
and (2) owners of closely held banks do not wish to lose con-
37trol of the bank.
The preceding paragraphs clearly suggest that the hold-
ing company enjoys certain advantages in the acquisition of
capital. As an example, the holding company can raise capital
at either the parent or affiliated bank level, or both. A
merged system can raise capital only at the bank level. The
holding company has no restrictions on the use of debt. The
merged system has limitations on debentures, and notes of less
than one year maturity must be counted as a liability requiring
reserves. Thus, the holding company seemingly has more flexi -
bility in raising capital. However, there is no empirical
evidence which conclusively demonstrates that this results in
some tangible economic benefit, such as a lower cost of capital
or greater earnings per share from the use of leverage. Con-
sequently, the flexibility advantage of the holding may be
less significant than it appears. Future empirical studies
comparing the "cost of capital - capital structure" relation-
ship of comparable merged systems and holding companies may
be useful in resolving this point.
Less Dependence on Outside Credit Centers
An advantage of both forms is that this type of organi-








"By building groups that have
substantial amounts of banking funds
concentrated in the hands of compact
organizations, adequate banking re-
sources will be available at all
times which will not be subject to
the influences foreign to the needs
of these regions. "38
Consequently, credit inflow is reduced and the region's de-
pendence on outside financial centers, such as New York City,
is lessened. In fact, this argument was cited as justification
for liberalizing Virginia's banking legislation, in 1962, in
order to get larger individual banking organizations in the
state.
IV. MARKETING CHARACTERISTICS
Marketing characteristics of holding companies and
merged systems are broadly discussed in the literature in
terms of the quantity and quality of banking services. With
few exceptions big banks, whatever their form, offer a larger
array of services, and service different markets and customers
than do small banks. With this in mind, the critical question
is: "What type of organization is better in this market of
big organizations?"
The literature argues that larger banking organizations






and these more efficient organizations typically can offer
more services at a lower unit cost to their customers. Four
marketing characteristics of these larger banking organizations
are commonly cited: (1) uniform banking facilities and ser-
vices, (2) greater range and depth of banking services, with
possibly improved and (or) less costly banking services, (3)
a stimulation to competition, and (4) marketing identity.
Uniform Banking Facilities and Services
The larger holding companies and merged systems both
offer banking facilities and services that are uniform in the
sense that each affiliate or unit has access to the same array
as all of the other units throughout the system. Thus, any
disparity between services available to metropolitan and rural
communities tends to be eliminated. For instance, one author
argued that in the holding company, "Country banks are able
to receive the benefit of specialists in banking who can be
maintained only by the large metropolitan banks. In this way
every bank customer is assured the use of all services promptly
39
and with little additional charge." While non-affiliated
country banks theoretically can and do obtain similar services
through their correspondent relationships, this often does not
provide the same degree of uniform "Regional Banking" that re-
sults from the larger merged system and holding company.
39Hogenson, op.cit., p. 139
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Greater Range and Depth of Banking Services
Larger banking organizations typically provide a greater
variety of services.
Larger Lines of Credit . It is alleged in the literature
that the banking needs of the region or community are better
served by the holding company and merged system because larger
lines of credit are available. By having a larger line of
credit these systems can better serve industry which generally
40has expanded more rapidly than banking. For instance, small
banks would find it difficult to serve the relatively few
customers who benefit from large lines of credit. By way
of contrast, the larger systems can serve- these typically
important customers in the broader regional or national mar-
kets and provide the specialized services they need. A re-
sulting benefit is greater diversification of risk in the
larger, more wide-spread banking organizations because they
can commit greater proportions of potential bank credit to
• a- -a i -4-- 41individual communities
.
More Extensive Banking Services . Centralized research
and service activities of both forms frequently benefit bank




41 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, "The New Look m
Banking Structure," op. cit . , p. 3.
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"Small unit banks are limited in the
quality and selection of financial services
they can offer the public whereas even the
smallest group affiliate can make a great
variety of specialized financial services
readily available to bank customers . "42
"Because of the ability to centralize
some functions, and because it is un-
necessary to erect expensive buildings
for each office, a branch system can pro-
vide full banking services in areas which
could not support even a small unit bank
offering limited services. "43
Trust accounts and other specialized areas are the most
commonly cited examples of the extension of banking services,
and it is pointed out that smaller unit banks are rarely able
to employ profitably really competent specialists. On the other
hand, the large holding company or branch system ordinarily
employs specialists in areas such as: (1) agriculture, (2)
industrial loans, and (3) real estate. This advantage of
system banking, however, obviously does not apply across the
board to all customers and all markets. Certainly, there is
no reason why all banks should supply every service, if for
no other reason than some markets may not profitably support
a full service banking operation.
More Effi cient and Less Costly B anking Services . As
previously concluded in this chapter, both forms generally
Lamb, op . cit
. ,
p. 2 3 5-36.
£ 3Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, "The New Look in





benefit from "economies of scale," centralization and speciali-
zation. Because of this it is suggested they bring more ef-
ficient banking services to the public. For instance, one
study suggested that communities had better banking services
following the entry of holding companies; loan-to-deposit ratios
were higher indicating community borrowing needs were probably
being better served and the general level of interest rates
44did not increase. In addition, a more recent study found
that the changes expected in the performance of affiliates in
local market areas were: (1) increased supply of bank loans,
(2) increased accommodations of state and local government
credit needs, (3) higher customer service charges, (4) not
significantly higher time deposit interest rates, (5) no
significant change in interest rates on loans; and (6) operating
efficiency not changed when measured in terms of operating ex-
45penses to operating revenues. For merged systems, another
study concluded that the performance characteristics of unit
banks and branch banks have "systematic differences". In gen-
eral, after mergers the community benefited from expansion in
the number of services offered by the affiliated banks and, in
the case of some service functions, lower costs.
"Interest on time deposits rose,
loan rates generally fell, and loan






terms and lending authority were
generally extended at the acquired
bank. Service charges on checking
accounts were generally increased
at the acquired bank. "4 6
While arguments and empirical evidence suggest that the
public benefits from greater services and possible lower costs
from the two forms, the findings are not considered absolute.
A recent summary of banking research stated that branch bank-
ing and performance relationships may be due to factors other
than the prevalent form of banking organization.
"In particular, branch and unit
banking follow fairly definite geo-
graphic patterns in the United States,
suggesting that regional differences
in demand or in the character of state
banking regulations could have pro-
nounced effects on bank performance
that may not properly be attributed to
organizational characteristics. "47
Furthermore, seven recent studies agreed in only one finding
—
branch banks usually have higher net earnings relative to
capital and higher loan to asset ratios, than unit banks in
48the same state. Consequently, findings in the area of ef-
ficiency and profitability of unit banking vis-a-vis system
banking are at best only suggestive. Furthermore, the
Horvitz and Shull, op. cit . , pp. 176-77.
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, "Competition in









comparative profitability of efficiency of one system as con-
trasted to the other is a question which lacks quantitative
evidence of a substantial nature. Consequently, no judgment
is possible on this point.
Stimulation to Competition
The argument that the expansion of both forms stimulate
competition among banking institutions was not universally
held in the literature. One view was that some economists,
bankers, and public officials believe that branch banking is
"an essentially procompetitive form of banking that facilitates
the penetration of additional banking markets and brings to
bear the force of potential competition on even the smallest
49
and most isolated banking markets." Additional support for
this view was drawn from a comparative study of Vermont, state-
wide branching, with New Hampshire, unit banking, which said
that statewide branching "also seems to have instigated slightly
more competition, although this might be caused by other fac-
50tors." And the same benefits are attributed to holding com-
pany operations
:
"The public is the beneficiary of
these activities, especially as they
49Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Competition m bank-
ing: the issues," Business Conditions , January 1967, p. 15.
50Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, "What Price Branching?




stimulate unit bankers in the area to
improve banking services in order to ,-,
maintain their positions in the market."
On the other hand, the opponents of branching—whether
accomplished through a holding company or by direct merger--
argue that it is monopolistic and tends to restrict competi-
tion. This controversy, of course, is still an open issue.
It involves many political and economic considerations in the
continuing broader public debate over the question of unit
versus multiple unit banking. The examination of this issue
is not included in the scope of this study.
Marketing Identity
The holding company has greater flexibility in selecting
its marketing identity than does the merged system. That is,
for a bank which has served a community for many years--one
with an outstanding reputation--the "local" name can continue
to be used after affiliation with a holding company. On the
other hand, where the acquiring holding company's name may be
better for marketing identification, then an affiliate can
take on the identity of its parent, i.e., Marine Midland. By
the way of contrast, in expansion by direct merger the acquired
bank, of course, takes the name of the acquiring bank, there-
by losing the benefit of "local identity" in markets where
this may be important.




The differences in the legal form of corporate organi-
zation and the consequences that flow from these differences
provide one of the biggest areas of contrast. These will be
discussed with regard to national and state regulation and
other legal considerations relating to expansion.
Bank Holding Company Legislation
The Banking Act of 1933 was the first Federal law af-
fecting the regulation of bank holding companies. It has his-
torical significance because it gave explicit recognition, for
52the first time in Federal Banking Laws, to such institutions.
"Although the Banking Act of 1933
was not designed primarily to regulate
group banking, it did contain provisions
covering limited supervision over holding
companies having control of banks belonging
to the Federal Reserve System. Under this
law a bank holding company is designated as
a "holding company affiliate" and as such is
required to secure a voting permit from the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System before it may vote stock of national
or state member banks. Thus, the Board
acquired new supervisory functions affecting
both banks and the holding company affiliates
controlling them. "53
However, this regulation proved inadequate and the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 1956 was passed after 18 years of debate








concerning Federal jurisdiction over the operation of bank
54holding companies.
Passage of the (Bank Holding Company) Act of 1956
established a new era for the development of the bank holding
company. It recognized this form of organization as an in-
55tegral component of American commercial banking. Generally,
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 accomplished three objec-
tives: "(1) to define a bank holding company in terms that
cover all such companies which need to be regulated, (2) to
control their expansion within limits that promote the public
interest, and (3) to require divestment of non-banking interests
in order to avoid certain hazards that could accompany mixed
ownership." The bank holding company was defined under
Section 2(a) of the Act as a company:
(1) "That directly or indirectly owns,
controls, or holds with power to vote
2 5 per centum or more of the voting
shares of each of two or more banks
or of a company that is or becomes a
bank holding company by virtue of
this Act, or
(2) that controls in any manner the
election of a majority of the dir-
ectors of each of two or more banks;
and for the purpose of this Act, any
54 T , • ,Ibid .
55
Ibid., pp. 199-200. Forty-two separate holding com-








successor to any such company shall be
deemed to be a bank holding company from
the date as of which such predecessor
company became a bank holding company."
The other provisions of the 1956 Act pertinent to this
dissertation relate to expansion. The Act requires prior
approval of the Federal Reserve Board for any holding company
formation or expansion. Approval is based on the following
factors as specified in Section 3(c) and (d) of the Act:
(c) The Board shall not approve-- (1) any
acquisition or merger or consolidation
under this section which would result in
a monopoly, or which would be in further-
ance of any combination or conspiracy to
monopolize the business of banking in any
part of the United States, or (2) any
other proposed acquisition or merger or
consolidation under this section whose
effect in any section of the country may
be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly, or which
in any other manner would be in restraint
of trade, unless it finds that the anti-
competitive effects of the proposed trans-
action are clearly out-weighed in the
public interest by the probable effect
of the transaction in meeting the con-
venience and needs of the community to
be served.
In every case, the Board shall take into
consideration the financial and managerial
sources and future prospects of the com-
pany or companies and the banks concerned,
and the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this section, no application shall be
approved under this section which will
permit any bank holding company or any
subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly
or indirectly, any voting shares of,
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interest in, or all or substantially all
of the assets of any additional bank
located outside of the State in which
the operations of such bank holding com-
pany's banking subsidiaries were princi-
pally conducted on the effective date of
this amendment or the date on which such
company became a bank holding company,
whichever is later, unless the acquisition
of such shares or assets of a State bank by
an out-of-state bank holding company is
specifically authorized by the statute
laws of the State in which such bank is
located, by language to that effect and
not merely by implication. For the pur-
poses of this section, the State in which
the operations of a bank holding company's
subsidiaries are principally conducted is
that State in which total deposits of all
such banking subsidiaries are largest."
The passage of the 1956 Act, in addition to accomplishing
the three objectives identified on Page V-31, gave bank holding
companies a "respectability" they lacked in the minds of many
persons both in and out of the banking business. The Act re-
moved many of the ambiguities that had made this form of bank-
ing somewhat unclear, i.e., it removed the fear that a highly
restrictive federal lav/ would be passed by Congress as the re-
sult of the hearings then being devoted to bank holding company
legislation. In fact, this fear of restrictive federal legis-
lation was identitied as one cause for the great expansion of
57holding companies in the period just before the Act.




The Bank Merger Act of 1960
Before enactment of the Bank Merger Act, Federal
statutes contained relatively few guidelines regulating expan-
sion of commercial banks by merger. The 1960 Act tightened
control. It provided for direct administration by the bank-
ing authorities and established broad public interest standards
5 8to guide the administration of controls. Expansion by merger
was put under the supervision of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the
Federal Reserve Board, depending on the legal status of the
. . 59
surviving bank. In broad policy regarding expansion the
Bank Merger Act of 1960 followed the direction of the Bank
Holding Company Act, although it incorporated slightly dif-
ferent legal and administrative standards. These differences
5 8The United States Treasury, "Appendix: The Banking
Structure in Evolution" Studies in Banking Competition and
the Banking Structure
,
January 1966, p. 407.
59
a) The Comptroller of the Currency has authority over
merger applications if the acquiring, assuming or resulting
bank is to be a national bank or District bank; b) the FDIC
has authority over merger applications if the acquiring, as-
suming, or resulting bank is to be a nonmember insured bank,
except a District Bank; and c) The Board of Governors of tne
Federal Reserve System has authority over mergers if the ac-
quiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a State member
bank, except a District Bank.
60George R. Hall and Charles F. Phillips, Jr., Bank
Mergers and The Regulatory Agencies (Washington, D. C. : Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1964.) This is a
recent study analyzing current policies as related to the merger
decisions by the three Federal bank supervisory agencies.
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were eliminated in the 1966 amendments to the Acts. Similar
requirements are now considered in the approval of merger or
holding company acquisition applications.
The Department of Justice has recently become active
in the regulation of bank expansion by way of anti-trust.
However, its interest in maintaining competition is not ger-
mane to this discussion of the relative advantages of merger
versus holding company expansion.
Differences Between Direct Merger and Holding Company Expan -
sion Stemming from National Regulation
Several differences in national legislation seem to
favor the merged form. While the literature gave scant atten-
tion to this area, one recent thesis suggested that advantages
to using the merged form of expansion are: (1) greater prob-
ability of approval of merger applications, (2) shorter time
for approval, and 1 3) less cumbersome procedural processing.
Greater Probability of Approval of Merger Applications .
Based on an examination of past Federal Reserve Board decisions
one study concluded that:
"The Board rules more harshly against
holding companies than mergers... From
r
-I
Flinn, op.cit., pp. 49-68.
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1961 through 19 66 the Federal Reserve
Board approved 7 9 bank holding com-
pany formation applications and denied
20, for a record of four to one. During
the same, period the Board approved 157
mergers and denied 15, for a record of
10 to l.*' 62
Application Approval Time . During 1963-1964 the same
study reported that holding company applications took con-
siderably longer to process than merger applications. The
average time was 7.4 months for the holding company and 3.2
6 "3
months for merger. The impact of a processing delay was
illustrated by a case concerning Virginia Commonwealth Cor-
poration. Here an acquisition offer seemingly was not ac-
ceptable to the stockholders of the bank being acquired be-
cause the market price of the holding company's shares fell
' 64during 5.5 months of processing by the Board.
Procedural Differences . Several major procedural dif-
ferences in the processing of applications are said to favor
the merger route. The differences apply to public disclosure-
also applicable to mergers where the Federal Reserve Board is
the governing agency--and the possibility of hearings and re-,






Ibid., pp. 54-55. It was noted that recent decisions
were being processed "with somewhat greater dispatch."
64
Ibid





appropriate state agency disapproves the application within
30 days. Also, minor differences in application processing
are said to make holding company application more cumbersome
to prepare.
"It should be sufficient to note that
the holding company applications are more
cumbersome in that the Board requires in-
formation for each affiliated bank and not
just for the system as a whole. In addition
data on correspondent bank balances, con-
sumer loans purchased, and municipal
securities is called for. This informa- ,,
tion is not required by the merger forms."
Differences Between Direct Merger and Holding Company Expan-
sion Stemming from State Legislation
The Virginia state banking code regulates the expansion
of individual banks. As discussed in Chapter III, de novo
branches are restricted to the immediate area of an existing
bank, while mergers are authorized on a statewide basis. As
the result of this, a bank merging into another community can-
fi 7
not branch de novo in the area of the bank it merged. By
way of contrast, holding company expansion is not regulated





A merged system could merge with a bank in another
community which already has its own branches, and thus obtain
multiple banking locations in the new area. However, further
de novo branches would not be authorized.
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of contrast, in expansion by holding company the acquired
bank retains its own board and bank officers because it re-
mains a separate corporate entity.
On one side, holding company proponents argue that re-
tention of the acquired bank's board keeps control of the bank
at the local level, in the hands of people who are familiar
with the problems and needs of the community. As one author
said, "No bank holding company can exert a veto power over
69
actions of the board of directors of bank subsidiaries"
,
although this statement appears to be of dubious validity be-
cause of the various voting control situations that can exist
for holding company affiliates. Thus, the legal status of
affiliate directors is thought to be the essence of decentra-
lized management in a holding company.
"Though they may delegate to their
officers the day-to-day routine of con-
ducting the bank's business, they cannot
delegate the consequences resulting from
unsound practices and policies for which
they are both criminally and civilly
liable." 70
On the other side, the proponents of direct merger argue that
a single board and group of officers simplifies the corporate
structure and facilitates management control.
These contrasting views ascribing to the virtues of
centralized versus decentralized control are a question which
Nadler and Bogen, op.cit
. , p. 22.
70
Flinn, op.cit., p. 79.
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is not and cannot be clearly resolved in the favor of either
form. However, this is not thought to be the only issue re-
garding directors. A question remains unanswered: "Are honorary
boards effective substitutes for the legal boards they replaced
and, if not, what are the consequences?"
Impact of Differences in Reserve Ratios on System De-
posits . There may be differences in earnings potential between
a merged system and a holding company because of differences
71in the reserve ratios applied to deposits throughout the system.
Ratios in the period of this study used for illustration of
this point were 10 percent for state non-members, 12 percent
for non-reserve city members, and 16 1/2 percent for reserve
city members.
For a merged system the location and classification of
the bank sets the reserve ratio against deposits for the whole -
system. For example, a merged system in Richmond--a reserve
city— applies the 16 1/2 percent ratio against systems deposits,
while a merged system in any other Virginia locality applies
12 percent, so long as it does not have a branch in Richmond.
A holding company with a Richmond affiliate applies the 16 1/2
percent ratio only to that bank, and the 12 percent ratio to
all affiliates outside of Richmond. Additionally, a holding
71 Ibid., pp. 93-95.
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company benefits from the 10 percent ratio for non-member
affiliates, thus further lowering the effective ratio applied
against all deposits in the system.
From this discussion it is clear that there are dif-
ferences in earnings potential on demand deposits for state-
wide banking systems depending on the type of system, the
location and the member status of the system. The impact of
these differences generally favors the holding company over the
merged system. However, changes in reserve ratios can and do
take place. Consequently, the foregoing discussion is valid
only as it applies to the situation reported. The ratios
could change at any time.
Entry Into a Reserve City . A major system operating
in Virginia with a home office outside of Richmond--a reserve
city--has an advantage in seeking entry into Richmond if the
expansion is done by holding company. For instance, a merger
with a Richmond bank by Virginia National, home office in
Norfolk, would require the greater Reserve City ratio be ap-
plied against their total system deposits. Thus, the potential
earning power of these incremental deposits are lost and the
profitability of the system as a whole is adversely effected.
A holding company acquisition in Richmond, however, would not
affect the reserve position of other system affiliates as they
are considered individual banks subject to the reserve require-
ment applicable to their own areas. As a result holding company

V-42
entry into Richmond is less costly and, therefore, more at-
72tractive than merger.
Procedural Implementation of Mergers and Holding Com-
pany Affiliation. A recent study, contrasting two methods of
expansion in Virginia, concluded that holding company expan-
73
sion is more flexible from a procedural standpoint. A hold-
ing company can expand by one of four methods: (1) acquisition
of an affiliate through an exchange of stock, (2) acquisition
by "the phantom bank technique", (3) acquisition of a de_ novo
branch, and (4) merger of an existing bank into one of the
holding company's affiliated banks. By the way of contrast,
a merged system can expand, outside of its own area, only by
merger.
A useful feature of bank mergers in Virginia is that
there is no minority interest. Under Virginia law a vote for
merger by two-thirds of the stock of the merging bank--if it
is a state chartered bank— forces the exchange of the remain-
ing stock.
"While under federal statutes (12
USC 215 and 215a) dissenting stockholders
of the merging bank have the right to an
72
This situation would apply to other states if they






appraisal of the value of their shares
and to receive cash payment, therefor,
the Virginia Statutes (Article 5 Section
13.1-6 8 et.seq. of the Virginia Stock
Corporation Act) contain no such pro-
vision. "74
By way of contrast, acquisition by holding company through an
exchange of stock generally results in less than a 100 percent
75ownership of the acquired bank. However, to obtain 100 per-
cent ownership in a holding company acquisition the "phantom
bank" technique can be used. Under this technique the new
bank may retain the name and charter of the merging bank, so
that it would appear the merging bank survived.
"This technique uses a shell cor-
poration, the phantom, a minimumly [sic]
capitalized corporation bearing a
bank name, into which the bank to be
acquired is merged. With an affirma-
tive vote by holders of two-thirds of
the bank's stock the remaining one-
third is forced to accept the exchange
(and dissenting stockholder, where ap-
plicable, to accept cash). Then in a
three-way exchange--the phantom through






75Under Internal Revenue Service regulations eighty per-
cent is needed to make the exchange on a tax-free basis. How-
ever, conditions for exchange of a minimum percentage of the
shares of the bank to be acquired can be set. For example, in
the exchange offer by United Virginia Bankshares dated December
13, 1962 to Citizens Marine Jefferson Bank, Trust and Savings
Bank of Lynchburg, Merchants and Farmers and the Vienna Trust
Company, 5 percent of the shares was used as a minimum per-
centage. In this case the holding company wanted majority
control and not a minority position.
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phantom (now a bank) issues its stock
to the holding company, and the holding
company issues its stock to the bank's
shareholders---the holding company acquired
100 percent ownership. "76
IV. SUMMARY
This chapter has identified the advantages and disad-
vantages of the two forms of organization as drawn from the
literature. They are now summarized in Table V-I in the form
of a "Factor Sheet" of advantages of one form relative to the
other:
TABLE V-I
FACTOR SHEET OF LITERATURE BASED ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF DIRECT MERGER AND
HOLDING COMPANY EXPANSION
Advantages of Holding Company—Relative to a Merged System
Operational and Organizational
1. Organizational flexibility
2. Wider range of options for management control
3. Local Autonomy
Financial









1. Affiliated banks retain local identity in their
market area
Legal




3. Can select easiest route for approval of expansion
4. Retain local control through the board of directors
and bank officers at the affiliate level
Advantages of Merged Systems—Relative to a Holding Company
Operational and Organizational
1. Organizational uniformity and simplicity
2. Closer control of policy and operations
3. Greater cost benefits from integration of
operations
Financial
1. Greater credit mobility
Marketing
1. Greater opportunity for uniform facilities
and services
2. Single corporate identity
Legal
1. Generally has required less time for approval of
expansion applications
2. "Track record" for approval of merger applications
has been better than for holding company applications
Apparent Weaknesses in the Literature
In important areas there seems to be lack of empirical
data directly comparing the two forms. Consequently, it was
not possible to draw from the literature conclusions that one
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form benefits more than the other with regard to economies of
scale, efficiencies from integration, or "cost of capital -
capital structure relationships".
Also, numerous alleged advantages and disadvantages
were commonly treated only in generalities. These did not
appear to consider the points-of view of various parties having
an interest in expansion, such as stockholders, management,
lenders, borrowers, or regulatory authorities; nor did they
consider various policies, such as management's attitudes to-
ward growth, competition, or organizational control. Conse-
quently, it was difficult if not impossible to assess ade-
quately the relative merits of these generalizations. The
contrasting views on "centralization vis-a-vis decentralization"
were a case in point.
Lastly, the literature did not illustrate or suggest a
method or approach whereby management could assess the signi-
ficance of the various advantages and disadvantages in select-
ing between the two forms; particularly in a specific situa-
tion. This deficiency appeared to stem, in part, from the
lack of an examination of the advantages and disadvantages
from various points-of-view, or from analysis of considerations
that might be determining in different kinds of situations. Exa-
mination of the expansion experiences of the two systems studied
will attempt to suggest how assessments of significance can be
made by consideration of various points-of-view and policies.

CHAPTER VI
THE EXPANSION DECISIONS: BACKGROUND
This chapter addresses itself to the background events
concerning the decisions of First and Merchants and Bankshares
to select forms of expansion. Three salient points are im-
portant to this discussion: (1) managements of both organiza-
tions had been interested in changing the restrictive branch-
ing legislation passed in 1948, (2) both had been sponsors of
the Virginia Metropolitan Plan, a proposal to liberalize
branching, and (3) after introduction of the Buck-Holland Bill
both had the option to select either form of expansion.
Prior to passage of the Buck-Holland Bill, in 1962,
First and Merchants and State-Planters--the lead bank in Bank-
shares--had been among a group of large Richmond banks actively-
sponsoring a change to the restrictive 1948 branching legisla-
tion. Together these banks attempted to gather support through-
out the state for the Virginia Metropolitan Plan, a branching
scheme to allow merger between banks in metropolitan areas.
The sponsors wanted this plan to be adopted by the Virginia
Bankers Association at their June 1961 convention. Had this
been done, the intent of the Virginia Bankers Association was
to propose the plan as an amendment to the state banking codes
for recommendation to the 1962 General Assembly; the plan,

VI-2
however, failed. Consequently, First and Merchants' and State-
Planters' managements felt any liberalization of the branching
laws had been delayed for at least another two years, until
the next biannual meeting of the General Assembly in 1964.
However, the subsequent surprise introduction of the Buck-
Holland Bill, in early 1962, permitted both banks to recon-
sider their expansion plans, in light of the fact that expan-
sion would be possible by direct merger as well as the holding
company route.
I. FIRST AND MERCHANTS ELECTED TO EXPAND BY DIRECT MERGER
After the Virginia Metropolitan Plan failed management
at First and Merchants considered expansion by the holding com-
pany route. In explaining the chronology of events, a First
and Merchants officer said:
"We were actively studying the
formation of a holdin9 company and
had retained the services of experts
in the field. Our planning for a
holding company had moved right along,
but we feel fortunate, from our stand-
point, that the Buck-Holland legislation
got into the mill in time for us to
take advantage of it. That is to say,
we had not gone so far that we could
not scrap our plans for a holding
company, and embark on a program
for expansion by merger, as authorized
under the 1962 legislation.
On this same subject, we believe
(we do not know) that if some of the
others had not gone so far with their
commitments for the holding company
form, they would have changed their
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plans, also. But, we feel some had
gone so far that they just could not
back up and they had to go ahead with
their commitments . "1
If it is assumed that direct merger is a "better method"
of expansion, passage of the Buck-Holland Bill was an unex-
pected advantage to First and Merchants. That is to say, if
First and Merchants' competitors had gone so far with holding
company plans that they could not reconsider, then they did
not have an opportunity to choose the "better method." How-
ever, if First and Merchants was late in formulating expansion
plans by way of the holding company route, then this fortunately
worked to their advantage because it resulted in its not being
committed to a less desirable form of expansion at the time
the Buck-Holland Bill opened the merger route.
II. BANKSHARES ELECTED TO EXPAND BY THE HOLDING COMPANY ROUTE
As was the case with First and Merchants, State-Planters
started to investigate the feasibility of forming a holding
2





As early as 1958 the president of State-Planters, the n
Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., had considered the concept of
formation of a holding company with other large Virginia banks.
This was seen as a move which would improve the competitive
position of the banks concerned, regardless of any subsequent
action by the state legislators to relax the highly restric-
tive 1948 branching laws. However, this initial plan for a






no action resulted from these efforts until, unexpectedly,
in the latter part of 1961, First and Citizens National Bank
of Alexandria approached State-Planters with a proposal. By-
early 1962 four other banks had joined together to form the
initial Bankshares group, which commenced operations as a six
3bank holding company in January, 1963. In explaining the
chronology of events, a Bankshares officer said:
"We knew of the Buck-Holland
legislation before we filed with the
Securities Exchange Commission to
form United Virginia Bankshares in
June, 19 62. Therefore, we had the
opportunity to drop it and go the
merger route if we wanted. But all
of the parties had been sold on, and
they liked the idea of forming a
holding company where everybody
would have something to say; we
were building something together;
all parties were participants. The
local autonomy aspect was important,
too. No proposal was made to try to
force through the merger route.
The feeling was just so strong
that this was what we wanted to 4
do that this is the way we went."
The original members of Bankshares had the opportunity
to change their holding company plans and expand by direct
merger under the Buck-Holland legislation, which became ef-
fective July 1, 1962. The foregoing quote indicates that
Cf . Appendix (A) , Table A-I, United Virginia Bankshares
List of Acquisitions and Affiliate mergers.
Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-3-4.
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management was not "locked into" the holding company form of
expansion, even though plans were well along in the final stages
Furthermore, while it is clear that expansion by holding com-
pany was the preferred route for the Bankshares group and that
a participating management philosophy was an essential factor
in this decision, it is assumed that had there been sufficient
evidence to indicate direct merger was clearly the better
route, then this path might have been chosen. Consequently,
Bankshares' management decision to expand involved an explicit
choice of alternative expansion methods—holding company
versus direct merger--as was the case with First and Merchants.
III. THE MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
1 The primary reasons why each of the managements chose
their respective form of expansion and the key elements of
their expansion strategy are summarized at the end of this
chapter, in Tables VI-I through VT-IV. The examination of
each of these topics follows in the next four chapters. These
chapters discuss why both managements considered one form of
expansion preferable to the other, and with reference to the
literature, will attempt to evaluate the various considera-
tions as guides for management action. The four functional
areas previously used in development of the literature frame-
work are each the subject of one chapter: (1) operational and






FACTORS CONSIDERED BY FIRST AND MERCHANTS TO BE ADVANTAGES
AND DISADVANTAGES OF EXPANSION BY DIRECT MERGER
The merged form was preferable to the holding company because
it provided or permitted:
1. A basis for better organizational control
than does the holding company form.
2
.
A better solution to the problem of manage-
ment succession.
3. Greater mobility of funds.
4. Greater diversification of risk.
5. Increased lines of credit to a single customer.
6. Greater financial flexibility.
7. Larger individual banking units which are better
able to attract industry to Virginia's growing
industrial communities.
,
8. Greater community services.
9. Economies in operation.
The merged form was seen to have these disadvantages as con-
trasted to the holding company:
1. Loss of the merged bank's name.
2. Change in the status of the merged bank's board
of directors
3. De Novo branching restrictions in the area of the
merged bank.
NOTE: The ordering of these factors does not indicate
priority
.





FACTORS CONSIDERED BY BANKSHARES TO BE ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF EXPANSION BY HOLDING COMPANY
The holding company form was preferable to the merged form
because it provided or permitted:
1. Greater de novo branching opportunities.
2. Efficiency equal to the merged form.
3. Flexibility in raising capital.
4. Greater flexibility in expansion.
5. Local autonomy for affiliates.
6. Local identity for affiliates.
7. Decentralized decision-making v;hich offers more
management flexibility and opportunity.
8. Non-member (Federal Reserve System) banks re-
tain their lower 10 percent state reserve require-
ments when they become holding company affiliates;
and only holding company affiliates (members of
Federal Reserve System) in reserve cities are
required to use the 16 1/2 percent reserve ratio;
other affiliates to use 12 percent.
Both forms were preferable to an individual bank in Virginia
because they provided or permitted:
1. Increased organization size to attract and train
management personnel.
2. A solution to a management succession problem.
3. Economic benefits to the acquired bank stockholders
4. Greater credit and funds mobility.
5. New services.
The holding company form was seen to have these disadvantages
as contrasted to the merged form:
1. Complications because of Securities Exchange
Regulations
.
2. A more complex organization.
3. Complications from regulations by more than one
agency.
4. Lack of a single corporate image.
NOTE: The ordering of these factors does not indicate
priority.





KEY FACTORS IN FIRST AND MERCHANTS' EXPANSION STRATEGY
1. Merge only into areas where the growth rate
will keep pace with or exceed the system as
a whole.
2. Avoid dilution of book value and earnings,
but give "fair value".
3. Keep strategy flexible because future mergers
may be difficult due to increasing competition
for the remaining banks and because of the
attitude of the regulatory agencies.
4. Offset de novo branching restrictions in
the area of the merged bank by acquiring
banks which already have branch offices.
5. Offset the loss of the merged bank's
board of directors by appointing an Area
Advisory Board.




KEY FACTORS IN BANKSHARES ' EXPANSION STRATEGY
1. Expand in growth areas, with emphasis on the
Virginia urban corridor from Washington, D. C.
south to Richmond and east through Williamsburg,
Newport News, and Norfolk.
2. Acquire a leading bank in an area, if possible
a bank with deposits over $10 million.
3. Emphasize local autonomy and a decentralized
management philosophy.
4. Deal directly with and through management and
not the shareholders of prospective affiliates.




THE EXPANSION DECISION: OPERATIONAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This chapter deals with three operational and organiza-
tional considerations thought to be significant by First and
Merchants and Bankshares in their selection of a form of expan-
sion. These considerations are: (1) management effectiveness,
(2) management succession, and (3) the efficiency of the organi'
zational form.
I. MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
The critical issue regarding management effectiveness
concerned the question: "Does a particular form of corporate
organization lead to or result in more effective management?"
This question was answered in the affirmative by both First
and Merchants and Bankshares, even though the two banks chose
different forms of organization. Their arguments centered on
points involving organization theory—centralization versus
decentralization, and local autonomy versus a more directive
form of management control.
The Position of First and Merchants
Management Control is Superior in the Merged Form.





corporate structure of the merged form because they thought
it provided a basis for better control. Management believed
there was less potential for the development of problems in
policy formulation and execution since the merged form had
a single policy group, the board of directors, and one group
of senior management to execute policy. Consequently, the
position of First and Merchants was that coordination to
achieve unity of purpose could be attained more readily in
the merged form.
By the way of contrast, First and Merchants' management
thought that the unity necessary to operate a large banking
organization effectively was harder to achieve in a holding
company. This was because a holding company was comprised
of a number of separate banks , each with its own board of
directors and senior management, who were legally responsible
for the soundness of policy and operations. Thus, the posi-
tion of First and Merchants was that there was greater potential
in the holding company for problems in policy formulation and
direction. Policies could vary in accordance with the manage-
ment philosophy of the individual groups.
Another aspect of control cited by First and Merchants
was that one group of senior management carrying out the
policies of a single board tends to reduce the time and effort
required of management at the local level on policy matters.
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Local management, therefore, has more time to devote to busi-
ness development and service to the customer.
The Position of Bankshares
2The Holding Company Form Permits Local Autonomy .
Bankshares preferred the holding company form because it pro-
vided local autonomy to the management of acquired affiliates.
Thus, this form was a suitable framework for implementation
of Bankshares 1 management philosophy, which was based on the
holding company organization being a participating enterprise.
Each of the six original affiliates was represented on Bank-
shares' board of directors. New affiliates were not necessarily
represented. However, a committee of presidents was planned
for establishment of certain policies.
"We try to get together at least
once a month with the presidents com-
mittee and talk about problems
,
poli-
cies, and new services that Bankshares
should provide. Thus, we have a joint
effort: (1) to become a statewide
organization, (2) to build a larger
organization to make bigger loans to
Virginia businesses, (3) to extend
new services throughout the system,
and (4) by pooling resources to provide
special services, such as in the com-
puter area, of a quality no one bank
could afford. "3
2




Local autonomy and a participating management philos-
ophy were believed by Bankshares' management to be important
factors in attracting new affiliates. Even so, they found
that it was hard to convince some bankers who were interested
in joining a holding company that what they said about their
method of operation was true. Some bankers had heard dis-
couraging reports from those who joined other holding com-
panies.
Local Autonomy was an Element of Bankshares ' Expansion
4Strategy . Local autonomy stemming from Bankshares ' cooperative
management philosophy was believed to be very helpful in at-
tracting additional partners to the organization. For instance,
an officer of Bankshares felt that local autonomy was parti-
cularly important to the executive operating a well-managed,
profitable bank; this type of executive was generally thought
to be a strong individual who did not want to give up any
measure of operating responsibility.
Banks interested in joining Bankshares were told that
the holding company retained central direction in changes in
top management--the top two--and their salaries, and purchase
of fixed assets or leasing new offices. Affiliates were






but anything more required approval by the holding company.
In this way real estate and purchases of major assets through-
out the system were coordinated. For instance, $12.5 million
had been raised during the years 1962-1966 to meet affiliates'
plans for expansion. Also, dividend policy and matters which
could result in a conflict of interest were other areas where
the holding company retained central direction.
Flexibility and Opportunity from Decentralization in
5the Holding Company Form . Bankshares* position was that the
decentralized nature of the holding company form offered
greater flexibility and opportunities for management than the
typical branch system. This aspect of holding company opera-
tions was stressed because it was thought to be inherently
more attractive to management personnel--it offered a better
environment for developing successor management talent within
the industry. Thus, it was the opinion of an officer of Bank-
shares that the holding company appeared to provide the better
solution to the problem of successor management.
Bankshares 1 position was that the critical aspect of
its decentralized management concept was the legal status of





Legal status" of the board of directors has reference
to the responsibilities of bank directors specified in banking
statutes. Article 6, Section 6.1-45 of the Laws 'of Virginia

VII-6
boards were thought to be a very real force in promoting and
maintaining decentralization of management.
The Holding Company Form : A More Complex Corporate
7Organization . Bankshares ' management saw local autonomy as
an advantage of the holding company, but at the same time
they also recognized that the merged form had a simple corpor-
ate structure, one board of directors and one senior group
of management. An officer of Bankshares' said that the less
complex structure of the merged system simplified policy formu-
lation and execution. Problems more easily avoided in the
merged form were thought to be: (1) diffused authority, (2)
internal conflict at the management level, and (3) administra-
tive complications, i.e., separate records for each affiliate.
But, Bankshares' position was that these problems could
be overcome since the holding company form provided substantially
the same range of management control options as a merged system.
Furthermore, management believed that the administrative pro-
blems of the more complex corporate organization of the holding
company were compensated for by other advantages.
Relating to Banking and Finance states, "The affairs of every
bank or banking institution incorporated under the laws of this
state shall be managed by a board of directors which shall con-
sist of not less than five persons."
7






The positions of First and Merchants and Bankshares
suggest that there is a direct and important relationship
between the form of corporate organization and the effective-
ness of management. However, when their views are examined
it is clear that, like much of the literature, they do not
and cannot settle the question whether a centralized or decen-
tralized organization and control is more effective. These
views involve questions of organization theory and the role
of the formal and informal organization. They involve at-
titudes and opinions of management. Consequently, it is dif-
ficult to resolve this question clearly in the favor of either
form.
Perhaps the answer is that one form is better, or worse,
for a particular group depending on the general point-of-view
of that group. In this context, the positions of both parties
generate several points which have implications in the selection
of an organizational form for expansion.
A Particular Style or Form of Management Does Not
Follow From a Particular Form of Corporate Organization .
Clearly, different methods of organizing and managing banking
organizations can be employed, irrespective of their corporate
form. That is to say, both merged systems and holding com-
panies may be either highly centralized or highly decentra-
lized. Therefore, differences in organization structure and
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management control seemingly are a function of the attitudes
of individual managements, and depend, in part, on the circum-
stances peculiar to the individual situation.
The Question of " Interna l Conflict -
-
Type of Corporate
Organization " . Both managements admit that there is greater
potential for administrative conflict in the holding company
form. Their positions seemingly are related to voting control
and the role of the directors in holding company affiliates.
In this dissertation it is argued that control in the holding
company is, in fact, less absolute; that affiliate management
has more autonomy than lower level management in a merged
system. This is a result of the legal responsibilities of
affiliate directors, and of the different voting control situa-
tions which may exist in a holding company affiliate--a hold-
ing company may have 100 percent voting control of an affiliate,
or some lesser degree of control.
A. Voting Control in Holding Company Affiliates . Gen-
erally, four different voting control situations exist in a
holding company, whereas only one exists in the merged system.
A holding company may have complete control, 100 percent; very
large control, say 80-99 percent; bare majority control, say
51 percent; and "minority" control, say 35-49 percent. The
implication for affiliate directors is different in each of
these situations. Directors are responsible to all stockholders,
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minority as well as majority and they have to think about dif-
ferent things in each case. For instance, questions of policy,
such as dividends, may have different meaning to the holding
company as a shareholder and to the individual investor as a
shareholder. Individuals may desire a high dividend payout
for income, whereas the holding company may desire a low pay-
out for capital growth and expansion. Also, different kinds
of capital expenditures— for example, purchase of real estate
—
may be viewed differently by a group of persons who are indi-
vidual stockholders, and by a single stockholder, the holding
company. Clearly, the resolution of such policy issues will
probably depend on the voting control situation in each af-
filiate.
i In cases where the holding company votes all or almost
all of the shares of the affiliate, policy conflict is proba-
bly no more of a control problem than in the merged form, i.e.,
8
equivalent "power to remove and replace rests with the parent.
In practice, however, the holding company does not have the
same control in the resolution of problems in the other three
voting control situations. Management has to accommodate satis-
factorily the minority interest, no matter how small, and this
8As reported in the 19 67 Annual Report, Bankshares owns
96.4 percent or more of each of its affiliates and two of nine
are owned 100 percent.
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is a complication with which management in the merged system
does not deal. Furthermore, the holding company has the re-
curring problem of replacing directors at the affiliate level.
There is no guarantee that the viev/s of new directors with
regard to policy will conform to the old. This is another
problem that does not arise in the merged organization.
B. The Role of the Directors in Holding Company
Affiliates . An important difference between the two forms is
the possibility of many boards of directors in a holding com-
pany vis-a-vis one in a merged system. This possibility has
distinct control implications; for example, the comment that
"no bank holding company can exert a veto power over actions




The chief officer of one large Virginia holding company
described control as more of a "sell" rather than a "tell" pro-
position; whereas in the merged system control may be much more
direct. He illustrated this difference in the case where the
affiliate board will not relieve an ineffective president of
his duties. Assuming the holding company has voting control,
a meeting of its stockholders could be called to vote in new
affiliate directors who would discharge the president. But





this would be an unusual step. It probably would cause other
problems in the areas of community relations, or business
development because the "fired" directors might be influential
leaders in the community. By way of contrast, similar pro-
blems could exist in the removal of a branch manager in a
merged system, but the potential consequences would probably
not be as severe as with the holding company where both the
president and the board of directors are involved. For this
reason, it was the opinion of the aforementioned chief officer
that the holding company may have to "live with" poor manage-
ment longer than the merged form. Consequently, not only is
control of management at the affiliate level less directive,
but the time required to obtain the desired response may be
commensurately longer.
From Bankshares 1 point-of-view, autonomy of management
at the local level is a highly persuasive and appealing en-
vironment for the type of manager who wants to be fully re-
sponsible for his own organization. However, this argument
is loaded with implicit assumptions concerning executive moti-
vation and performance which are not and cannot be answered
here. On the other hand, several points regarding Bankshares 1
implementation of this concept are significant: (1) six orig-
inal affiliates were represented on Bankshares' board of
directors, (2) new affiliates were not necessarily repre-
sented; however (3) a committee of presidents was planned for
establishment of certain policies.
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This pattern of action establishes the "character" of
local autonomy in the Bankshares organization, particularly
for those initial affiliate officers who are also members of
the holding company board. In this case, the concept of
local autonomy for these affiliates is preserved so long as
the "original actors" are serving in their respective roles.
However, "control" of successor generations of affiliate
management probably may be more simply accomplished than in the
case of the "original actors". New presidents and directors
will come from within an already established organization. Con-
sequently, the successor generations of management will tend
to be more "organization oriented" rather than "unit bank
oriented," as were their predecessors. And, as a result of
this, differences in control between the two forms will tend
to narrow, but not disappear over time.
Business Development and Service to the Customer at the
Local Level. Clearly, it is difficult to draw generalizations
regarding the time one form or the other provides local level
management to devote to operations versus policy. The amount
of time management can devote to business development and cus-
tomer service at the local level in both forms seemingly de-
pends on the range and depth of services from the parent organi-
zation, and the type of control exercised by the parent. A
holding company— for example, with a high degree of centralized
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management control and a large service organization—probably
can - provide management at the affiliate level with as much
time to devote to business development and customer service
as a merged system—for example, with a high degree of decen-




Both Bankshares and First and Merchants contended that
their respective forms of organization improve their ability
to compete for and retain management talent and to solve the
problem of management succession. Bankshares' position was
that this benefit was shared by both forms, as the result of
increased organization size. On the other hand, First and
Merchants ' position was that direct merger benefits more than
the holding company.
The Position of First and Merchants
Merger Provides a Better Solution to the Problem of
Management Succession . Three reasons were given by First
and Merchants why merger provided a better solution to the
problem of management succession: (1) fewer numbers of manage-






operating levels, (2) larger individual banking institutions
are in a better position to attract and hold young management
talent, and (3) flexibility in movement of management personnel
is greater.
A. Fewer Management Personnel are' Required in the
Merged Form . First and Merchants preferred the merged form
because only one organization was involved in expansion. Their
position was that fewer numbers of management personnel were
required at the policy development and operating level, where-
as each holding company affiliate had a continuing need for
management at all levels, as long as they remained individual
.banks. Consequently, an officer of First and Merchants ex-
pressed the opinion that merger tended to make more effective
allocation of management resources.
B. The Merged Form has Larger Individual Institutions .
First and Merchants preferred expansion by direct merger be-
cause it resulted in larger individual banking units which
were thought to be more attractive to the younger person be-
cause of greater opportunities, salaries and responsibilities.
Furthermore, the experience in First and Merchants indicated
management personnel in larger organizations typically were
more willing to accept assignments in the less desirable loca-
tions because such assignments were viewed as a training ground
or stepping-stone to bigger things; it was not a life-time job.
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The importance of this point was illustrated by the statement
made to an officer of First and Merchants by the Chief Officer
of an independent bank in an outlying area:
"How can I conceivably attract
anybody to come here and live? As
far as profits of the banks are con-
cerned and because of lack of loan
demand it is difficult to pay a
beginning salary to attract good
young management. And, further-
more, what is really available
here in the community to attract
permanent management? There is
nothing here, except what has
existed back through the century.
Young qualified and educated people
are interested in going where they
can grow and where they do not have
a definite ceiling placed on their
abilities. They do not want to
come here. "H
' Flexibility in Movement of Management in the Merged
Form is Greater . First and Merchants preferred the merged
form because it was thought to have greater flexibility in
the movement of management personnel. Transfer was a matter
internal to one organization in the eyes of the personnel com-
mittee, the president, and the board of directors. By way of
contrast, a transfer in a holding company was seen by First
and Merchants as having the possibility of complications
Cf. Appendix (C)
, pp. C-6-7. In this opinion there
are numerous implicit assumptions about the community, and
"young people", that might or might not be valid. The opinion,
however, is thought to be both honest and informed.
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because it involved two or more separate banks, each respon-
sible for maintaining and managing its own personnel. Con-
sequently, it was thought that a conflict of interest between
two corporate entities and two boards of directors might re-
sult. For this reason, an officer of First and Merchants ex-
pressed the opinion that movement of personnel was easier in
the merged system, and that the holding company, as the prime
organization, could not possibly achieve this flexibility.
The Position of Bankshares
Increased Organization Size Benefits both the Holding
12Company and Merged System. Bankshares' management saw both
forms gaining relative to an individual bank in Virginia when
competing for and holding management talent, as the result
of increased size. Larger organizations have the staff and
organization to undertake training programs to help speed the
development of personnel entering the banking industry for
the first time, and they have employee benefits that are
superior to those provided by small banks. However, in the
competition for young executive talent Bankshares argued that
the holding company offered more top executive positions
than a comparable sized branch organization, i.e., each af-
filiate has a president.
12




Affiliation is a Solution to Management Succession in
13
the' Holding Company . Bankshares cited as an advantage of
both forms—as contrasted to an individual bank in Virginia--
the fact that they both provide a solution to the problem of
management succession. In fact, three of the banks which joined
Bankshares had a management succession problem, as was said of
most of the other banks that approached Bankshares on an un-
solicited basis. Each of the three banks was supplied a
new president from within the system.
Discussion
The only point made in the literature is that larger
banks typically are superior to smaller banks in attracting
and keeping management talent: "As is true of any of the larger
enterprises, there are more and varied opportunities for able
individuals interested in banking as a career with a group of
14banks, than within a single unit." Larger institutions have
higher salaries, more extensive employee benefits, training
and educational programs, as added incentives for employment.
Thus, the literature supports the position that these benefits






Hogenson, op. cit . , p. 143.
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Employee Benefits . In Virginia where holding companies
and merged systems are actively competing in major markets
throughout the state, neither appears to have an advantage in
this area. Table VII-I shows that employee programs are gen-
erally shared by holding companies and merged systems alike.
TABLE VII-I
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND PROGRAMS COMMON TO ONE OR MORE
OF THE MERGED SYSTEMS AND HOLDING COMPANIES
OPERATING IN VIRGINIA
— Retirement Plan
-- Group Life Insurance Plan
-- Hospitalization and Major Medical Plan
— Profit Sharing Plan (officers and staff)
-- Employee Training Programs
— Personnel Department
-- Centralized Recruitment
-- Employee Education Programs
NOTE: Data from 1962-1966 Annual Reports of: (1) First
Virginia Corporation, (2) First and Merchants National Bank,
(3) Virginia Commonwealth Bankshares, (4) Virginia National
Bank, and (5) United Virginia Bankshares.
There is one aspect of employee benefits, however, where
it is clear that there may be a difference between the two
forms. After a merger, the corporate benefit plan automatically
extends to the new employees. But after a holding company
acquisition it is not required that the benefit plan for the
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group cover the new affiliate. Consequently, it may be that
as more and more banks are added by direct merger, there are
increasing and sometimes very difficult problems in merging
existing benefit plans. It appears, therefore, that the hold-
ing company does not face comparable difficulties. This con-
clusion is supported by the results of one study that found
uniform plans and fringe benefits in only one-half of the
15holding companies surveyed.
Comments on First and Merchants' Flexibility in Move -
ment of Personnel Argument . First and Merchants' argument
that greater flexibility in movement of personnel is a benefit
of the merged form is probably valid. First, it is clear that
the question of moving management personnel is internal to
the merged organization. By the way of contrast, changes in
holding company management involve different corporate organi-
zations. On this point, the chief officer of the lead bank
of a Virginia holding company, which also has some branches,
suggested that it makes a great deal of difference if he is
dealing with one of his branch managers or the president of
an affiliate. The latter situation, he said, involves a
greater risk of administrative conflict since a matter such
15Fischer, Bank Holding Companies
,
op.cit., pp. 87 ff.
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as movement of a key manager in an affiliate required "selling",
whereas in a branch the change could be "directed"
.
Organizations of both forms which have centralized re-
cruiting and which have training and benefit plans achieve
flexibility in movement of personnel, particularly where such
activities are specifically aimed at solving the problem of
management succession. For instance, Bankshares quickly and
without difficulty provided top management from within its
organization for three of the banks that joined. Additionally,
movement of management in a holding company has the same benefit
First and Merchants alleged for a merged system. It is not
necessarily a "lifetime job". It may be the stepping-stone
to jobs of greater responsibility. However, the implication
of "local autonomy" in the holding company form seemingly
gives greater supposition to remaining in one location because
it appears to contain hypotheses regarding motivation, the
importance of the community, and the interests a bank officer
has in being part of a community.
On balance, it is difficult to generalize on the issue
of flexibility in movement of personnel. However, control of
personnel seemingly is easier in the merged form because it
is more difficult to "direct" changes in the holding company.
1 c
Cf. Appendix (A), p. A-16
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First and Merchant ' s Fewer Personnel Argument. First
and Merchants' position that the merged form requires fewer
personnel at the policy development and operating level is
probably valid for several reasons. First, in those areas
where a merged system can integrate operations and a holding
company cannot, there may be savings of both management and
staff through the consolidation of these functions. Second,
a merged system clearly requires fewer directors since hold-
ing company affiliates continue to require legal boards in
each of their separate banks. And third, lesser management
skills may be needed to fill the top position in a branch
when contrasted to a comparably sized and functioning holding
company affiliate.
The first two reasons why a merged system requires fewer
personnel need no amplification, as the potential savings are
clear in each case. The third reason, however, requires
brief comment. Here, the past chief officer of both a hold-
ing company and a large bank in Virginia argued that the
abilities required of an affiliate president are more exten-
sive than for a branch manager. The affiliate president has
to deal with his board of directors as well as the community;
and the reputation of the bank depends, to a great extent, on
his performance. By the way of contrast, it was this officer's
experience that a branch manager benefits from the "marketing
image and reputation" of the home office. Therefore, the
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branch manager does not have the same complexity of adminis-
trative and marketing problems as the affiliate president.
And if this argument is valid, then a merged system can operate
comparable sized offices with a lower order of managerial
skills. Consequently, it may be easier to fill the manage-
ment needs of a merged system than a holding company.
On the other hand, both forms--when compared to a unit
bank--can save on officers and employees where they can staff
for limited banking services in branches throughout their
systems. Only deposit facilities may be needed in locations
which would otherwise not generate enough business to support
even the smallest unit bank.
"Advocates of branch banking
i
maintain that because of the ability
to centralize some functions, and
because it is unnecessary to erect
expensive buildings for each office,
a branch system can provide full
banking services in areas which could
not support even a small unit bank
offering limited services. "17
Additionally, several other forces come into play in
the efficient use of personnel by both types of systems when
compared to a unit bank. First, the experiences of the organi-
zations studied suggest that there may be a tendency for ex-
panding systems to upgrade and broaden the scope of services





in a new marketing area. Thus, expansion of services may
more than offset any savings in numbers of personnel which
may otherwise benefit the organization in aggregate. Also,
this study has shown that acquisition does not necessarily
result in a reduction of personnel, i. e., corporate policy
may dictate that any excess personnel be retained, and that
19
attrition reduce the staff over the long run.
III. OPERATING ECONOMIES
r.
As suggested by the literature, large banks--whether
merged or holding company--clearly ought to be able to achieve
20
operating economies over smaller unit banks. The critical
question, however, is: "Which of the two forms--a holding
company or a merged system—can achieve greater operating
economies?" On this issue, both First and Merchants and Bank-
shares cited operating economies as an advantage of their
respective form of organization.
21The Position of First and Merchants
First and Merchants preferred the merged form since it
led to operating economies in areas such as (1) purchasing,










(2) insurance, (3) data processing, and (4) personnel admin-
istration. On the other hand, it was the position of First
and Merchants that economies in these areas can be offset
by the cost of new services, improved quality of existing
services and other factors. For example, smaller banks usually
can be integrated into the system with greater ease. Merger
with a larger bank tends to involve problems involving func-
tions and personnel in the merged bank normally centralized
in the home office. On this subject a First and Merchants
officer said:
"Let me say that the hoped for
economies have not been as realistic
as we had thought they would be, and
we have not experienced them yet. We
hope to in the future, but I think we
i would make a very serious mistake if
we tried to achieve economies through
a negative approach. I consider re-
ducing the merged staff by arbitrary
laying-off or just saying you do not
have a job because we eliminated your
position to be a terrible mistake to
make at the local scene.
In no case have we dispensed
with personnel services as a result of
merger. Normal attrition has taken care
of this problem. That has been a policy
long before the passage of the merger
law."22
22 Ibid, p. C-13.
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23
Bankshares' position was that both forms share many of
the advantages attributed to larger banking units: (1) cen-
tralization of support functions, i.e., to purchase supplies
and system advertising, and (2) use of specialists for trust,
legal, tax, accounting, data processing, and other services.
The relative economic merits of one form as compared to the
other were described by an officer of Bankshares in these
terms
:
"My feeling is that selection of
an organizational form will in time
(perhaps not initially) be primarily
a matter of economics. That is to
say initially the selection of an organi-
zation form may be based on evalua-
tion of factors (i.e., legislative)
then existing, but in the final
' analysis the choice will be proven
out by economics. For example, if
a holding company cannot operate just
as effectively and efficiently as a
branch system, then there is no reason
not to make the holding company one
merged institution (assuming this is
feasible as it is in Virginia)." 24
Bankshares thought that its experiences and the growth of hold-
ing companies in Virginia and elsewhere suggest that the hold-
ing company form is generally competitive with merged systems;
or if not, there are other factors which tend to offset any
23









operational inefficiencies— the de novo branching advantage
in Virginia.
Discussion
Clearly, big banks of both forms ought to benefit from
25
economies of scale over smaller unit banks:
"Empirical studies of this issue (52)
are subject to both conceptual and method-
ological difficulties, (53) but they sug-
gest that (a) there are significant econo-
mies of scale in banking (i.e., costs per
unit of output decline as size increases)
as bank size increases up to $10,000,000
in deposits and there may be some less
significant economies beyond that size; (54)
(b) branch banks tend to have higher total
costs than unit banks of equal deposit
size (55) but differences in costs between
branch and unit operations decrease rapidly,
as size increases; (56) and (c) it is doubt-
i
ful that a holding company can achieve the
same economies of operation as a branch
system (57) .
"
However, the answer to the question whether a holding company
or a merged system can achieve greater economies of operations
is not clear from either the literature or the experiences of
the organizations studied.
The merged form has one advantage over the holding com-
pany, but the extent of this advantage largely depends on the
objectives and policies of a particular management group, not
25Haynes and Phillips, Jr., op.cit. , p. 30.

VII--27
on universally valid standards. Greater operating economies
are theoretically possible in a merged system because some
operating functions cannot be combined in a holding company--
the corporate entity of each affiliate requires that trust
accounts , and bond and loan portfolios be separately maintained.
Consequently it appears that a merged system has the potential
for a somewhat greater degree of economy than a holding company,
assuming all things are equal
:
"Most commentators on banking
concentration agree that the close
integration typical of branch systems
makes greater economies possible than
those achieved in holding company bank-
ing. It should be pointed out, however,
that many of the large group systems
make extensive use of branch offices
in those locations where they are per-
mitted by law. "26
However, within the constraints of the assumption that
if the organizations studied are comparable in all other areas
affecting profitability, then the data in Table VII-II su9gest
that the question of "ef ficiency--type of corporate organiza-
tion" is a matter of "six of one and a half dozen of the ether"
in Virginia, when measured by twe broad indicators of operating




Lamb, op.cit . pp. 236-37.
2 7
A statistical test comparing: (1) the average of the




RATIOS: NET OPERATING EARNINGS TO TOTAL DEPOSITS AND NET
OPERATING EARNINGS TO CAPITAL FOR FIRST AND MERCHANTS
AND BANKSHARES, 1962-1966
Bankshares First and Merchants
Year Earnings/ Earnings/ Earnings/ Earnings/
Deposits Capital Deposits Capital
1962 .89 9.3 .97 10.2
1963 .88 9.9 .91 9.4
1964 .98 12.6 .99 10.4
1965 .97 12.2 .99 11.2
1966 1.03 13.1 1.10 12.6
5 year avg. .950 11.42 .992 10.76
NOTE: Data from Appendix (A), Table A-III, Appendix
(C) , Table C-III.
The resolution of the "ef ficiency—type of corporate
organization" question boils down to a choice between a posi-
tion that: (1) the merged form is more efficient because of
closer integration in areas such as trust, loan and investment
portfolios, or (2) there is no significant difference between
and (2) the average of the five year earnings to capital ratios
shows a t value of .68. With 8 degrees of freedom, a t value
as large as 2.306 would occur by chance alone with a proba-
bility of .95 when the samples are from the same distribution.
These data, therefore, do not support an hypothesis that the
samples are from different populations.
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the forms as suggested by the profitability experiences of
the organizations studied. The better choice is the first
conclusion because the validity of the quantitative com-
parison is severely limited by its constraining assumptions,
2 8
small sample size and the short period of measurement.
The relative efficiency of the two forms, however, also
depends on the objectives and policies of the individual manage-
ment group. Clearly, decisions made by management on the ex-
tent of centralization or decentralization will affect inte-
gration at all levels of the organization. This suggested re-
lationship can be visualized as follows:
A. Assuming the merged system as a form of organiza-
tion is more efficient than a holding company—because of
closer integration of operations—it will be to the right of









In measuring differences in operating economies between
the two forms there would be problems similar to those en-
countered in measuring economies of scale between large and
small organizations. Many factors apart from the type of organi-
zation could contribute to differences in profitability. Con-
sequently, valid research results require answers to questions
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B. But, assuming there is a range of ef ficiencies--
depending on the objectives and policies of a particular
management—then integration of operations are likely to vary
from bank to bank and there could be any number of points on
the efficiency scale where both forms are the same, as re-




such as: (1) "What is efficiency in commercial banking?", (2)
"How is efficiency measured?" , (3) "How can the holding com-
pany and merged system be reliably compared considering basic
differences in: (a) size, (b) location, (c) business mix, (d)
organizational form, (e) legal factors, (f) management, (g)
markets, and
;
(h) other factors?" This study was not intended
to and cannot resolve these questions.

CHAPTER VIII
THE EXPANSION DECISION: FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
This chapter deals with four financial considerations
commonly thought to be significant by bank managements in
their selection of a form for expansion. These include: (1)
credit and funds mobility, (2) acquisition and control of
capital, (3) economic benefits to the acquired bank's share-
holders, and (4) diversification of risk. These considera-
tions cover a variety of unrelated financial subjects. The
order of discussion first treats two issues considered by
both First and Merchants and Bankshares; and second, two
issues considered by one of the managements and not by the
other.
I. CREDIT AND FUNDS MOBILITY
Mobility of funds was a point cited by both Bankshares
and First and Merchants. Bankshares position was that this
is an advantage not peculiar to the holding company vis-a-vis
a merged system, but rather as contrasted to an individual
bank in Virginia. On the other hand, First and Merchants
suggested that a merged system may have greater potential
than a holding company in this area.
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The Position of First and Merchants
Mobility of Funds is Greater in the Merged Form.
First and Merchants 1 management thought the merged form had
greater potential for credit mobility because a branch in a
high loan area could have 100 percent or even more of its
deposits invested in loans; this was possible since a branch
was constrained only by the limits placed on the system as a
whole. By the way of contrast, a holding company competitor
in the area, in theory, could place the same amount of loans
with the participation of other affiliated banks. However,
an officer of First and Merchants argued that participation
among several banks did not work too well in practice.
"... Participation must go through
the separate boards of directors of a
holding company, and each may not react
the same way. The extension of credit
is personal judgment--it is not an
exact science by any manner of means.
While the holding company could say what
will be done in a certain situation, the
board of directors of an affiliate is
still required by law to exercise in-
dependent judgment, or be subject to
legal action. "2
The Position of Bankshares
' Credit and Funds Mobility are Comparable in Both Forms.







3 Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-18-19.
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systems , have the capability of pooling lending resources
among affiliates to serve the growing credit requirements of
industry. For example, to facilitate the flow of funds through-
out its system, Bankshares developed a loan participation pro-
cedure and encouraged its banks to pre-clear large loans that
needed to be shared throughout the system. It was an opinion
of an officer of Bankshares that the use of: (1) rapid com-
munication devices, (2) central credit files, (3) charge cards,
plus (4) the efficient use of data processing equipment, will
ultimately remove any advantages branch systems now enjoy in
the area of credit mobility.
Discussion
"Outset loan" participation arrangements were a limit-
i
ing factor on holding company credit mobility until eliminated
4by an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act in 19 66. Now
the literature suggests that there are no significant restric-
tions on the purchase of loan paper or on loan participation
5between subsidiaries of holding companies. Consequently,
differences in funds mobility between the holding company and
merged form have narrowed, but not disappeared.
4
An "outset loan" involves participation agreement among
the affiliates prior to the placement of the loan.
5Lawrence, op.cit., p. 10.
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The Role of Directors Influences Funds Mobility. As
a practical matter the question of mobility of funds is
directly related to the role of the directors in an organi-
zation. Because of this it is argued--in this study—that
the holding company typically does not enjoy the same funds
mobility as the merged form.
In a merged system there is only one board of directors,
but in a holding company there may be many boards. In moving
funds within a holding company the individual affiliate direc-
tors have legal responsibilities and liabilities not mitigated
in any sense by a standard participation agreement, or the
lending policy of the holding company. These responsibilities
and liabilities particularly apply where the affiliates are
less than 10 percent owned, for here the directors are re-
quired to protect the rights of the minority in the same way
that they protect the rights of the holding company stockholder.
Because of this, affiliate directors may have conflicting in-
terests on matters relating to funds mobility which could,
from a practical standpoint, constrain funds movement through-
out a holding company system. For instance, under conditions
of credit rationing, affiliate directors might face the problem
of satisfying the loan demand in their local service area as
opposed to participating in loans of other prime customers in
the eyes of the holding company. But, this question of
separate directors is "theoretical" in the sense that it would
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not be likely to generate a problem in, say, nine out of ten
working days. However, it would not be "theoretical" when
and if it came up on the tenth day, because that is when it
would be least welcome by management.
Through 1966, however, there appears to be no signifi-
cant difference in funds mobility for the systems studied.
The data in Figure VIII-1 suggest that the expansion of loans,
measured as a percentage of deposits, between Bankshares and
First and Merchants was comparable, assuming, of course,
equally able loan officers in each organization, and equally
good lending opportunities in each banking community.
1963 1964 1966
FIGURE VIII-1
COMPARISON OF FIRST AND MERCHANTS AND BANKSHARES LOAN TO
DEPOSIT RATIO: 1962-1966 (FROM APPENDIX A,
TABLE A-III; AND APPENDIX C, TABLE C-III)
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Branch Structure and Location Influence Funds Mobility .
Mobility of funds within a branch structure will depend on
the types of location branches serve; there are some locations
where deposits will clearly exceed loan demand, a wealthy
urban community; there are are some locations where loan demand
will exceed deposits, a business community; and there are some
locations where loans and deposits about balance. Consequently,
it is difficult to generalize on the subject of comparative
funds mobility between not only holding companies and merged
systems, but also among individual holding companies and
individual merged systems. Therefore, a relevant question for
bank management appears to be: "Which type of organization uses
the different types of banking location to best advantage?"
For instance, does one form of expansion do better in high loan
locations, whisre the customers are firms with multi-plant or
office locations elsewhere in the state?
II. RAISING AND USING CAPITAL
Both First and Merchants and Bankshares cited "fi-
nancial flexibility" as an advantage of their respective forms.
However, Bankshares use of the term was different from First
and Merchants in that: (1) it was broader in scope because it
concerned both raising and allocating capital, and (2) it was
more nearly consistent with the concept of "financial flexi-
bility" in the literature. The following discussion explores
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the possibility that both Bankshares ' and First and Merchants'
managements have equally valid points-of-view, depending on
the respective definition of the term.
The Position of First and Merchants
To First and Merchants Financial Flexibility Meant
Easier Control over the Capital Account . First and Mer-
chants' management preferred the merged form because it re-
sulted in greater financial flexibility in the sense that
one capital account was easier to control in a merged system:
"It's much more easily controlled and manipulated than if it
were in many independent units." Also, it was the position
of First and Merchants that a local bank name was an advantage
when selling equity or debt in the market area of the bank.
This advantage was explained by a First and Merchants officer
as follows:
"To buy First and Merchants
National Bank stock there is accepta-
bility of the equity and debt in-
struments at the local community
and this would be much greater than
it would be for a holding company
that does not identify to any bank.
Today there is a problem, so the
bankers say, in the identification
of a holding company with a bank
in the community, i.e., people in
the community tend to get mixed




up. However, this does not apply
to a sophisticated investor, but 7
to the man on the street, it does."
The Position of Bankshares
To Bankshares Financial Flexibility Meant More Ways to
Raise Capital. Bankshares' management preferred the holding
company form because it had more flexibility in raising capital
Two reasons were cited for this: (1) financing could be done
either at the level of the affiliated banks or at the holding
company level, and (2) financing could be done in more ways
and with more ease than in a merged system. Also, use of
leverage and raising capital at lower cost and with greater
ease were said to be important benefits resulting from fi-
nancing at the holding company level:
"The potential of the holding
company is to maximize leverage,
using debt financing to a greater
extent than through a bank. After
all the examiners who examine banks
are going to be more restrictive on
how much debt they are going to allow
a bank to issue. They would not have
the same concern about a holding
company since we do not have any
depositors. It is a different thing
if we go under. If we fail it has
nothing to do with the banks. We
are just the stockholder. The stock-






Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-7-9.

VIII-9
We could issue short-term debt
at a rate we wanted and that the
market would permit. If a bank
tried to do the same thing there
would probably be a limitation on
the rate. If the debt instrument
was construed as a deposit by the
Federal Reserve Board then it would
be subject to reserve requirements
and to the rate limitations of
Regulation Q. I don't think any
holding company yet has maximized
the possibilities. But every now
and then you see where somebody
has used one . "9
A recent example of the greater "financial flexibility"
of the holding company involved State-Planters. In this case
the bank could not obtain property needed for a new building
and still provide the property owner with a tax-free trans-
action because the bank could not issue stock, except under
stock options, in a cash sale or in a merger. However, the
holding company could obtain the property on a tax-free basis
by exchanging its stock for the land.
Discussion
First and Merchants ' Control of the Capital Account
Argument . There appear to be some essential differences
between the forms in control of the capital account that may
be important to management. Seemingly these differences are




For instance, in a merged system the transfer of capital funds
is internal to one corporation, while in a holding company
more than one corporation is involved. In the latter case,
problems may arise involving minority interest and the respon-
sibilities of directors on such issues as: (1) dividend policy,
(2) rates on up and dov/n stream loans, or (3) allocation of
costs to affiliates for holding company services. Further-
more, in the merged system there is one accounting system
and one set of financial statements, while in the holding com-
pany each affiliate has its own statements and each affiliate
may have its own accounting system. Consequently, the operating
results of individual holding company affiliates are a matter
of public record for shareholders and investors, while in the
merged system branch profitability is an internal matter. Put
together, these differences suggest that management in the
merged system probably does have more direct control over the
use of capital. It is a matter internal to one corporation,
a single group of management, and one body of stockholders.
First and Merchants ' Greater Acceptance of the Merged
System' s Financial Instruments at the Local Level Argument.
Section 23A of the amended Federal Reserve Act per-
mits loans between af filiates--both bank affiliates and hold-
ing company subsidiaries—with restrictions that the total
amount to one affiliate shall not exceed 10 percent of the
lending affiliate's capital and surplus, or that the total
amount to all affiliates shall not exceed 20 percent of the
lending affiliate's capital and surplus.
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Presumably the question of "bank name" re selling a bank's
stock contains assumptions about the motivations of buyers
of stock and suppliers of capital. Clearly, there are different
kinds of buyers with different motivations and objectives in
the capital markets. Consequently, most arguments as to whether
unit banks, holding companies or merged systems can raise
capital most easily are meaningless in the sense that they
omit considerations of the basic fact: "Who, what, and where
is the market for different kinds of securities?" Each situa-
tion—in essence— "turns" on these considerations.
Bankshares ' Flexibility in Raising Capital Argument .
If flexibility in raising capital is a significant advantage
for the holding company, then it should result in some de-
finitive economic benefit. This might be a lower cost of
capital or improved access to the capital markets, since
these considerations influence profitability and growth. Con-
sequently, the critical question is: "Are the benefits to one
form significantly greater than to the other?"
'While both forms can use equity and debt financing,
there are fewer constraints in the use of debt financing in
the holding company. Therefore, the holding company appears
to have greater potential in the area of financial leverage.
First, as suggested by Bankshares, the holding company may be
able to use more debt than a bank because the regulatory
agencies are not concerned by depositor protection at the
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holding company level. For instance, use of the short-terra
promissory notes by banks-~authorized by the Comptroller of
the Currency (Saxon) in 1963~-was virtually terminated by the
fact that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System classified them as deposits. This made short-term
notes subject to the reserve and interest ceiling rate re-
quirements of the Fed. On the other hand, holding companies
have no such constraint.
Second, there are limitations on the use of capital
debentures or notes specified for national banks by the Comp-
troller which do not apply to holding companies.
"... the principal amount of
capital debentures outstanding at
any time, when added to all other
outstanding indebtness of the bank,
except those forms of indebtness
exempt from the provisions of 12
U.S.C. 82, shall not exceed an
amount equal to 100 percent of the
bank's unimpaired paid-in capital
stock plus 50 percent of the amount
of its unimpaired surplus fund."! 2
Moreover, the non-banking nature of a holding company may re-
sult in a more liberal attitude on the part of its management
toward the use of debt. This possibility is suggested by the







comment of a Bankshares officer that the holding company could
"go- under" and the individual banks would not be affected,
at least directly. These differences suggest that holding
company management could justify the use of more extensive
debt in order to maximize leverage. And, under such conditions
the holding company form might experience a lower long run
13
cost of capital.
However, from the point-of-view of the merged form it
is argued— in this study— that a lower cost of capital may be
more a function of the size of an organization than the type
of an organization. In support of this position one study
found that large holding companies were able to sell their
stock at rates often competitive with the largest independent
banks in an area. This finding implies comparable capital
costs for large organizations of both forms, rather than an
advantage to either. Furthermore, assuming all other factors
affecting the cost of capital are comparable, the data in
Table X-I suggest there is no significant difference in Virginia
13This assumption is based on the "traditional" view-
point in finance that a firm's cost of capital can be lowered
by the use of a judicious amount of debt.
14 Fischer, Bank Holding Companies , op. cit . , pp. 124-25.
The study also found that: (1) small holding companies appar-
ently had little advantage in lowering capital costs since
affiliates usually raise their own capital, but (2) a small




between three holding companies using debt and two merged
systems not using debt, during the years 1965-1966. The
holding companies, as of December 31, 1966, had debt to
equity ratios ranging from a low of 2 4.9 to a high of 4 3.0
percent; debt was financed at rates ranging from 4 3/4 to
4 7/8 percent.
TABLE VI I I-
I
COST OF CAPITAL COMPARISON OF THREE HOLDING COMPANIES AND
TWO MERGED SYSTEMS IN VIRGINIA FOR THE YEARS 1965-1966
Three Holding Companies Two Merged Systems
Year Weighted Cost of Equity and Debt Cost of Equity
1965 6.2% 6.3%
1966 7.4% 8.1%
2 year average 6.8% 7.2%
NOTE: The cost of equity capital is approximated by
the earnings price ratio; the cost of long term debt is ap-
proximated by the rate on outstanding debt.
Data from J. C. Wheat and Company, Richmond, Virginia,
Virginia Bank Stock Annual Review , 1965-1966; and 1965-1966
Annual Reports for First and Merchants National Bank, First
Virginia Corporation, Virginia Commonwealth Corporation, Vir-
ginia National Bank and United Virginia Bankshares.
But, to the extent the three holding companies have
been able to use 4 3/4 to 4 7/8 percent debt financing in the
Comparison of the average cost of capital indicates
a t value of .37. With 2 degrees of freedom, a t value as
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place of higher cost equity, and recognizing that interest on
debt is a deductable expense, then they may have gained some
economic benefit which is not reflected in the admittedly
rough approximation of cost of capital shown in Table VIII-I.
The cost of capital issue narrows down to a choice
between a conclusion that: (1) the holding company benefits
more than the merged system because of its greater potential
for leverage, which may result in a lower long run cost of
capital, or (2) there is no significant difference as suggested
by the experiences of holding companies and merged systems in
Virginia. The first of these conclusions is thought to be the
better choice because the validity of the quantitative data
supporting the "no difference" hypothesis is severely limited
by the small sample size, the short time span measured and the
limiting assumption in this admittedly rough approximation of
cost of capital. Consequently, a clear resolution of the
"economic" consequences of this issue can come only from
future empirical research, and only after the banking indus-
try, as a whole, has adopted practices which make more effec-
tive use of debt financing.
large as 6.965 would occur by chance along with a probability
of .95 when the samples are from the same distribution. These
data, therefore, do not support an hypothesis that the samples
are from different distributions.
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IV. ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE SHAREHOLDERS
OF THE ACQUIRED BANK
Only Bankshares cited economic benefits for the share-
holders of the acquired bank as a significant consideration
in selecting a form of expansion; it was identified as an ad-
vantage applicable to both forms.
The Position of Bankshares
There are Economic Benefits to the Acquired Bank '
s
Shareholders . Bankshares ' management thought that the
financial terms of an acquisition were important and, in some
cases, a decisive influence in a bank joining their holding
company. Policy was to acquire banks on a book value basis,
adjusted to reflect current value of assets. The economic
benefit to the stockholders of the bank being acquired re-
sulted from the fact that their stock, like the stock of many
small banks in Virginia, generally sold at or below book. On
the other hand, Bankshares stock generally sold above book
and, at times, had been as high as 200 percent of book. An
officer of Bankshares illustrated this point as follows:
"Assume you are a large holding
company or a large bank and your
stock is selling at a substantial price
above book. You can afford to offer
16Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-17-18.
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somebody book for book and at
the same time give him, say,
100 percent appreciation on what
he can get for his stock on the
market. One day he has stock
certificates worth $100 and
just by joining you in a merger or
holding company his stock is
immediately worth $200. It is
hard to gauge the influence that
this has, but it is important. It
may be the real clincher. We also
talk to management about local
autonomy, tell them how we operate,
etc. We tell them the two or three
requirements that you have to hammer
on: (1) that their board is responsi-
ble for running the show, (2) that
Bankshares as a stockholder is
basically a service organization,
(3) that we are interested in doing
bigger and grander things and most
importantly to earn some money for
our stockholders. But, who knows
really how much impact philosophy
has versus the dollar?"17
i
Premiums for banks in Virginia interested in joining a
system were thought to be less likely in the future because
the speculative interest in merger candidates has bid up the
stock of banks with acquisition potential.
Discussion
The literature clearly supports the position that af-
filiation with a holding company can result in economic benefit






profitable premium through exchange of stock with a group"
is ''among the three most frequently cited reasons for joining
1 o
a holding company. However, as pointed out by Bankshares,
this benefit is not limited exclusively to holding company
affiliation. Direct merger also provides a premium to the
shareholders of the acquired bank when the acquisition is
made on a book to book basis and when the acquired bank's
stock is selling at or below book. Seemingly, the greater
liquidity of the shares of big banking organizations—of
both forms— is an important attraction in merger or affilia-
tion. Premiums received commonly are attributed to the better
marketability of shares of big organizations, as compared to
small banks, than to almost any other factor.
Table VTII-II illustrates Bankshares ' point that pre-
miums over book were common to both forms of expansion during
the years 1962-1966:
Fischer, American Banking Structure , loc. cit . The
most frequently cited reason for affiliation is "desire of




COMPARISON: BANKSHARES AND FIRST AND MERCHANTS STOCK
PRICE AS A PERCENT OF BOOK VALUE FOR THE YEARS
1962-1966






NOTE: Data from J. C. Wheat and Company, Richmond,
Virginia, Virginia Bank Stocks Annual Review , 1962-1966.
V. DIVERSIFICATION OF RISK
Only First and Merchants cited diversification of risk
as a significant consideration in the selection of a form of
expansion.
The Position of First and Merchants
Diversification of Risk is an Advantage of the Merged
19System . First and Merchants preferred the merged form
because it provided for greater diversification of risk in








The literature generally holds that larger banking
organizations of all types--unit banks, holding companies,
and merged systems--are better able than small banks to diver-
sify risk in their loan and investment portfolios. These
larger organizations typically serve markets of greater size,
and when these areas have different economic characteristics,
this diversification can work to reduce the risk in the
loan portfolio. Similarly, larger banking organizations have
more funds and can gain greater diversity in their invest-
ment portfolios, this— theoretically at least—minimizes the
impact of any one loss.

CHAPTER IX
THE EXPANSION DECISION: MARKETING CONSIDERATIONS
This chapter addresses itself to three marketing con-
siderations, thought to be significant by the managements in
their selection of a form of expansion. These include: (1)
larger lines of credit, (2) marketing identity, and (3) new
and expanded services. Also, this chapter examines some
marketing related elements of First and Merchants' and Bank-
shares' expansion strategy.
I. LARGER LINES OF CREDIT
First and Merchants argued that expansion by direct
merger results in an increased line of credit for any one cus-
tomer, as the result of increased capital. Bankshares did
not comment on this point.
The Position of First and Merchants
Larger Lines of Credit . First and Merchants, in 1962,
could lend one customer approximately $1.5 million; nine Vir-
ginia banks were required to participate to lend $5.0 million.
However, after expansion of its capital as the result of
mergers, First and Merchants could lend approximately $3.5





million in 1966; just a few large Virginia banks were needed
to lend $5.0 million.
In the absence of the merger law the only way the bank's
capital structure could have been increased would have been
through retained earnings or the sale of additional stock.
An officer of First and Merchants expressed the opinion that
capital funds definitely would have been much less had not
mergers taken place. Also, he said First and Merchants was
still not the size desired when measured by either capital
or deposits.
Discussion
The following paragraphs focus on two points. First,
larger lines of credit are important in other ways not dis-
cussed by First and Merchants. Second, larger lines of credit
are common to both forms as a function of increased organiza-
tion size, independent of the form of corporate organization.
The larger lines of credit argument is applicable to
only a small percentage of a bank ! s business, say 1-5 percent
of the number of borrowers in any given market area. But,
these few borrowers are of much greater importance with re-
gard to the total volume of loans. Furthermore the size of
the credit line is an important defensive shield in keeping
other large banks from acquiring business in the "home area"
banking community. And, at the same time it provides a bank
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with an opportunity to operate in a larger market. These con-
siderations were clearly recognized by bankers in Virginia as
a justification and need for larger banking units in 1961,
and were important in bringing about liberalized branching
legislation in 1962.
"Virginia is surrounded by banks
in North Carolina, Maryland and the
District of Columbia with greater lend-
ing ability than any of the Virginia
banks
.
Consequently, the financing for
big commercial and industrial projects
in Virginia is being supplied by out-
of-state banks with increasing frequency.
These big loans are profitable business
for the banks and they create deposits...
Beyond doubt, Virginia bankers say,
this state is losing banking business to
North Carolina. A recent example was the
H. K. Porter Co., whose $2,650,000 electrical
1 transformer plant at Lynchburg was financed
by a North Carolina bank and whose Disston
Saw Division in Danville, which cost
$1,500,000 to $2,000,000, was also fi-
nanced in North Carolina.
No single Virginia bank could
have made those loans, but either
of two banks in North Carolina could.
The implications found in North
Carolina financing of Virginia commerce
and industry are important. If the
borrower establishes banking connections
in North Carolina, it perhaps becomes
plausible for him to build his next
plant or expansion in North Carolina
instead of Virginia."2
A larger line of credit is common to both forms of ex-
pansion; it is primarily a function of increased organization
2 Richmond Times Dispatch, July 2, 1961.
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size, regardless of the corporate form. This position is
consistent with the literature and the experiences of the
organizations studied. For instance, Figure IX- 1 compares
the capital of First and Merchants with Bankshares for the
years 1962-1966; at the same time it compares First and Mer-
































COMPARISON OF CAPITAL FOR FIRST AND MERCHANTS, BANKSHARES, AND
STATE-PLANTERS FOR THE YEARS 1962 AND 1966 (FROM APPENDIX (A)
,
TABLE A-III; AND APPENDIX (C) , TABLE C-III)
If the single bank lending limit of State-Planters is used as
the measure of Bankshares credit line, then First and Merchants




is compared to Bankshares on a system basis, then Bankshares
has the larger credit line. In this case a "system to system"
comparison is the more meaningful representation of the lend-
ing power of the two forms:
"In effect, the combined capital
accounts of the banks within a group
system permit any local member institu-
tion to accommodate the financing re-
quirements of the larger customers.
While similar arrangements exist
between independent unit banks through
correspondents, the closeness of
these relationships varies so much as
to limit the application of this form
of lending. In those group systems
whose banking operations are supple-
mented by branch offices the flow of
funds between areas is promoted even
further by virtue of the branch form
of organization. "3
II. MARKETING IDENTITY
Both managements considered the question of marketing
identity, each alleging certain advantages and disadvantages
of a "system image" versus a "local image".
The Position of First and Merchants
A Disadvantage of Expansion by Direct Merger Was the
4
Loss of the Merged Bank'
s
Name. First and Merchants made
several points concerning the influence of the merged bank's
3Lamb, op. cit .
,
p. 239.
4 Cf . Appendix (C) , pp. C-14-15

IX-6
name to: (1) management, (2) stockholders, and (3) cus-
tomers .
In some cases management of the bank to be merged
placed a great deal of emphasis on its "local identity".
A First and Merchants officer stated:
"... it is surprising how
important an existing bank's name
can be to the bank's management.
In many instances bank management
just does not want the name to
disappear, and under the holding
company route the name can be con-
tinued. "5
In other cases, First and Merchants' management believed that
the surviving bank's name was more important to the acquired
bank's stockholders. For instance, if a bank were merged
into First and Merchants, the local stockholders would receive
First and Merchants stock, i.e., shares in a local bank as
opposed to a holding company, which may be located in some
other area. Here First and Merchants' management believed
the stockholder's tie to a local bank was stronger and pro-
vided just as much local identity in a merged system as does
the retention of the name for a bank which joins a holding
company.
First and Merchants' management believed customers







A survey made in the Tidewater area indicated that 80 percent
of the old depositors, who had for years been doing business
with the acquired bank, associated with the First and Merchants
name 24 months after merger.
The Position of Bankshares
The Value of the Marketing Image Varied with the Circum-
stances . Bankshares ' position was that marketing identity
works both for and against the holding company. A Bankshares
officer said that it was an advantage in local markets where
the banking relationship tended to be highly personal and the
customer had a banking association of a longstanding nature.
On the other hand, the single corporate image of a merged
system---or a holding company using a standard affiliate identi-
fication, i.e., Marine Midland—tended to be a more important
marketing characteristic in areas where the urban customer
was attracted to a large branch system for the uniformity of
services he received. Here an account was good in any branch
in the market area, while in a holding company each affiliate
was a separate bank. However, Bankshares management believed,
that problems stemming from the separate identity of holding
company affiliates could to a degree be offset by having wire
service verification and a corporate symbol for use by each
affiliate. Bankshares took both of these steps.




A strong argument is made in the literature supporting
holding companies since this form permits the retention of
local identity of an affiliate. However, from a marketing
point-of-view it seems impossible to generalize about the value
of a bank's name. The value varies with the individual cir-
cumstances .
The value of a "local" bank name versus a "system" name
depends on considerations such as the areas being served and
the types of customers in these areas. For instance, as
Bankshares argued, in smaller communities or rural areas where
population turnover is low and business and banking associations
are of a long standing and personal nature, the name of the
"local bank" may be best for customer relations. On the other
hand, a "system name" may be a more valuable marketing asset
in the larger urban communities or metropolitan centers where
population mobility is high and banking services are more
7likely to be chosen on the basis of convenience and uniformity.
7
In the case of Bankshares they started operations with-
out system identification at the local level, but in 1968
announced that affiliates would assume a common identification
in early 1969. As quoted from a Bankshares press release,
"J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., President of United Virginia Bank-
shares Incorporated, announced today that after lengthy study
and consultation with the firm of Lippincott & Margulies in
New York City as well as consumer representatives in several
of the United Virginia Bankshares cities that all member banks
of United Virginia Bankshares will adopt a program of common
identification in early 1969. In commenting on this move before
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It is also apparent that management can weigh the
importance of identity in terms of the customer's banking
alternatives. For example, "local identity' 1 is of little
consequence if there is no other banking alternative in the
community. In such a situation the bank's name could be
dropped as the result of a merger with no fear of customer
and depositor switching.
a conference of bank directors from each of the member banks,
Mr. Wilkinson referred to the move as a forward step dictated
by two geo-economic factors. He referred to the increasing
mobility of our population in which 20% of our people change
locations each year and in Virginia 90% of those changing
locations make their changes to other locations in the state.
Wilkinson also called attention to the economic necessity of
taking full advantage of overlapping communications and pro-
motional media, a practice which can be substantially augmented
by uniform identification.
1 The first step in this program was naming the corpora-
tion's "Edge Act" subsidiary United Virginia Bank International,
followed by giving the name United Virginia BankAmericard to
the credit card offered by UVB members. Subsequent plans call
for a newly designed common logo and for each member bank to
be known as "United Virginia Bank" in its respective community
and branch trading areas . In order to achieve the continuing
local identification presently considered such a valuable part
of the holding company concept, an identifying separatism will
be achieved by the addition of a localizing suffix. Plans when
successfully concluded will result in member banks in United
Virginia Eankshares operating under new names as follows: In
Richmond - United Virginia Bank/State Planters; In Norfolk -
United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National...
Concluding his announcement of the identification program
Wilkinson said, 'All of our members eagerly look forward to the
execution of this new program. While in many instances our mem-
bers have achieved success over a period of more than one hundred
years with their previous old and respected names, our changing
times demand changing images and we believe that nowhere is the




Local Identity and the Stockholder. First and Mer-
chants management has a valid argument that merger provides
"local identity" for a bank's shareholders. In this case
their stock carries the name of their bank, whereas a holding
company shareholder does not hold stock in the name of any
bank. This argument, however, does not seem as significant
as the importance of a bank's name with regard to different
markets and customers. Any benefit is limited by the relatively
small number of shareholders compared to total customers— in
the case of First and Merchants approximately 5,300 share-
holders in 1966.
III. SERVICES
New and expanded services was a point cited by both
First and Merchants and Bankshares. First and Merchants sug-
gested that a merged system may have greater potential in this
area, whereas Bankshares cited expanded services as an advan-
tage not exclusive to either form, but rather as contrasted
to the relatively small unit bank in Virginia.
The Position of First and Merchants
p
Community Service . First and Merchants preferred ex-






were thought to be provided through this form of expansion.
All of the services and facilities of a merged system were
available at the local level, i.e., each branch office could
perform any and all services just as if it were the main
office.
"...This is something that de-
finitely can not be done to the same
degree in a holding company organi-
zation. Direct contact with the
specialist in the bank of your
choice, as in a merged organiza-
tion, appears to be a solution which
would give the customer more confidence
than in the holding company where
the specialized services may be
performed by a bank of another
name, or the holding company. "9
Expansion By Direct Merger Creates Larger Bank ing
Units , First and Merchants' management believed that expan-
sion by direct merger developed larger individual banking
units which were then able to offer larger credit lines and
a wider range of services: "Industry is more naturally drawn
to the larger financial organizations which can better serve







The Posi tion o f Bankshares
12New Services . Both forms were thought to provide a
greater range, depth and quality of banking services to Vir-
ginia citizens than a typical unit bank.
"A direct comparison, however,
of holding companies and merged
systems is difficult. This would
depend on the service objectives
of management and the needs of
each market area. For example, First
Virginia, operating primarily in
Northern Virginia, emphasizes con-
sumer business. Therefore, their
service structure would be quite
different from, say, First and Mer-
chants, operating largely in the
Central and Tidewater Virginia areas,
which caters, in a fairly balanced
manner, to both consumer and industrial
accounts . "*-*
Bankshares' position was that service benefits stemmed from
the ability of the holding company to employ specialists in
areas such as trusts, industrial accounts, and data processing.
As an example, expanded services of Bankshares in the 1962-1966
period were: (1) Municipal Bond Department, (2) Professional
Services Program, (3) College Tuition Loan Program, (4) Com-
puterized Payroll Service Program, (5) One Check Payroll
Program, (6) Marketing Department, and (7) Planned operations
of cr'edit card program.
Discussion
The literature clearly holds that both forms provide
for greater range, depth and quality of banking services as
12




a benefit of increased size, irrespective of the form of cor-
porate organization. The issue is which form of organization
does it more effectively?
Both organizations added new and expanded banking ser-
vices to the growing number of communities they served. This
action suggests that the literature and Bankshares positions
draw the more meaningful contrast. That is to say, the more
meaningful contrast is between a small unit bank which does
not have and cannot afford specialized knowledge and competence
in its own personnel and must rely on its correspondent banks
for providing these services, and both the large merged system
and holding company, which can and do provide more and better
services at the local level.
Furthermore, Bankshares certainly has a valid point re-
garding the difficulty of drawing a direct comparison of the ser-
vices of these large banking organizations. Clearly, manage-
ment's marketing objectives and the areas and customers served
are factors which influence service at the local level. Conse-
quently, direct comparisons of the two forms are meaningless
unless these circumstances are considered on an individual basis
IV. MARKETING STRATEGY
First and Merchants and Bankshares each planned and
implemented an expansion strategy aimed at the growth areas
Cf . Appendix (A) , Table A-II; and Appendix (C) , Table




in Virginia. The following paragraphs examine their respec-
tive positions in light of the results of their expansion
programs during the years 1962-1966.
The Marketing Strategy of First and Merchants
15Expand Into Growth Area s. ~ First and Merchants ex-
pansion by direct merger was planned on a statewide basis. It
was primarily directed at urban and industrial areas which had
above average growth potential. Expansion was based on manage-
ments ' concept that growth in metropolitan areas was more as-
sured than rural areas. For this reason Northern Virginia,
Tidewater urban areas, Roanoke, and Lynchburg were considered
for expansion. Also, Winchester, Harrisonburg, Staunton,
Waynesboro, Bristol, Martinsville, and Danville were attractive
because they had more assured industrial growth potential.
An officer of First and Merchants said that merger
partners were looked at from the standpoint of what could be
foreseen as the future development in their areas.
"More opportunities to merge
were turned down than have actually
merged—about three to one. With
some of the people that we have
known for many, many years, the
hardest decision to make was to





the areas that they represented did
not have the required growth poten-
tial. Banks like these generally
wanted: (1) to share in the future
growth and earnings of the First
and Merchants system, (2) to solve
a management succession problem, or
(3) to obtain more marketability for
-, fi
stockholders shares from the merger."
First and Merchants' expansion strategy was highly
selective. Management believed selectivity was sound even
though other bankers contend it was foolish to turn down a
merger because the State of Virginia was going to grow, and
if you could merge, merge.
The Marketing Strategy of Bankshares
17Expansion was Directed at Growth Areas . Bankshares
strategy was to expand in growth areas and to become a state-
wide banking system. Growth areas were defined by above average
population and industrial expansion. The urban corridor south
from Washington to Richmond, then east through Williamsburg
to Newport News and Norfolk met this definition. Also cities
outside the corridor, such as Lynchburg, were seen as key
locations for a statewide system. On this point, a Bankshares
officer said:
16 Ibid., p. C-19





"Bankshares was interested in
going into other cities that were
not in the corridor in order to
become statewide. Yet, we were not
interested in picking small country
banks, because they do not have
growth potential in our opinion, and
serve only a very limited area. "18
This same officer observed that one major system in Virginia
was employing a contrasting strategy in that it merged banks
throughout the state in rural communities.
"I don't know what they see in
these areas. We have heard them say
that they can take a bank and operate
it so that it is going to earn so much
on total assets. But, we feel we can
do the same thing, but we are interested
in growth rather than just keeping a
small branch that is never going to
amount to anything. "19
Discussion
The expansion of both First and Merchants and Bankshares
seems to have been generally consistent with their marketing
strategy. As shown on Table C-I , Appendix (C) , First and Mer-
chants completed seven mergers during the 1962-1966 period.
These mergers gave the bank 33 new banking offices; they pro-
vided entry into the twelve new marketing areas shown on
Table C-II, Appendix (C)
.
Bankshares completed the 13 acquisitions shown on










These acquisitions gave Bankshares 73 offices in the 20 market-
ing areas shown on Table A-II, Appendix (A)
.
With few exceptions, the acquisitions of both organi-
zations were growth oriented, in keeping with their strategy.
For instance, five metropolitan areas were involved in their
expansion programs. Each area had a population growth rate,
over the period 1962-1966, exceeding the 9.1 percent for the
rest of the state. The growth rate of Washington, D. C. --Vir-
ginia part--was 32.5 percent; Richmond 15.2 percent; Norfolk-
20Portsmouth 14.5 percent; Lynchburg 10.9 percent.
Growth Area Strategy : Growth and Profit Opportunities .
Seemingly the plan to merge only banks in high growth areas
does not consider some other growth and profit opportunities.
First, this strategy if strictly followed excludes banks in
low growth areas which have a relatively high return on
capital or which have a very low loan to deposit ratio and,
therefore, surplus funds for immediate use in high growth or
high return areas. Such combinations seem to offer interesting
profit opportunities--to an expanding system—which might make
a low growth merger attractive. Also, screening acquisitions
by area growth potential eliminates the profit opportunities
Bureau of Population and Economic Research, op. cit .
,
p. 8. "Estimates of the Population of Counties and Cities of
Virginia as of July 1, 1966."
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from "management induced growth"; where better management
might improve profitability or the market share.
Growth Area Strategy ; Impact on Competition . Com-
petition in the areas served by First and Merchants, Bank-
shares, and other expanding systems appears to be in-
creased. For example, no statewide banking system served the
Waynesboro, Staunton, Augusta County regional population
center in 1961. Furthermore, the largest of the eight banks
21
serving this area, in 1961, had deposits of $15 million.
By the end of 1966, Table E-II, Appendix (E) shows that this
area was served by branches and affiliates of three banking
systems--with system deposits ranging from $301 to $536
million-- and three smaller banks with deposits ranging from
$5.8 to $19 million. 22
The nature of banking competition in many of the areas
served by the statewide systems also has changed. This fact
is illustrated by the transformation of First National of
Waynesboro, a bank with $11 million deposits, into a branch
of a bank with over $250 million in deposits, by its 1964 merger
with First and Merchants. In such a situation the full re-
sources and wider range of services of a large statewide
2
1
Bureau of Population and Economic Research, "Virginia





banking institution—more than four times the combined size
of all of the competing banks in the area just the year be-
fore—became available in the Waynesboro service area. And,
when more than one statewide system serves an area a new type
of competition exists— system to system competition, between
large full service banking organizations.
While it is sometimes argued that increased concentra-
tion from merger and holding company acquisitions lessens rather
than increases competition, this does not appear to be the case
in Virginia. For example, Table E-II, Appendix (E) shows that
all of the metropolitan areas, except Roanoke, are served by
three or more systems. Additionally, while concentration of
deposits in large banks in Virginia has increased since 1962,
Virginia was not among the 17 states which had a concentration
23
ratio over 50 percent in 1965.
Growth Area Strategy: Its Impact on Rural Areas . One
result of a growth area expansion strategy is that any service
and cost benefits which statewide systems bring to the banking
public tend to be limited to the urban markets. The implication
of this strategy is that both organizations did not care about
becoming "statewide" in a geographic sense. Consequently, this
type of expansion strategy takes on the character of "skimming




the cream from the top" . It tends to maximize growth oppor-
tunities for management, but it does not necessarily serve
equally well all segments of the banking public. However,
since banking facilities are a scarce resource, equal facilities
cannot be given to all areas. Therefore, it may be that a
"skim the cream off the top" strategy actually serves the
public interest since too extensive expansion might waste
24
resources. For instance, an economic planner, in allocating
this scarce resource, would likely assign such facilities to
the areas where they will most quickly produce the biggest
24 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, A Study of Selected Banking Ser-
vices by Bank Size
,
Structure
, and Location , 82nd Congress , 2nd
Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 19.
"...those who urge more extensive branching do so on the ground
that large systems would open offices in places now served only
by small banks and so not as fully serviced as places served by
larger banks or their branches. On this, our data indicate
that banking services definitely increase with bank size . It
follows that services would rise if large banks opened offices
in places now served only by small banks. However, this would
not necessarily be in the public interest. Inspection of the
particular cases where small banks are less apt to provide the
service than large ones suggests that usually it is because
there is little demand for this service by the customers of the
smaller banks. Thus, more extensive branching conceivably at
least could result in the rendering of excessive services, i.e.,
a misallocation or waste of resources. For the principal impli-
cation of our data is that small banks as well as larger banks,
regardless of size and location, play a useful role in our
society. They service "neighborhoods." It would be wasteful
for them to provide many services normally offered by other
classes of banks. There is no neighborhood demand for the
services in question. As a corollary and most importantly,
our data indicate that, in general, banking services are pro-
vided where a demand for them exists."
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results--in this case in Virginia's fast growing industrial
and' urban areas which are served by First and Merchants and
Bankshares
.
A negative aspect of the growth area strategy of both
organizations is that it appears to be inconsistent with the
view of management that merger and holding company affiliation
can provide a solution to the problem of management succession
in smaller banks. This is because the smaller low growth
rural banks that are more likely to have management succession
problems are excluded from the merger universe.
Non-metropolitan banks, however, have not been "outside"
of the merger and holding company movement in Virginia. Nearly
50 percent of the banks merging other banks in the 1962-1966
period were non-metropolitan banks. Also, other systems such
as Virginia National Bank have followed a strategy to acquire
banks in rural areas
.
V. OTHER ELEMENTS OF EXPANSION STRATEGY
Both managements cited other elements of strategy which
were important considerations in their acquisition plans.
Other Elements of First and Merchants' Expansion Strategy
Avoid Dilution of Book Value and Earnings—But Give







was to avoid dilution of book value and earnings in mergers,
but to give the merging bank's shareholders "fair value" for
their holdings.
Maintain a Flexible Strategy. An officer of First
and Merchants saw either a slowdown in the pace of their ac-
quisitions, or a modification of their selective strategy
because of: (1) regulatory concern over the size and extent
of mergers and holding company acquisitions, and (2) competi-
tion for the good banking locations. Here it was implied that
First and Merchants management recognized these influences
and saw the need for a flexible strategy in the future.
Discussion
1 Dilution of Book Value and Earnings Per Share (EPS) .
Clearly, First and Merchants' strategy to avoid dilution of
book value and earnings per share is intended to benefit the
stockholders as well as management. However, on two occasions
since 1962, management has reported to stockholders that earn-
ings were relatively lower as the result of merger activities,
i.e., the 1963 and 1965 annual reports to stockholders attrib-
uted EPS dilution to additional shares of stock issued in
mergers. This experience of First and Merchants seemingly is
26
Cf. Appendix (C) , pp. C-20-21.
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consistent with the findings of one study of mergers in Vir-
ginia which concluded that stockholders of banks expanding by
merger were not getting the same EPS growth as stockholders of
banks not merging:
"Stockholder interests do not
appear to be furthered by the bank
mergers that have occurred in New
York and Virginia. In fact, earnings
per share in Virginia is significantly
negatively associated with merger activity,
perhaps indicating that there may well
be conflict of interest between managers
and stockholders, at least in the short
run. "27
But, as found in this study, lower EPS can be explained in
part by "start up costs" in a merged organization and the added
2 8
costs of new and expanded services. Consequently, the long
run effect of expansion might work to increase EPS growth re-
lative to banks not expanding by merger.
Flexibility in Expansion Strategy . The "flexibility"
aspect of First and Merchants strategy reflects appreciation
by management that important external forces were influencing
the merger picture in Virginia. For instance, regulatory
authorities through denials and policy statements influenced
the supply of merger candidates by giving bankers an idea of








what size and type of mergers might be approved. Shortly
after the 1962 legislation the merger of the Colonial-American
National Bank and First National Exchange Bank, both of Roanoke,
was denied on the grounds that the former bank should be pre-
served as the nuclei of further statewide expansion. This
action was evidence that merger of two relatively large banks
in the same market area in Virginia probably would not be
approved. Consequently, management had to be aware of these
important "outside" influences when planning expansion strategy.
Other Elements of Bankshares' Expansion Strategy
Bankshares ' Strategy was to Acquire a Leading Bank in
29
an Area, if Possible a Bank with Deposits over $10 million .
Bankshares wanted to acquire the leading bank in a community,
one with deposits over $10 million, if possible. First, Bank-
shares wanted strong, well run banks in key locations. A
Bankshares officer explained:
"At the outset we were parti-
cularly interested in getting the
leading bank in a community--one
with a good reputation, good manage-
ment, and one which was well established.
We wanted to create a strong group. "30
While Bankshares was interested in the largest bank in
an area, management believed that the Federal Reserve was less
29







likely to approve such a combination. However, Bankshares did
get the largest bank in Northern Virginia (First and Citizens
of Alexandria— $61.8 million in deposits), and the second
largest in Richmond (State-Planteis--$220 . 3 million) and the
second largest in Newport News (Citizens and Marine Jefferson--
$18.9 million) and Lynchburg (First National Trust and Savings--
$33 . 6 million)
.
A second reason for acquiring a leading bank was to
obtain banks which had the staff to operate on their own
without day-to-day supervision. Given a choice Bankshares
preferred banks over $25 million. An officer explained this
as follows:
"You have more problems with
banks under $10 million and have
to spend more time working with
them. We have a small staff, where-
as Virginia Commonwealth and First
Virginia operate, by and large,
with a large holding company staff.
A larger staff allows them to ac-
quire more smaller banks...
In such cases these banks (banks
over $10 million) run themselves
except for some of the sophisticated
services that the holding company can
give them, i.e., supplying capital,
and helping in taxes, insurance,
accounting, purchasing, investment
-.^
portfolio, and computer applications."
After the initial organization of Bankshares, the size
of subsequent acquisitions became a more important consideration
31Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-26-27.
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to management. This was because the regulatory authorities
were concerned over large bank combinations and Bankshares
management believed that acquiring the largest bank in a com-
munity would be looked upon as putting the smaller banks at a
disadvantage. However, management thought if one of the smaller
banks were acquired the chances for approval of the acquisition
would be greatly improved.
Bankshares ' Acquisition Strategy was to Deal Directly
32
with the Acquired Bank ' s Management . Bankshares' management
thought that an acquisition would not work well for either
party without the full cooperation of the management of the
bank being acquired. Bankshares made no effort to go around
management and talk to the big stockholders, if management
happened to be reluctant to join.
Discussion
Bankshares' expansion strategy was clearly influenced
by having a small holding company staff, whereas some of the
other holding companies operating in Virginia have a large
staff. For example, a small staff appears to be more in keep-
ing with Bankshares' philosophy of a participating management
organization. A large holding company staff probably would
lead to more direct control and less autonomy at the affiliate
32
Cf. Appendix (A), p. A-2:
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level. Furthermore, the choice of Bankshares 1 management to
operate with a small staff also explains their strategy for
acquiring relatively large banks which have management that
could operate without daily supervision.
The logic of Bankshares' strategy to work through the
management of the bank being acquired appears well founded.
Clearly, the support of the incumbent management is needed if
Bankshares 1 objective of independent operations by the af-
filiate are to be realized. Furthermore, it probably would
not be desirable to take on the problem of replacing management
in the acquired bank if Bankshares had a comparable opportunity
elsewhere, i.e., where management conflict was not an issue and
where Bankshares 1 management could have confidence in the
ability of the acquired organization to operate with a minimum
of supervision.
However, profit and growth opportunities may exist in
banks where management is "cool" toward the acquisition, but
the stockholders wish to seek improvements through affiliation.
To the extent such situations do exist, it may be desirable
to deal directly with the stockholders— in full knowledge of
a possible management disposition problem—because of potential
profit and growth opportunities in the situation, or possibly
to get a key location.

CHAPTER X
THE EXPANSION DECISIONS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
This chapter is concerned with four legal considera-
tions thought to be significant by the managements in their
selection of a form of expansion. These include: (1) de novo
branching, (2) reserve ratios, (3) boards of directors, and
(4) regulation.
I. DE NOVO BRANCHING
The critical issue regarding de_ novo branching in Vir-
ginia concerned the disparity in branching pertaining to a
merged system and to a holding company. The managements of
both First and Merchants and Bankshares considered that the
holding company form enjoys a significant advantage as the
result of its greater de novo branching opportunities.
The Position of First and Merchants
De Novo Branching Restrictions Favor the Holding Com-
pany . An officer of First and Merchants stated that the de
novo branching restriction on a merged system was probably
the most valid argument in favor of the holding company form.






eliminated by legislation which would enable a merged system
to branch to the same extent as a holding company.
The impact of the de novo branching restriction was
illustrated in terms of First and Merchants operations in
Lynchburg. Here they obtained six branches by merger with
Peoples National Bank and Trust Company, in January 1963.
However, no additional de novo branches could be established
in the area, even though the community will continue to
grow. On the other hand, holding company affiliates operating
in Lynchburg have been able to branch de novo in the area,
whenever the need was justified.
To Offset De Novo Branching Restrictions in the Merged
Area, First and Merchants Prefers Merger Partners with Branch
2Offices . First and Merchants' expansion strategy minimizes
the de novo branching restrictions in the area of the acquisi-
tion through merger with a bank which has an already well
established branch system.
The Position of Bankshares
The Holding Company has Greater De Novo Branching
Opportunities . Bankshares' management preferred the holding




Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-5-6.
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greater de novo branching opportunities than it did to banks
expanding by direct merger. A merged system could not establish
additional branches in the area of the bank it merged. By
the way of contrast, a holding company could acquire a bank as
an affiliate and the affiliate, as a separate bank, could con-
tinue to de novo branch in its home office area.
Discussion
Clearly, differences in d£ novo branching provide a
holding company with a competitive advantage over a merged
system. The literature concerning the Virginia banking scene
and the managements of both forms acknowledge this fact. How-
ever, this advantage applies only in the Virginia situation
since it stems from the state banking code. It is not typical
of state legislation elsewhere. Moreover, this advantage
applies to the Virginia situation only until such time as
the law is changed. However, this probably will not be in
the near future, if for no other reason than that the Virginia
General Assembly only meets every two years.
The consensus of opinion of the bank officers inter-
viewed indicates that the de novo branching advantage of the
holding company is not significant in the short run, although
it could become an important factor in the long run, if the
legislation is not modified.
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Short Run Impact . A merged system can offset de novo
branching restrictions by selecting merger partners with well
established branch systems. For example, First and Merchants'
mergers in Lynchburg and Newport News added six offices in
each place, and its merger with The Bank of Virginia Beach
added ten. Also, in the initial phase of the merger movement
there are greater opportunities than there are likely to be
later to execute more than one merger in the same locality.
First and Merchants added 14 offices in metropolitan Norfolk
by a merger in Virginia Beach and another in Chesapeake. In
this manner, good initial coverage was obtained in the new
market area. That is, population and industrial growth patterns
are generally slow to change, consequently the structure of
demand for banking services probably will not be altered in
many communities for a number of years.
The Long Run Impact . The alternatives open to a merged
system to keep pace with a holding company in growing communities
are: (1) additional mergers, (2) formation of a new bank and
subsequent merger, and (3) relocation of existing branches.
Each of these alternatives, however, is generally less de-
sirable than de novo branching.
Over a period of time opportunities for additional
mergers will become less as the number of independent banks
decreases and the concentration of the expanding systems in-
creases. Often more than one merger in the same market area
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may not be possible where there are only a few acquisition
eli'gible banks and where the elimination of a competing bank
increases concentration in the area. For example, the
Justice Department, in January 1969, challenged the proposed
merger of Virginia National Bank and The Bank of Hampton
Roads, alleging the merger would, reduce competition in viola-
4tion of the Clayton Antitrust Act.
Furthermore, mergers in new market areas may not be
possible because banks may not be located in the area, and
formation of a new bank in anticipation of subsequent merger,
or relocation of existing branch offices are typically more
costly and less efficient methods of entry than are merger
or de novo branching. Thus, the long run expansion opportunities
of merged systems are not only likely to decrease, but they are
generally more costly than the de novo branching opportunities
of the holding company.
Wall Street Journal , January 21, 1969. "Virginia
National Bank, which the suit said is the second-largest in
the state, has eight branches in Hampton Roads. It has 42%
of total commercial bank deposits in the Hampton Roads area,
a larger share than any other bank in the area, the suit said.
Virginia National doesn't operate branches in Newport News,
which adjoins Hampton Roads, but Virginia National's Hampton
branches hold 12% of total commercial bank deposits in the
combined Newport News-Hampton Roads area, the suit added.
The Bank of Hampton Roads has one office in Hampton
Roads and four in Newport News. It accounts for 8% of the
total deposits in both Hampton Roads and in the Newport News-
Hampton Roads area, according to the suit.
Virginia National, as of June 29, 1968, had assets of
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A Public Benefit Consideration . If the long run dis-
parity in growth opportunities between the two forms becomes
a significant competitive factor, merged systems may form
5holding companies to improve their growth potential. And,
if it is true as alleged in the literature and argued by
First and Merchants that merged systems are potentially more
efficient than holding companies, then the Virginia banking
public may face higher cost, less quality, and less extensive
banking services in the long run. On the other hand, the
situation in Virginia clearly will permit legislators and
bankers to assess better the relative merits of each organi-
zation, if they are provided equal opportunities for growth,
profit, and public service.
II. RESERVE RATIOS
The focus of the reserve ratio issue was on the fact
that a holding company, under certain conditions, can gain a
lower effective reserve ratio on its total system deposits
than can a merged system. Bankshares cited this point as a
significant consideration.
$705 million, deposits of $628 million and loans of $412 mil-
lion.
The Bank of Hampton Roads, as of that date, had assets
of $19 million, deposits of $17 million and loans of $12 million."
In forming a holding company it may be possible for a




The- Position of Bankshares
Lower System Reserve Requirements for Holding Companies
.
Bankshares preferred the holding company form because it had
an economic advantage in terms of the reserves required against
system demand deposits. This advantage, representing higher
potential earning power, came from two factors. First, non-
member (Federal Reserve System) affiliates continued to operate
with 10 percent reserve ratio on demand deposits in lieu of
the 12 percent (country bank) or 16 1/2 percent (reserve city
bank) ratio required for banks merged into a member of the
Federal Reserve System. Bankshares' three non-member banks,
in 1964, gained an estimated $640,000 in earning reserves, in
Bankshares' view, potentially worth income of approximately
$38,400 per year.
Second, each holding company affiliate used the reserve
ratio applicable to its own locale. Thus, only affiliates in
designated reserve cities needed to apply the higher 16 1/2
percent reserve city ratio, other banks could use 12 percent.
By the way of contrast, a merged system with an office in a
reserve city was required to apply the 16 1/2 percent ratio to
total system deposits, wherever located. By not having the
16 1/2 percent rate required on all affiliates, in 1966,
6
Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-14-15.
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Bankshares gained an estimated earning reserves of $4 6 mil-
lion, in Bankshares' view, potentially worth some $360,000
income a year, at 6 percent.
Discussion
Clearly lower reserve ratios on demand deposits can be
a significant economic advantage for the holding company. For
example, the profit opportunities due to differences in re-
serve ratios on deposits could vary between:
A. A holding company not operating affiliates in
Richmond (a reserve city)
:
— 10 percent ratio for non-members
— 12 percent ratio for non-Richmond affiliates.
B. A holding company operating affiliates in
Richmond
:
— 10 percent ratio for non-members
-- 12 percent ratio for non-Richmond affiliates.
-- 16 1/2 percent ratio for Richmond affiliates.
C. A merged system without an office in Richmond:
-- 12 percent reserve ratio for the complete
system.
D. A merged system with an office in Richmond:
— 16 1/2 percent reserve ratio for the complete
system.
In the outcomes A through D, a holding company generally has
a ratio advantage over a merged system. It has an opportunity,
in certain cases, to apply lower reserve ratios against system
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deposits. That is, a member bank merged system cannot use the
lower 10 percent ratio, and a merged system with an office in
Richmond must apply the 16 1/2 percent ratio against all system
deposits, whereas a holding company with a Richmond affiliate
applies the 16 1/2 percent ratio only against the deposits
of that affiliate. Consequently, the holding company form has
greater profit opportunities, not because of better or more
aggressive management, but because of the impact of legisla-
tion on earning reserves.
The disparity in earnings opportunities favors the
holding company in acquisitions. For example, if a Charlottes-
ville member bank were acquired as an affiliate by a Richmond
holding company, the 12 percent ratio would apply to the af-
filiates' deposits. By way of contrast, if the Charlottesville
member bank were acquired by a Richmond merged system as a
branch, the 16 1/2 percent ratio would apply. Under these con-
ditions the 4 1/2 percent differential on earning deposits
would give the holding company either: (1) "quicker pay back"
on its acquisition, or (2) the opportunity to pay higher pre-
miums for the bank with the same "pay back". In either case,
the difference in earnings potential gives the holding company
a competitive edge in acquiring two of banking's scarce re-
sources—desirable locations and desirable management, or both.
There are several reasons why it is difficult to assess
the significance of the unequal earnings opportunities result-
ing from the ratios applied to demand deposits. First, the
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time elapsed since 1962 is not of sufficient duration to
identify the possible long-term effects on the competing
forms in Virginia. Second, if there were an adverse effect
on competition it would be very difficult to lay the cause
to the ratio differential and not to other conditions affect-
ing competition, such as: (1) management, (2) markets, (3)
customers, (4) services, and (5) organization structure.
Possibly an interim perspective on this issue stems
from the fact that the literature does not indicate that
academicians, bankers or regulatory authorities have expressed
undue concern on this point. Because of this, the problem may
be more theoretical than actual.
III. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
The critical question regarding boards of directors
is: "Are honorary boards of directors in a merged system as
effective as the legal boards they replaced?" This question
arises because holding company affiliates are separate legal
entities and, therefore, continue to operate with their own
boards of directors and bank officers.
The Position of First and Merchants
Change in Status of the Merged Bank 1 s Board of Directors
7
is a Disadvantage of Expansion by Direct Merger . To replace
7 Cf. Appendix (C)
, pp. C-15-16, 22
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the merged bank's legally constituted board of directors,
First and Merchants appointed an area advisory board, using
the same group of men. Management found that their experience
with advisory boards was especially good because the directors
were used as they had been previously. That is, advisory
board members were used for their advice and knowledge of the
community and its affairs. The only significant difference
noted by an officer of First and Merchants was that area
advisory board members did not have any real legal liability.
The Position of Bankshares
p
Local Identity . Bankshares preferred the holding com-
pany form because the acquired banks retain their identity
and because the bank officers and directors retain full re-
sponsibility for the bank's operations. Affiliation did not
remove a bank from the local scene. The community continued
to deal with the same corporate entity and corporate officers
and changes in the service area tended to be minimized since
local management and local boards of directors continued to
exercise daily supervision of the affiliate's operations.
Because of these considerations, an officer of Bankshares
offered the opinion that the fundamental philosophy of group
banking more nearly meets the test demanded in the compromise
p
Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-12-13.
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between Virginia's traditional concept of unit banking and
the state's need for larger banking organizations.
In addition, an officer of Bankshares argued that with
affiliate directors representing one stockholder, the holding
company, there was no accommodation of multi -group stock-
holders .
"Most of our banks are 10 percent
owned except for directors' qualifying
shares. The exception is a very small
minority whose basic rights are guar-
anteed by law. Naturally we safeguard
them too for we don't want to go to
court. The point is this, where you
have basically one stockholder who
speaks with one voice, the directors
representing the stockholder, who is
only one, are naturally more respon-
sive to the stockholder's wishes.
Directors do not represent different
groups of stockholders with divergent
ideas. Also, with only one stockholder
is it not natural to be more attentive
and responsive to his wishes? After all
he owns the bank, lock, stock, and barrel.
In a publicly owned corporation ynu
don't have this. Neither do you have
a stockholder who advises and counsels
the directorate. The stockholder can't
be capricious and the directors can't
be arbitrary in a holding company set
up." 9
Discussion
A central issue concerning boards of directors in the






versus "honorary" members. A question to be answered is:
"What are the differences of operating with "honorary" boards
versus "legal" boards at the local level?"
" Honorary " Boards of Directors . The discussion of
honorary boards, also called Area Advisory Boards and Regional
Boards, considers three stages in their evolution. The first
is the period immediately following merger when feelings at the
local level have to be considered. In this stage the appoint-
ment of an honorary board has the "negative" advantage of
avoiding ill will for those members of the merged bank's old
board who were not appointed to the board of the merging bank.
At this time of initial entry into a market area, the continuing
"good will" of the previous bank's management could be an
important factor in community relations, particularly where
the old board members were leaders of the community.
The second stage in the development of an honorary
board is the time when the first "new" member has to be ap-
pointed, since this action inevitably raises the question
whether the board will be perpetuated. Managements decision
at this point will probably be based on how effective the
honorary board has been in maintaining and generating business.
That is, "Have honorary boards 'paid their way ' in their ad-
visory role?" In the case of First and Merchants, its "Re-
gional Boards" have been judged to be effective by management.
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In addition to new members being appointed to some of its
boards, a new board for Richmond was formed.
"Through their particular knowledge
of local conditions and interest in the
bank, members of our several Regional
Boards have rendered invaluable assis-
tance in promoting the affairs of our
various widely separated offices. Re-
cognizing this, and also that the make-
up of our Board of Directors is becoming
increasingly statewide in character, a
new Board for Richmond offices was
formed during the year. We look for-
ward to a close association with this
group of outstanding men as we do with
members of the Leesburg and Virginia
Beach Boards, added at the time of our
recent mergers. "10
The third stage in the development of an honorary board
involves the "second generation" management, if the boards are
perpetuated. In this stage the motivation of second generation
directors probably will be different than the first because of
differences in the "legal" and "honorary" role in policy
development and management control. There will be a natural
tendency for management policy development and implementation
to fall within the framework of legal responsibility in the
corporation, keeping honorary directors in a purely advisory
role. Consequently, it may become more difficult to attract
and hold the desired quality of persons on honorary boards
First and Merchants National Bank, 1965 Annual Report
,





because top management talent is less likely to remain in
a purely "advisory" capacity. As a result, holding com-
panies might have a long run advantage in competing for the
best qualified talent to fill boards at the local level. How-
ever, the experiences of both forms in Virginia are not of
sufficient duration to evaluate this last stage of "honorary"
board evolution.
Legal Boards
. Retention of legal boards was one of
three reasons given by Bankshares why expansion by the holding
company route more nearly meets the test demanded in the com-
promise between Virginia's traditional concept of unit bank-
ing and the state's need for larger banking organizations.
The other two reasons were that holding company affiliation
does not remove a bank from the local scene and directors of
affiliates representing one stockholder, the holding company,
give more direct response than directors who have to accom-
modate multi-group stockholders.
A. In a Holding Company Affiliate the Community Con -
tinues to Deal with the Same Corporate Entity and the Same
The legal aspects of advisory boards also are not
completely clear. For example, advisory board members may
not have legal responsibility in the same direct manner as
before, but they may have comparable moral responsibilities
in their areas of influence. Therefore, it seems possible
that advisory board members may be subject to conflict of
interest suits in the same manner as regular directors.
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Corporate Office rs . Bankshares argued that changes in the
service area are minimized under the holding company form
because local management and local boards continue to exercise
daily supervision of affiliate operations. This argument appears
to imply that local level management and service inevitably
change as the result of expansion by direct merger; also that
change may not be beneficial to the banking public. These
results, however, are not necessarily the case. For example,
a merged system--like a holding company--can retain an acquired
bank's officers at the local level. In fact, this will clearly
be the case where the purpose of the merger was to "buy" good
management. The local banking public would deal with the
same people, v/ith different titles. And, as suggested by the
proponents of direct merger, the officers in a newly acquired
branch may retain the same or gain even more operating respon-
sibility than they had before merger. In such situations,
the public could benefit, as an example from higher lending
limits at the local level.
By the way of contrast, an officer of a large Virginia
holding company expressed the opinion that the customer feels
that his interest is better served when he deals with the "top
man" in a banking organization. He argued, a bank president
is the "top man", whereas a branch manager is not. He thought
that the customer often assumes, rightly ot wrongly, that the
president has the authority necessary to solve the customer's
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problems, i.e., reference "to the home office" is not required
as may be the case in a branch of a merged system.
To assess the foregoing attitude the following question
is asked: "To what types of customers and in what types of
banks might this attitude be an important factor?" First, in
large or medium size banks the typical depositor, checking
account or savings account, is not likely to be a customer who
would have a problem requiring access to the chief executive.
Also, for many borrowers, a loan officer is likely to be the ' >
highest officer they would see or desire to see, i.e., for
time contracts or small loans. In smaller banks, however,
more customers probably like and expect direct contact with
the chief executive. Even so, customers requiring access to
the president are probably a relatively small percentage of a
bank's day-to-day business, although they may be more impor-
tant profit-wise. Therefore, customer access to the bank
president vis-a-vis a branch manager may not be as important
as some other factors, such as the ability of any bank officer
or employee to promote the feeling of responsive customer ser-
vice.
Bankshares point-of-view that retention of local con-
trol results in a minimum number of changes in the service
area seemingly implies that changes may not be in the best
interest of the local banking public and that there are no
problems of "outside control" in the holding company form. On
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this point, it is evident that changes in the local service
areas may not be undesirable per se . New and expanded ser-
vices, after either merger or affiliation, are the generally
expected and beneficial results of large system banking.
Also, retention of legal directors at the local level does not
necessarily avoid the problem of "outside control". For in-
stance, the holding company could exercise "dictatorial" con-
trol through appointment of "puppet" boards at the affiliate
level. Also, holding companies are open to control of special
interest in outside financial centers such as New York, in the
same manner as any large corporation whose shares are traded
on regional or national markets.
B. Bankshares ' Position is that Holding Company Af -
filiation Does Not Remove a Bank From the Local Scene . It is
evident that affiliation vis-a-vis merger "as the best com-
promise with tradition" is not a matter of principle with
holding companies in Virginia. This observation is supported
by the fact that holding companies have had affiliates merge a
bank in some cases rather than the holding company acquiring the
bank as an independent unit. Furthermore, there seems to be
little difference between affiliation and merger with regard to
possible adverse effects on competition. While it is true that
there is one less bank in the state after a merger, both merger
and affiliation eliminate a competitor and increase banking
concentration. Seemingly, therefore, the result in the eyes of
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the "traditional unit banker" of either merger or holding
company affiliation would be much the same, i.e., "an indepen-
dent bank" is replaced by a "system bank".
C. Bankshares ' Position is that Holding Company
Directors Provide More Direct Response . Clearly, the question
of director response and management control is an area where
the discussion of "organizational and operational" and "legal"
considerations overlap. As concluded in Chapter VII, a dis-
tinction needs to be made between the situation where an af-
filiate is 100 percent owned by the holding company and the
situation where there are varying degrees of ownership. Where
affiliate ownership is almost 100 percent, as is the case with
Bankshares, it appears that the action of affiliate boards
can be and would be more responsive to the holding company,
than it would be in cases where affiliates are owned sub-
stantially less than 100 percent. However, the question of
accommodating multi-group stockholders will continue to face
holding company management where any minority interest exists
at the affiliate level. In fact, some bankers interviewed
during the course of this study expressed the opinion that
there are no more unattractive securities— from the viewpoint
of the stockholder—than a minority interest in a small local
bank that is controlled by a holding company. Probably the
stockholder has no chance of selling his stock to anyone

X-20
except the holding company and this is likely to mean on the
holding company's terms. Therefore, the unattractive position
of the minority interest in an affiliate appears to make hold-
ing company management more vulnerable to charges from the
minority. That is, the only avenue for effective minority
action may be to sue, whereas in a merged system all stock-
holders have access to a broader market for disposition of
their shares in the event they disagree with management
policies or actions. By the way of contrast, problems of a
dissident minority do not remain after a merger in Virginia,
since an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the merging bank's
stock forces the other third to exchange or to accept cash,
as applicable.
The legal differences between directors in the two
forms definately have control and response implications.
These differences can be seen by examining the functions and
duties of legal directors as outlined in a publication of the
New York Stock Exchange:
"State laws under which the businesses
are incorporated hold boards of directors
responsible for the welfare of their com-
panies. Directors are not only trustees
of the business, and have a fiduciary
relationship to stockholders, but also
have a responsibility to the company's
employees, its customers, and to the gen-
eral public, upon whose good will the well-
being of the enterprise depends. Failure
to take cognizance of the responsibility
to each of these four groups can adversely
affect the solvency of the corporation.

X-21
The laws do not spell out the duties
of directors other than that they should
manage the affairs of the company, so
there are wide variations in the functions
actually performed by boards of directors.
However, there are seven areas of respon-
sibility that appear to have general ac-
ceptance .
1. To establish the basic objectives
and broad policies of the corpor-
ation.
2. To elect the corporate officers,
advise them, approve their actions,
and audit their performance.
3. To safeguard and approve changes
in the corporate assets (issuance
of securities, pledge of assets on
loans, declaration of dividends,
and conveyance of property)
.
4. To approve important financial
matters (such as budgets, capital
appropriations, officers' pay, fi-
nancial audits) and to see that proper
annual and interim reports are given
to stockholders.
5. To delegate special powers to others
to sign contracts, open bank accounts,
sign checks, issue stock, make loans,
and such other activities as may re-
quire board approval.
6. To maintain, revise, and enforce the
corporate charter and by-laws.
7. To perpetuate a sound board through
regular elections and the filling of
interim vacancies . "12
The very nature and scope of the legal director's re-
sponsibilities makes the functioning of management control
12New York Stock Exchange, The Corporate Director and
The Investing Public (New York: The New York Stock Exchange,
November 1965), p. 18.
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and director response in a holding company significantly
different than in a merged system. The development and im-
plementation of policy involves resolution of problems among
a number of managements, each equally and legally responsible
not only to the stockholders, but also in some measure to
employees, customers, and the general public. Consequently,
the management process is likely to be more complex than is




Bankshares cited three points regarding the impact
of regulation on the two forms of expansion. One, "flexibility
in expansion" , was considered an advantage of the holding com-
pany form. Two, "Security Exchange Commission Regulations"
and "Regulatory Agency Control", were considered disadvan-
tages. First and Merchants did not cite any of these points
as significant.
The Position of Bankshares
13
Flexibility in Expansion . Bankshares preferred the
holding company form because it provided greater flexibility
in selection of a method of acquisition. For example, a holding
13
Cf. Appendix (A), pp. A-9-11.
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company could expand by acquisition of a bank as an affiliate
of the holding company, or expand by merger of a bank into an
affiliate of the holding company. Management felt that this
option provided an opportunity to select the most likely route
for regulatory approval. In support of this point, it was
stated that the opportunity to choose the approval path of
least resistance was an important factor in the acquisition
of one of Bankshares ' affiliates.
A merged system, on the other hand, had the problem
of changing its charter from national to state, or visa versa,
in order to change the route for regulatory approval. That
is, a national bank could become a state member bank and,
thereby, change the approval agency from the Federal Reserve
to the Comptroller of the Currency. However, an officer of
Bankshares stated that merged systems were reluctant to switch
charters back and forth just to pick the most likely agency.
The "phantom bank" device was an additional acquisition
technique used by Bankshares. Under this method a bank was
first established on paper only, in the area where Bankshares
wanted to acquire another bank which was already in operation.
The purpose was to merge these two banks, the "paper" or
"phantom" bank and the operating bank. Merger otherwise would
not have been possible unless a holding company affiliate was
already operating in the area. The advantages of this method
of acquisition were: (1) elimination of minority interest and
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exemption from Securities Exchange Commission registration,
since acquisition was by merger and not affiliation, and (2)
the acquired bank could remain as the continuing organization
14if it were the surviving bank after merger.
15Securities Exchange Commission Regulations . At the
time Bankshares was formed, 1962, banking was not subject to
such requirements of the Securities Acts, as registration and
prospectus requirements, annual and periodic reporting re-
quirements, proxy and financial reporting requirements, and
insider trading requirements. With the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1964 banking was brought under the Acts so that to-
day banks, for the most part, are subject to the same securities
rules as holding companies. However, a difference in administra-
tion still remains in that banks do not have to report directly
to the SEC since they deal exclusively with their respective
regulatory agency for securities regulations, as well as other
matters. On the other hand, holding companies report both to
the SEC and banking agencies.
1 /r
Regulatory Agency Control . Bankshares saw duplicity
of regulatory control as a disadvantage of the holding company
Cf. Chapter V, pp. V-43-44 for a more detailed ex-
planation of the "phantom" bank device.






form. For example, a merged system--as a single banking in-
stitution— reports primarily to one supervisory authority for
matters pertaining to examinations, branches, and "incidental
17powers". By the way of contrast, a holding company may have
a mixture of state or national, FDIC or non-FDIC, and member
or non-member banks. Consequently, a holding company could
have all of the regulatory authorities involved in supervision
of its various affiliates, as well as the holding company
itself being under the supervision of the Federal Reserve
System. Under these circumstances, it was the position of
Bankshares that the duplicity of regulatory control resulted
in minor differences in areas such as capital requirements and
loan limits. Thus, policy on these matters was not uniform
throughout the system.
Discussion
" Flexibility of Expansion " . The holding company has a
greater number of ways by which it can acquire a bank. For
18instance, it can acquire a bank by affiliation or merger.
This added flexibility might improve the "odds" of acquisition
17
Also, each bank obviously must comply with the ap-
plicable regulations of the other regulatory authorities,
aside from the areas of specific concern of the supervisory
authority with primary cognizance over the bank.
18There are various technical differences under the
Virginia Stock Corporation Act between merger, consolidation,
and acquisition of assets in the sense that tax and other
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over the long run by the fact that the holding company is
better able to process an acquisition application to the agency
with the best "approval record".
First, it is possible that differences in the attitudes
of government agencies approving applications for expansion
may continue to exist even though the legislative criteria
for approval of merger and holding company applications now
are substantially the same. Given such future conditions the
holding company could select the "most likely route for ap-
proval". For example, its application can go via the Comp-
troller of the Currency, Federal Reserve System or FDIC--
whichever has the "best approval odds"—by merging a bank with
a national, state-member or non-member Federal Reserve System
affiliate, as appropriate. On the other hand, a merged system
can process only through its applicable agency, unless the
surviving bank changes its charter in order to change the
agency reviewing its application.
Flexibility in acquisitions would be important to
management only if the "odds of approval" were significantly
better at one agency, and if a system were still in the early
phase of its expansion program. Probably, however, management
considerations vary. However, merger, consolidation, and ac-
quisition of assets are considered the same under state and
federal laws regulating expansion.
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in a holding company or merged system which had reached the
planned limit of its expansion would be indifferent to this
consideration
.
Differences in Regulation . The coverage of this point
in the literature is "thin". It is significant that the only
source found in the course of this study discussing procedural,
legal, and technical differences between holding company and
merger expansion was a thesis authored by Lewis B. Flinn,
19Secretary-Treasurer of United Virginia Bankshares.
A. Procedural Differences . Flinn cites-~from the view-
point of holding company management—several procedural dif-
ferences which make the holding company route more difficult
20 .
than direct merger. Among these are the requirements for:
(1) public disclosure (where the Federal Reserve Board is the
approving agency this would also apply to merger) , (2) the
possibility of hearings, with their resulting delays and un-
certainties, required under Section 4(b) of the Holding Com-
pany Act (if the Comptroller of the Currency or the appropriate
state agency disapproves the application) , and (3) minor dif-
ferences in application forms. Holding company application




forms are more exhaustive since the Board requires information
for' each affiliated bank and not just the system as a whole.
Information not required on merger forms includes correspondent
bank balances, consumer loans purchased, and municipal securities
held.
While Flinn suggests that these procedural differences
make the holding company route "more difficult" it is possible
that the perspective may be, or should be "more expensive."
The marginal cost of these differences is likely to be minimal
and holding companies have specialists in their organizations
to accommodate the problems they involve.
B. Legal and Technical Differences . Flinn cited certain
technical and legal differences which work both to the disadvan-
21tage and to the advantage of the holding company. Disadvan-
tages of holding expansion are that affiliation requires the
expense of registration with the SEC and affiliation does not
eliminate minority interest—there is no minority interest
in a merger. Advantages are that the holding company gains
flexibility from the fact that it may purchase its own stock
for use in acquisitions, and stockholder approval is not needed





C. Regulatory Agency Control . The differences in
regulatory agency control discussed by Flinn do not appear to
be a significant factor in the selection of a method of expan--
22
sion. However, the one-bank holding company has particular
significance to the choice of a form of organization for ex-
pansion, and to managements who have already chosen to expand
23by either of the two forms.
Managements in both forms can elect to form a one-bank
holding company. The essential difference under current legis-
lation is that the regulated bank holding company will have to
change the multi-bank aspect of its corporate structure and,
thereby, give up the benefits management saw when group banking
was initially selected as a form of expansion. Consequently,
under the current legislation management in a regulated bank
22
Ibid.
23New York Times, September 18, 1968. The extent of the
one-bank holding company movement is illustrated in a tabula-
tion made by M. A. Schapiro and Company, Inc. In 196 8, there
were 27 one-bank holding companies operating with $50.8 billion
in deposits, or 15.8 percent of the $320.3 billion held by the
Federal Reserve System's 6,000 members— these 27 banks also
held on a capital basis $3.8 billion, or 13 percent of the
$29.1 billion total. The significance of this movement is
illustrated by the statement of the president of the Bank of
America on the subject of their plans to reorganize as a one-
bank holding company. "A one-bank holding company presents
possibilities for greater participation in a number of pro-
fitable activities, particularly overseas. While we have no
specific businesses in mind, such activities might include
leasing, warehousing, mutual funds, financing land development,




holding company cannot elect to have their banking operations
in the group form, and at the same time have non-banking
operations as a one-bank holding company. Here, a choice will
have to be made by management: to weigh the benefits management
sees in diversification into non-banking operations against
the benefits of group banking. By the way of contrast, manage-
ment in a merged system can keep their banking operations in
the form desired and also diversify into non-banking operations
as a one-bank holding company. That is, management in the




The principal objective of this research was to pre-
sent information on the two banks studied~-First and Merchants,
expanding by direct merger; and Bankshares, expanding by the
holding company route--with a view toward examining, from the
management point-of-view, the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of direct merger and the holding company as alterna-
tive methods of expansion. To accomplish this objective, the
research design focussed on the central issues considered by
the managements in their decisions to expand. Or, in other
words: "How were these issues assessed by the managements in
terms of the advantages and disadvantages of one form of
organization relative to the other?"
This chapter now restates the developments of the pre-
vious chapters and discusses the more important findings and
conclusions of the whole study.
I. SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The discussion of banking history and changes in the
structure of banking in Virginia, during the period 1962-1966,
was intended to provide a perspective of the expansion of
banks in the state.
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A. In the past forty years the state law regulating
expansion of banks in Virginia underwent three significant
changes. In 1928 bank expansion was curtailed. Mergers
were limited to the immediate geographic area of the parent
bank and de novo branches to cities having a population of
not less than 50,000. In 1948 bank expansion was further cur-
tailed. De novo branches were limited to the immediate area
of the parent bank. In 1962 bank expansion was liberalized.
De novo branches and mergers continued to be authorized in the
immediate area of the parent bank, but mergers were authorized
elsewhere in the state.
B. Until 1962, Virginia bankers generally had a
negative attitude toward branching. This attitude, in part,
derived from concern over the expansion activities of The
Bank of Virginia, previously The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond.
Other factors which had an effect on bankers' attitudes were
the division of the state into separate economic, social, and
political regions, and the fact that Virginia bankers, like
many bankers elsewhere, were slow in seeing any need to enter
the field of consumer finance or other fields that were not
"traditional".
C. Ultimately dynamic forces outside and inside the
state forced a change of thinking on the part of Virginia
bankers and legislators regarding branching. Consequently,
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legislation passed in 1962 authorized statewide expansion of
bafiks by direct merger. The significant forces external to
Virginia were: (1) the enactment of the Holding Company Act
in 19 56 and the subsequent rapid expansion of holding com-
panies, (2) the increasing competition from larger banking
systems in neighboring states, and (3) the banking industry's
development of broadened services for the public, i.e., the
evolving concept of a bank as "a department store of finance".
Significant forces internal to Virginia were: (1) the accel-
erated trend toward urbanization and industrialization of
Virginia's communities, and (2) the growing competition from
holding companies, which were not regulated by state law and
which, therefore, could expand into communities throughout the
state, while individual banks could not.
D. The changes in the Virginia banking community were
the result of forces that bank management, for the most, did
not originate and could not control. Bankers, therefore, were
not the primary motivating force of innovation in the state.
E. The 1962 legislation authorizing merger on a state-
wide basis resulted in an "Oklahome Land Rush" of mergers and
holding company acquisitions throughout Virginia. Some of the
significant changes in the banking structure resulting from
this were: (1) fewer banks, but more banking offices, (2)
creation of six statewide banking organizations— two merged
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systems and four holding companies, (3) greater deposit con-
centration in the largest banks and banking organizations,
(4) accelerated growth of the larger banks in relation to
their competitors, permitting development of banking organi-
zations in Virginia large enough to compete with the banking
organizations to the north and south of Virginia.
F. The merger and holding company movements resulted
in the following beneficial changes: (1) larger lines of bank
credit, (2) improved mobility of funds for meeting the credit
needs of the several regions throughout the state, (3) more
extensive banking services, (4) greater flexibility for banks
to serve growing urban communities, (5) broadening of local
markets in which Virginia banks compete with each other, and
(6) evolution of a new level of banking competition—system
to system competition on a statewide basis.
II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IN THE AREA OF THE LITERATURE
The literature is strong to the extent that it embodies
a comprehensive list of the advantages and disadvantages of
the two forms of organizations . Most of these were considered
by the managements of First and Merchants and Bankshares in
their selection of a method of expansion. The literature,
however, is thought to be weak in other respects, and for
reasons generally recognized by scholars and bankers, alike.
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These weaknesses largely are the result of the imperfect state
of 'research in certain areas.
The literature generally is "thin" in the area of
direct and comprehensive comparisons of a merged system and
a holding company as alternative forms of expansion. Discus-
sions typically contrast the holding company or merged system
to a unit bank, rather than one to the other. Yet, this situa-
tion is understandable since, historically, the controversy
has been between the desirability of unit banking versus any
and all forms of multi-office banking.
The literature tends to cite advantages and disadvan-
tages as "generalizations", in the sense that little attention
is given to the question: "To whom is this or that organiza-
tional characteristic an advantage or disadvantage?" Issues
ordinarily are not examined with a view toward recognizing
any differences between the parties at interest, who may be:
(1) management, (2) stockholders, (3) depositors, (4) regulatory
authorities, (5) borrowers, and (6) the general public. Also,
issues typically are not examined with a view toward considering
management policy toward: (1) deposits, (2) loans, (3) capital,
(4) services, (5) profits, or (6) growth. The importance of
this deficiency is that the consideration of different points-
of-view alters the significance of a particular advantage or
Cf. Quotation p. V-l.
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disadvantage, depending on the circumstances at hand. For
example, an advantage of the holding company is alleged to
be that an acquired bank retains its name after affiliation;
therefore, it continues to benefit from its "local identity"
in its service area. However, this is not a valid generali-
zation because the lack of homogeneity of customers and mar-
kets may make a "statewide system identity" the preferred
marketing name under certain conditions.
Some of the advantages and disadvantages cited in the
literature cannot be resolved clearly in favor of either form
because supporting empirical evidence is lacking. For instance,
quantitative evidence directly comparing the holding company
and the merged system is needed in the areas of: (1) economies
of scale and integration, and (2) cost of capital—capital
structure.
Other issues cannot be resolved in the favor of either
form because they are subjective in nature; consequently, they
are not subject to quantitative proof. These issues relate to
questions of "management choice or preference", such as centra-
lized versus decentralized control, or the value of "legal"
versus "honorary" directors. Furthermore, some advantages or
disadvantages tend to change their character over time, after
the persons active in management at the time of an acquisition
disappear from the scene.
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III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE EXAMINATION OF
THE EXPANSION EXPERIENCES OF FIRST AND
MERCHANTS AND BANKSHARES
Significant findings in various areas are drawn to-
gether in the following paragraphs. They are discussed with
regard to an explicit set of criteria against which the two
forms can be measured: (1) efficiency and profitability, (2)
ease of acquisition, (3) management effectiveness, first gen-
eration and successor generations, (4) amount of scarce re-
sources needed and ability to acquire and use them, and (5)
ability to adapt to a changing environment and technology.
The measurement of the two forms against these criteria is
not intended to provide the "right answer" or "absolute
truth" on the issues and questions considered in this dis-
sertation. Rather, it is intended to provide a framework in
which to think about various points. Such perspective is
significant since investigation of the expansion experiences
of First and Merchants and Bankshares shows that the choice
between direct merger and the holding company turns on con-
siderations which are largely particular to a given situation.
Therefore, there are generally no "right" or "wrong" answers
in the normative sense.
Profitability and Efficiency
It is a conclusion of this study that--in Virginia---the
holding company has a clear-cut advantage over the merged system
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with regard to profitability. On the other hand, it is a
conclusion of this study that the merged system, under certain
conditions, is a more efficient form of organization than the
holding company. Without question, however, the profitability
advantage of the holding company seems to be the most signifi-
cant of these items.
The Holding Company is Potentially More Profitable . In
Virginia, the holding company is potentially more profitable
than the merged system because of several advantages resulting
from the legal environment. These advantages involve: (1) de
novo branching, and (2) reserve ratios. They are a type of
"quasi resource" in that they result from legislative factors.
A * ££ Novo Branching . The holding company has a signi-
ficant growth advantage as a result of greater opportunities
for de novo expansion under the Virginia banking code. A
holding company acquiring affiliates located throughout the
state attains what is the equivalent of statewide de novo
branching privileges. By the way of contrast, a merged system
has de novo branching privileges limited to the area of its
home office. Clearly, therefore, there is a disparity in
growth opportunities between the two forms. The holding com-
pany has a clear-cut advantage in the acquisition of "locations"




The de novo branching advantage of the holding company
is probably not significant in the short run since merged
systems can acquire banks which already have a well-developed
branch system. Holding companies, however, are expected to
hold a significant advantage in the long run, unless the
branching statutes are changed to provide equal opportunities
for expansion. That is to say, if equalizing legislation is
not enacted the growth of merged systems will be restricted
in a manner similar to that experienced by The Bank of Vir-
ginia, as a consequence of the restrictive legislation in
1948. In The Bank of Virginia situation, branch operations
were frozen in the urban areas it served apart from its home
office, while local banks and holding companies in these areas
could expand to capture the fast growing, profitable urban
market. Resolution of this issue does not seem possible in
the short-term, if for no other reason than the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly meets only every two years.
B. Reserve Ratios . The holding company has the poten-
tial for higher earnings because it has an opportunity, in
certain cases, to apply lower reserve ratios against system
deposits. The significance of this is in the potential for
higher earnings, and a resulting financial edge in the com-
petition for good locations or good management. With higher
earnings potential, holding company management can, perhaps,
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justify paying more for a particular acquisition—than a merged
system—and still maintain the same "pay back" and impact on
future earnings per share.
The Merged System is the More Efficient Form of
Organization . Several theoretical and practical considerations
suggest that the merged system may be the more efficient form
of organization. First, closer integration of banking opera-
tions is possible in the merged form. For instance, certain
functions in a holding company cannot be combined; trust ac-
counts and the loan and investment portfolios are examples.
Also, the separate corporate entity of holding company af-
filiates makes integration of some operations and services
more difficult than in a merged system. Assuming all other
factors are equal, differences such as these seem clearly to
give the merged system greater potential for organizational
efficiency. However, the lack of banking research, based
on empirical data, makes this conclusion less certain than
would otherwise be the case.
In practice managements in both forms may centralize
or decentralize various functions and responsibilities and
establish the amount of autonomy given to management in sub-
ordinate levels of the organization. Normally this will be
in response to different attitudes and circumstances in the
individual situation. Clearly the size, nature and integration
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of staff and operating functions at all levels of an organi-
zation affect efficiency, regardless of the corporate form.
Because of this, the relative efficiency of any one merged
system compared to any one holding company is likely to de-
pend on the particular circumstances at hand, even though
merged systems, theoretically are the more efficient form
of organization. Consequently, the previously discussed
legislative factors affecting profitability seem likely to be
of greater significance to management than the question of
organizational efficiency. This is particularly so in view
of the fact that both forms of organization have opportunities
for operating efficiency as a function of increased size,
regardless of their form of corporate organization.
Ease of Acquisition May Favor the Holding Company
The holding company has a greater number of ways by
which it can acquire a bank. For instance, it can acquire a
bank by affiliation or merger, whereas a merged system is
limited to acquisition by merger. This added flexibility
might improve the "odds" of acquisition over the long run by
the fact that the holding company is better able to process
an acquisition application to the agency with the best
"approval record".
However, flexibility of acquisition would be of impor-
tance to management only if the "odds of approval" were signi-
ficantly better at one agency, and if a system were still in
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the early phase of its expansion program. Probably, however,
management in a holding company or merged system which
had reached the planned limits of its expansion would be in-
different to this consideration.
Management Effectiveness
It is evident from the organizations studied that each
management believes that there is a direct and important re-
lationship between the corporate form of organization and
the resulting effectiveness of management. Issues in this
area include questions of organization theory and the role
and importance of the formal and informal organization. They
involve the attitudes and opinions of management on the rela-
tive merits of centralization versus decentralization and
local autonomy versus a more direct form of management control
,
However, because subjective judgements, attitudes and opinions
are predominant in discussing these questions, it is difficult
to resolve them clearly in favor of either organizational form,
Nevertheless, from a management viewpoint certain considera-
tions viewed by themselves lead to significant conclusions.
Policy Development and Implementation and Control of
Operations is Easier in the Merged System . A particular style
or form of management does not necessarily follow from a
particular form of corporate organization. By nature the
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holding company is more decentralized and the merged system
is more centralized. Apart from the corporate form, however,
management in both situations may choose to centralize or
decentralize a number of functions and responsibilities, or
establish a high degree or a low degree of autonomy at the
subordinate levels of the organization, in consonance with
management policy.
Aside from the above consideration—it is a conclusion
of this study-that policy development, implementation and
control of operations is generally easier in the merged system,
In this form these matters are internal to one organization;
they are formulated by a single policy-making body; they are
controlled by a single group of top management. By way of
contrast, in the holding company there may be many corpora-
tions, many presidents and many boards of directors. Each
corporate management is legally responsible for the operations
of its own bank.
These organizational differences are commonly thought
to make control more difficult in a holding company, parti-
cularly where the affiliated banks are not 100 percent owned.'
Directors and officers of an affiliate are equally responsible
to the parent stockholder; to any minority interest, no matter
how small; and to the depositors and the community. On
questions such as: (1) dividends, (2) rates on up and down
stream loans, (3) movement of funds, or (4) allocation of
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headquarters costs, resolution in a holding company is clearly
not as readily made as in the merged system with its single
board of directors.
In the Long Run Boards of Directors of Holding Company
Affiliates are Likely to be More Effective than Merged System
Area Advisory Boards . Expansion by direct merger permits a
choice of retaining a merged bank's board of directors in an
advisory capacity, as an Area Advisory Board, or eliminating
the use of a board of directors in the area of the merged
bank. Expansion by the holding company route involves no
such choice, since each affiliate must have its own board.
This difference raises the question: "Is an honorary board of
directors an effective substitute for a legal board at the
local level?"
It is the conclusion of this study that there are
several reasons why honorary boards of directors, in the long
run, are not likely to be effective substitutes for the legal
boards they replaced. These focus on differences between
"original actors" and "successor management." Specifically,
it is assumed that area boards will be reasonably effective
substitutes for the legal boards they replaced so long as
the "original actors" remain in their roles as board members,
regardless of the obvious differences of legal responsibilities
This hypothesis is based on differences likely to distinguish
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original management from successor management. For instance,
the role and influence of "founders" in both a holding com-
pany and merged system, apart from their positions in the
organization, clearly is stronger than successor management,
if for no other reason than that they are likely to exercise
a significant influence as stockholders. Because of this,
"original actors" in their capacity of honorary directors
will tend to exercise more influence than will successor
management, even though there has been a change in legal re-
sponsibility. This conclusion draws a distinction between
the "formal" and "informal" organization and underscores that
it is likely to change over time.
Over the long run, however, the character and influence
of honorary boards seem likely to change. Responsibilities
and job status have been altered from an operating role to a
purely advisory role. Under such conditions it may be dif-
ficult to attract and hold the same quality of man for area
boards. First class management talent may not desire to want
to accept or want to remain in a purely advisory role. Con-
sequently, if merged systems find it difficult to replace
"original actors" with management of the same qualifications
and interests, then successor area boards are not likely to
be as effective as the legal boards they replaced.
The potential consequences of this consideration on
the operations of merged systems in Virginia is not evident at
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this point in time. Moreover, it will be difficult to evaluate
in the future because this is not a question that is subject
to "quantitative" investigation or measurement.
Amount of Scarce Resources Needed and the Ability to
Acquire and Employ These . Scarce resources are discussed in
terms of management, capital and locations. Certain char-
acteristics of the two forms suggest differences in the
amount and type of scarce resources they require.
A. The Merged System May be Able to Operate with
Fewer Management Personnel and in Some Circumstances with
Personnel Having a Lesser Order of Skills . Two considera-
tions suggest that the merged form may be more economical than
the holding company in the utilization of management. First,
the merged system is likely to require a lesser order of skills
at the branch level, than if the branch were operated as a
separate affiliate. For example, this study discussed the at-
titude that the complexity of the typical branch manager's
job is not as great as a bank president's, who has to deal
with his own board of directors and who ha3 to build the reputa-
tion of his own bank. Also, the merged form is likely to re-
quire fewer numbers of management where merger may result in
the elimination of officers and employees for functions that
can be combined in the merged system which cannot be com-
bined in the holding company; or where an affiliate, as
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contrasted to a branch, tends to need a full complement of
officers because of its status as a separate corporation.
However, the numbers and skills of management and
employees is another function which is dependent on how a
particular management wants to organize and manage the organi-
zation. Clearly, a merged system which is decentralized and
which is managed with a high degree of local autonomy may re-
quire more management with a higher order of skills, than a
holding company of similar size which is centralized and which
is controlled directly from the parent level. Therefore, a
generalization that merged systems may make better utilization
of management talent is limited by the assumption that all
'
other factors apart from the form of corporate organization are
equal.
B. The Holding Company May Have a Lower Cost of
Capital in the Long Run . The holding company has an advantage
over the merged system in raising capital and using leverage,
for several reasons. These reasons are that: (1) a bank has
a limit on the amount of debentures of 100 percent on capital
stock plus 50 percent of surplus, whereas a holding company
has no such limitation, (2) a bank is required to count
short-term notes, less than one year, as a liability requiring
reserves, whereas a holding company has no such requirement,
and (3) a holding company can raise debt and equity in two
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ways: by the affiliated banks or by the holding company,
whereas a bank is limited to one way of raising debt and
equity. However, no data exist which conclusively point to
tangible economic benefits for the holding company as the re-
sult of these differences, such as a lower cost of capital.
Presumably, though, added flexibility in raising and using
capital is a benefit which potentially could result in a
lower cost of capital over the long run.
C. The Merged System May Have Greater Credit and
Funds Mobility . The question of comparative funds mobility
cannot be clearly reconciled by "hard data" from the litera-
ture or this study. However, there is one factor which theo-
retically if not practically is a constraint on mobility of
funds in a holding company. This factor is the role of the
directors of an affiliate, particularly where there is a
minority interest. Directors are charged with the legal re-
sponsibility for the operation of the bank and this trans-
ends any credit policies or participation agreements of the
holding company. Clearly, the possibility of many affiliates
with their boards do not provide for the same ease of resolu-
tion of matters relating to mobility of funds, or for that matter,
dividends, investments, and the many other issues that affect
the profitability and operations of an individual bank.
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D * The Holding Company Has a Definite Long Run Ad-
vantage in_ the Acquisition of Locations . In Virginia, under
the present statutes, the holding company has a significant
advantage over the merged system in where acquisitions can
be made because of their greater de novo branching oppor-
tunities; in how acquisitions can be made because they can
choose either to acquire a bank as an affiliate or merge the
bank into an affiliate, depending on the individual circum-
stances at hand; and in the cost of the acquisitions because
of lower reserve ratios in some situations. Furthermore, the
holding company has an advantage by way of greater flexibility
in choosing the type of identification it desires for its
banks. It can choose to have affiliates retain the name used
before acquisition for "local identity"; or change the bank
name to clearly identify the affiliate with the holding com-
pany for a "system identity"; or use some combination of
2
system and local identity as service area conditions dictate.
On the other hand, a merged system has less identification
flexibility since all branch offices carry the home office
2 Richmond Times Dispatch , November 5, 1968. A com-
bination of local and system identification was adopted for
the first time in Virginia, in 1968, by First Virginia Bank-
shares Corporation when they renamed their Cambria Bank of
Christiansburg as the First Virginia Bank of the Southwest.
According to the president of First Virginia Bankshares their
other banks would be renamed as local conditions, such as ex-
pansion and mergers, dictate.
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name. However, identity is dependent on the customers and
markets served and the competition in a given area. As an
example, customer and service area characteristics may make
a "system identity" more desirable in some situations and
"local identity" more desirable in others. Under these con-
ditions, a merged system would not be at a disadvantage to a
holding company in markets where a "system" marketing image'
is the preferred identity. Consequently, it is not possible
to generalize about all merged systems and all holding com-
panies because of the influence of markets and customers in
each individual case.
Ability to Adapt to Changing Environment and Technology
This is the last criterion against which the holding company
and direct merger are measured. In one respect it is the most
important evaluation for it views the significant differences
between the two forms in terms of the future. That is, it
examines each form of expansion in terms of the ability of
the form to accommodate to changes in environment and tech-
nology.
Summarizing, the holding company in Virginia has great-
er profit and growth potential, and service opportunities than
the merged system. On the other hand, development and im-
plementation of policy and control of operations seemingly is
easier in the merged form and this form is theoretically more
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efficient from the standpoint of integration of operations.
The question now becomes: "How do these fundamental differences
affect the capabilities of each form to adapt to changes in
environment and technology?"
A. The Holding Company : Environmental and Technological
Change . The holding company certainly has an edge over the
merged system in meeting the challenge of a changing environ-
ment and technology, as the result of its greater profit and
growth potential. A case in point is the "computer revolution"
where high costs and uncertain, but significant rewards faced
firms making an early entry into this field. Typically in
this type of environment the big, financially strong companies
can afford to be leaders by accepting the risk and profiting
from the rewards; the less financially strong become followers;
the small and weak may not benefit from new technology at all.
Placing this point in perspective, the revolution of change
in the banking industry has just begun; future change is likely
to be rapid and far reaching; innovation is likely to become
very important to success, as banking moves toward the
"checkless society". Consequently, the holding company in
Virginia may be in a stronger position than the merged system
when accepting the risks inherent in change and innovation.
However, this advantage of the holding company is "artifi-
cial". It could disappear at any time since it results from legal
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circumstances—apart from the form of organization—which can
be and may be changed to give competing banking systems the
same economic opportunities.
B . The Merged System and Environmental and Technological
Change . The merged system has an edge on the holding company
in that development and implementation of policy and control
of operations is easier. Also, the merged form is potentially
more efficient from the standpoint of integration of opera-
tions. Because of the first advantage, seemingly the merged
form can respond to changes and the challenges of innovation
more readily than the holding company. It is not burdened
with the administrative complexity of separate corporations
and problems involving accommodation among many managements.
Consequently, decision-making is likely to be quicker and
policy implementation easier. This advantage is particularly
significant in an environment where the rate of change is in-
creasing and where the ability to rapidly respond to a situa-
tion could be important to the future of the firm, i.e.,
witness Ford's Mustang; IBM's 360 computer series.
The merged form advantage of greater organizational
efficiency is significantly different from holding company
advantage of greater profit and growth opportunities. The
former is not an "artificial" advantage, the latter is. Given
equal opportunities under law, the potentially greater ef-
ficiency of the merged form may tip profitability in its favor.
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In the event profit and growth opportunities are
equ.alized— thus eliminating the economic advantage of the
holding company--then the merged system may become the more
3
viable form of banking organization in Virginia. In this
lies the challenge to the banker and legislator in Virginia:
create a truly competitive environment where the holding com-
pany and merged system operate on an equal footing, and let
the forces of competition point to the most efficient form of
banking organization, if there be just one.
3Evidence supporting this conclusion appears to be the
action by First Virginia Bankshares, Corporation—reported in
the Washington Post , January 30, 1969--whereby this holding
company plans to consolidate three large affiliates in the
Northern Virginia (Washington Metropolitan) area. In this
situation the surviving bank is a state non-member with a
home office in Fairfax County. With the exception of de novo
branching into Arlington County--where a branch system already
exists— the new bank could de novo branch in all of the other
cities and counties previously open to the three affiliates.
Consequently, the growth opportunities of the newly merged
bank are essentially the same as the three independent affiliates
But, by having the surviving bank as a state non-member
the lower 10 percent reserve ratio for state non-members applies
to the combined deposits of the three banks. Consequently,
First Virginia gains approximately $587,500 in demand deposits
available for loans and investments, worth approximately
$41,250 in pre-tax earnings, if invested at 6 percent—computed
on the differential between the state non-member ratio and non-
reserve city ratio of 12 percent, on the first $5 million de-
mand deposits and 12 1/2 percent, on demand deposits over $5
million.
Seemingly, this decision reflects the "best of two worlds"
First Virginia gains the organizational advantages of a merged
system, and at the same time the profit advantage from the lower
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UNITED VIRGINIA BANKSHARES INC.
I. PURPOSE
This material was collected in connection with a study
of two banking systems in Virginia which chose different
methods of expanding their banking operations on a statewide
basis, as a result of the enactment of liberalized branching
legislation in 1962. It is based on interviews with Mr. Lewis
B. Flinn, Jr., Secretary and Treasurer of United Virginia
Bankshares Inc., of Richmond, Virginia. The information is
presented in the form of paraphrased text and direct quotes.
It contains no opinion, editorial comment, or analysis by the
researcher.
This part of the study concerns the experiences of
United Virginia Bankshares Inc. (hereafter called Bankshares)
which chose to expand by the holding company route as opposed
to direct merger. The focus of this information is on: (1)
the central issues in management's selection of the most ap-
propriate form of expansion, i.e., the significant character-
istics considered by Bankshares to be advantages of expansion
via the holding company, as contrasted to or different from
expansion by merger, and (2) significant factors in Bank-
shares expansion strategy.
Case prepared, 1968, by Paul L. Foster, doctoral candi-
date. All rights reserved by the Sponsors of the Graduate School





The passage by the Virginia General Assembly of the
Buck-Holland Bill in 1962 gave Virginia banks significantly
greater opportunities for expansion. After the 1962 legis-
lation, statewide expansion could be undertaken by: (1)
holding company affiliation, (2) merger, or (3) a combina-
tion of the two. Before that time holding company affiliation
had been the only alternative available for expanding banking
operations beyond the general locality of a bank's home office,
Mr. Lewis B. Flinn, Jr., Secretary and Treasurer of
Bankshares explained that State-Planters Bank of Commerce and
Trusts, Richmond, (the lead bank in United Virginia Bank-
shares) was one of the large Richmond banks interested in ex-
pansion. As early as 1958 the president of State-Planters,
then Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., had considered the concept
of formation of a holding company with other large Virginia
banks. This was seen as a combination which would improve
the competitive position of each of the banks concerned re-
gardless of any subsequent action by the state legislators
to relax the highly restrictive branching laws. However, as
Flinn explained, "the plan never got off the ground, i.e.,
never got beyond the conceptual stage."
In 1961, after the earlier efforts had failed to put




other alternatives. Flinn explained, "We started looking else-
where and talking to other banks. During this time the Vir-
ginia Metropolitan Plan was conceived by three large banks
in Richmond--that was in 1961--holding company plans were stopped
for a while." State-Planters, First and Merchants, and Cen-
tral National Bank, the three prime correspondent banks in
the state, worked hard to sell the Virginia Metropolitan Plan,
a de_ novo branching and merger scheme for banks in metropolitan
areas. The plan was proposed to bankers just before the
June, 1961 meeting of the Virginia Bankers Association. Its
sponsors had hoped the plan would be recommended and brought
up in the General Assembly in the winter of 1962. However,
according to Flinn, the plan was not accepted, probably be-
cause it was sponsored by the big banks in Richmond.
After the Virginia Metropolitan Plan failed to gather
the support of the state's bankers, Bankshares 1 management
felt that there would be no changes to the branching laws for
another two years, until the 1964 General Assembly.
"We started again to probe other
banks to form a holding company but
couldn't get anything moving until out
of the blue (we hadn't talked with
them) First & Citizens came down and
said let's form a holding company.
This- was in the latter part of 1961,
and by early 1962 we had collected a
group of six banks.
We knew of the Buck-Holland
legislation before we filed with the




United Virginia Bankshares in
June, 1962. Therefore, v/e had the
opportunity to drop it and go the
merger route if we wanted. But all
of the parties had been sold on, and
they liked the idea of forming a
holding company where everybody would
have something to say; we were building
something together; all parties were
participants. The local autonomy
aspect was important, too. No pro-
posal was made to try to force through
the merger route. The feeling was
just so strong that this was what
we wanted to do, that this is the way
we went.
"
III. IDENTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FACTORS CONSIDERED
BY BANKSHARES IN THEIR DECISION TO EXPAND VIA THE
HOLDING COMPANY ROUTE
Advantages of Expansion by Holding Company
Flinn cited eight significant characteristics which
were considered by management to be advantages of expansion
by holding company as contrasted to or different from expan-
sion by direct merger; and five characteristics considered
to be advantages not exclusive to the holding company vis-a-
vis direct merger, but rather contrasted to a local bank in
Virginia. These factors are summarized below.
Advantages as contrasted to direct merger ;
-- Greater de novo branching opportunities.
The ordering of the factors does not connote priority
or weight assigned by management.
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-- The holding company form can be equally as
efficient as the merged form.
-- Flexibility in raising capital.
-- Greater flexibility in expansion.
-- Local autonomy for acquired affiliates.
-- Local identity of the affiliate is maintained.
-- Decentralized decision-making offers more manage-
ment flexibility and opportunity than in the
typical branch system.
— Non-member (Federal Reserve System) banks retain
their lower 10 percent state reserve requirements
when they become holding company affiliates; and
only holding company affiliates (members of Federal
Reserve System) in reserve cities are required to
use the 16 1/2 percent reserve rate. Other af-
filiates use 12 percent.
Advantages as contrasted to a local bank :
-- Increased organization size improves ability to
1 attract and train management personnel.
-- Affiliation provides a solution to a management
succession problem.
-- Affiliation offers economic benefits to the ac-
quired bank stockholders.
-- Credit and funds mobility.
— New services.
The Eight Characteristics Considered by Bankshares ' Manage -
ment to be Advantages of the Holding Company as Contrasted
to or Different From Direct Merger
Holding company expansion offers greater de novo




banking code limits de novo branching to the immediate geo-
graphic area of a bank's home office. For example, he pointed
out that a Richmond bank merging in another city cannot
establish any more branches in that city after the merger
because Richmond was the home office of the merged bank. On
the other hand, a holding company can acquire an affiliate
and the affiliate can continue to branch since it remains as
a legal entity, a separate bank, even though it is a member
of a holding company. According to Flinn, this disparity in
de novo branching opportunities is not an over-whelming ad-
vantage in the short-term. He did think, however, that it
could be quite a decisive advantage in the long-term. Further,
he speculated that there is going to be pressure applied by
those banks following the merger route to change the state
banking code to give merged systems the same de novo branching
freedom that holding companies now have.
The holding company form can be equally as efficient
as the merged form . In support of this point, Flinn said
that both the holding company and merged system share many
of the advantages attributed to larger banking units: (1)
centralization of support functions; for example, purchasing
of supplies and system advertising, and (2) use of specialists





"My feeling is that selection of
an organizational form will in time
(perhaps not initially) be primarily
a matter of economics. That is to say
initially the selection of an organi-
zation form may be based on evaluation
of factors (i.e., legislative) then
existing, but in the final analysis the
choice will be proven out by economics.
For example, if a holding company can-
not operate just as effectively and
efficiently as a branch system, then
there is no reason not to make the
holding company one merged institution
(assuming this is feasible as it is in
Virginia) .
"
According to Flinn, the experiences of Bankshares, and the
growth of holding companies in Virginia and elsewhere suggest
that the holding company form is generally competitive with
merged systems, or if not there are other factors which tend
to offset any operational inef ficiencies--for example in Vir-
ginia, the de_ novo branching advantage.
Holding companies have greater flexibility in raising
capital . Flinn illustrated this point by saying that Bank-
shares can finance either at the bank level or at the hold-
ing company level. He added that an important benefit of
financing at the holding company level is that capital can
be raised more cheaply than at the affiliate level.
Flinn continued:
"The potential of the holding com-
pany is to maximize leverage, using debt
financing to a greater extent than through




banks are going to be more restric-
tive on how much debt they are going to
allow a bank to issue. They would not
have the same concern about a holding
company since we do not have any de-
positors. It is a different thing if
we go under. If we fail it has nothing
to do with the banks. We are just the
stockholder. The stockholder can go
broke, but the bank is still in opera-
tion. "
In addition, Flinn said that a holding company can raise
money in a way a bank can not. For instance, a state bank
in Virginia (this happened to State-Planters) cannot issue
stock except under stock options, or in a sale for cash or to
another bank's stockholders in a merger. State-Planters Bank,
he said, wanted to acquire land for a building and the party
that owned the land wanted a tax-free transaction. The bank
could not give him their stock, as such transactions were
prohibited. So he was given holding company stock, and it
was a tax-free exchange, i.e., property for property. "This
is one example," Flinn said, "of how a holding company has
more flexibility." In addition, he indicated some other ways
that holding companies can finance with more ease than a bank.
For example, a holding company can issue convertible deben-
tures, preferred stock, and short-term debt and commercial paper
in 30 - 100 day maturities.
He continued by saying:
"We could issue short-term debt
at a rate we wanted and that the market
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would permit. If a bank tried to do the
same thing there would probably be a
limitation on the rate. If the debt
instrument was construed as a deposit
by the Federal Reserve Board then it
would be subject to reserve require-
ments and to the rate limitations of
regulations Q. I don't think any
holding company yet has maximized the
possibilities. But every now and then
you see where somebody has used one."
Greater flexibility in expansion . Two factors were
cited by Flinn which provide holding companies in Virginia
with more flexibility in expansion: (1) expansion can be by
either acquisition of a bank as an affiliate of the holding
company, or by merger of a bank into an affiliate of the
holding company, and (2) the option to either acquire or merge
provides an opportunity for holding company management to
select the most likely route for regulatory authority approval
of the planned expansion. Continuing on these points, Flinn
observed that the holding company has the opportunity to
choose the method which has the best chance of regulatory
agency approval. On the other hand, merged systems would
have the problem of changing their charter from national to
state, or vice versa, if they wanted to change the route for'
approval. He felt that many merged systems would be reluc-
tant to switch charters back and forth just to pick the most
likely path for approval of their application for merger. For
this reason, Bankshares has an advantage of added flexibility
in routing applications. In addition, he felt that the
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opportunity to choose the course of least resistance was an
important factor in their acquisition of the Seaboard Citizens
2Bank of Norfolk. Lastly, Flinn discussed one other method of
acquisition open to holding companies not open to merged systems
This is the "phantom bank" device, which he stated no one else
in Virginia, to the best of his knowledge, has used. In de-
scribing Bankshares use of this device for the first time he
stated:
"We set up a shell corporation, the
phantom, under the title of a bank,
nominally capitalized, to exist on paper
only. The scheme is that the existing
bank will merge into this shell corpora-
tion—this phantom. Application was
made to the Federal Reserve Board to
acquire this phantom, and in this
particular case, we also applied to the
Board for permission for this phantom
to merge with an existing bank. There
were two applications but for one pur-
pose—to acquire a bank in Williamsburg
.
With an exchange offer, which is the
more normal route, stockholders have
the option of taking it or leaving it,
and usually you end up with some minority
interest. These are not necessarily
people who want no part of the deal, but
some were dead, traveling, unlocatable, and
so forth.
"
Since the phantom bank technique is processed as a
merger it has two advantages. First, it eliminates minority
2 Seaboard Citizens Bank of Norfolk was acquired as an
affiliate in January 1967 through consolidation with Merchants
and Farmers Bank of Franklin which had been previously ac-
quired as an affiliate in January 1963.
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interest. Second, stock issued in exchange for the acquisi-
tion is exempt from Securities Exchange Commission registra-
tion, and this is a substantial cost savings in comparison to
an exchange offer.
Local autonomy for acquired affiliates . Flinn stressed
that local autonomy of affiliates of Bankshares has two tangi-
ble benefits. First, Bankshares was intended from the start
to be a joint effort or partnership affair. Each of the
original partners was represented on Bankshares' board of
directors and, therefore, had a say in the policies of the
organization. In addition, while each new joining bank was
not necessarily to be represented on Bankshares 1 board, it
was planned to have a committee of presidents which would set
the policies for the type of services which the holding com-
pany would give to affiliates. In this way, Flinn continued,
the holding company form of organization, which is decentralized
by nature, was ideally suited for implementation of Bankshares'
participating management philosophy.
"We try to get together at least
once a month with the presidents com-
mittee and talk about problems, policies,
and new services that Bankshares should
provide. Thus, we have a joint effort:
(1) to become a statewide organization,
(2) to build a larger organization in
order to make bigger loans to Virginia
businesses, (3) to extend new services
throughout the system, and (4) by pooling
resources to provide special services,
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such as in the computer area, of
a quality which no one bank could
afford."
i
Second, Flinn said that local autonomy for affiliates,
coupled with a participating management philosophy at the
holding company level, was an important factor in attracting
new member banks to the Bankshares organization. According
to Flinn, there were some banks which would not join a merged
system because the presidency of the merged bank would be
eliminated. In addition some of these same bankers would not
join a holding company unless they were assured that there
was, in fact, local autonomy at the operating level. Flinn
said that it is hard to convince some bankers interested in
joining the holding company because they don't believe what
is said about Bankshares 1 method of operations—they have
talked to someone else who went with another holding company,
and they have heard discouraging things. "All holding com-
panies are different", Flinn continued. "We feel that local
autonomy and our management philosophy is a very important
aspect in attracting banks to our enterprise."
Local identity of the affiliate is maintained . Ac-
cording to Flinn the fundamental philosophy of group banking
more nearly meets the test demanded in the compromise between
Virginia's traditional concept of unit banking and the state's
need for larger banking organizations. Holding company

A-13
affiliation does not remove a bank from the local scene.
The community continues to deal with the same corporate entity
and corporate officers. Flinn believes that this tends to
minimize any changes in the bank's service area since local
management and local boards of directors continue to exercise
daily supervision of the affiliates operations. The bank's
officers and directors retain full responsibility (actually
and legally) for the bank's operation.
In addition, Flinn believes that with directors repre-
senting one stockholder (the holding company) there is likely
to be more directed response from directors of affiliates,
i.e., no accommodation of multi-group stockholders is needed:
"Most of our banks are 100 percent
owned except for directors' qualifying shar-
es. The exception is a very small minority
who's basic rights are guaranteed by law.
Naturally we safeguard them too for we don't
want to go to court. The point is this,
where you have basically one stockholder
who speaks with one voice, the directors
representing the stockholder, who is only
one, are naturally more responsive to the
stockholder's wishes. Directors do not
represent different groups of stock-
holders with divergent ideas. Also,
with only one stockholder is it not
natural to be more attentive and re-
sponsive to his wishes? After all he
owns the bank, lock, stock and barrel.
In a publicly owned corporation you
don't have this. Neither do you have a
stockholder who advises and counsels
the directorate. The stockholder can't
be capricious and the directors can't




Decentralized decision -making offers more flexibility
and opportunity than the typical branch system . Flinn
stressed this aspect of holding company operations because
it was inherently more attractive to management personnel,
and it offered a better environment for developing successor
management talent within the industry. Thus, he said that
the holding company form appeared to provide the better solu-
tion to the problem of successor management.
The unique aspect of the decentralized management con-
cept in holding companies, Flinn pointed out, is the legal
status of each affiliate's board of directors. This legal
status of constituent bank directors is a very real force in
promoting and maintaining decentralization of management.
Holding company non -member ( Federal Reserve System )
banks retain their lower 10 percent state reserve require -
ments and only holding company member affiliates (members
Federal Reserve System ) in reserve cities are required to use
the 16 1/2 percent rate--other member affiliates use!2 1/2
percent . An economic advantage pointed out by Flinn was that
non-member holding company affiliates continued to operate
with 10 percent reserve requirements on demand deposits in
lieu of the 12 percent (country bank) or 16 1/2 percent (re-
serve city bank) if they were merged into a bank which was a
member of the Federal Reserve System. This advantage to
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Bankshares ' three non-member banks in 1964 was estimated as
$640,000 in reserves, potentially worth some $38,400 in
income
.
Flinn pointed out that each holding company affiliate
was required to use the reserve rate applicable to its own
locale. Thus, only those affiliates headquartered in of-
fically designated "reserve" cities need to apply the higher
16 1/2 percent reserve city rate. The other member banks
could use the 12 percent country bank rate. On the other
hand, a merged system with an of f ice, not necessarily the
head office, in a reserve city was required to apply the
16 1/2 percent rate to the entire bank regardless of the bank's
various office locations. In 1966 this advantage to Bank-
shares was reported as being worth, potentially, $360,000
in income a year (at 6 percent) , i.e., if the 16 1/2 percent
rate were required on all affiliates, as in a merged system
with an office in Richmond, additional reserves of $6 million
would have been required.
The Five Characteristics Considered by Bankshares' Management
to be Advantages of both the Holding Company and Direct Merger
as Contrasted to a Local Bank in Virginia
Increased organization size improve s the ability to
attract and train management personnel . One benefit seen by
Bankshares was that through increased size a holding company
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could better compete in the labor market for executive
talent and have the staff and organization to undertake train-
ing programs to help speed the development of personnel enter-
ing the banking industry for the first time. As Flinn ex-
plained, the holding company form has two things to offer
which are generally sought by the young executive. First, it
has a large decentralized organizational structure which has
more top executive positions than a comparable sized branch
organization, i.e., each member bank has a president. Second,
larger organizations generally can afford to offer training
and employee benefits that are superior to those provided by
small banks.
Affiliation with a holding company is a solution to
the management succession problem . Flinn illustrated this
point by saying that most of the banks that approached
Bankshares on an unsolicited basis had management problems,
i.e., top management was nearing retirement age, and there
was no one underneath who could capably continue the opera-
tion. According to Flinn, three banks that had joined Bank-
shares had a management succession problem. Affiliation was
described as a practical solution to the problem since the
holding company could provide capable management. In each
of these three cases the holding company provided a new pre-
sident from within the system.
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Affiliation can re sult in economic benefits to the
acquired bank' s stockholders . Flinn said that the monetary-
aspect was considered as important and, in some cases, a
decisive influence in acquisitions. He illustrated this
situation by pointing out that Bankshares ' acquisition policy
was to acquire affiliates, wherever possible, on a book value
basis, i.e., Bankshares' book versus the acquired bank's
3book. Most of Bankshares' acquisitions have been on this
basis. The economic benefit to the affiliate's stockholders
resulted from the fact that the stock of many small banks in
Virginia generally sold below or at book value, while the
holding company generally sold above book and had been as
high as 200 percent of book value. He said:
"Assume you are a large holding com-
pany or a large bank and your stock is
selling at a substantial price above book.
You can afford to offer somebody book
for book and at the same time give him,
say 100 percent appreciation on what
he can get for his stock on the mar-
ket. One day he has stock certifi-
cates worth $100 and just by joining
you in a merger or holding company
his stock is immediately worth $200.
It is hard to gauge the influence
that this has, but it is important.
It may be the real clincher. We
also talk to management about local
autonomy, tell them how we operate,
etc. We tell them the two or three
3Stated stockholders' equity adjusted to reflect cur-
rent valuation of assets.
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requirements that you have to hammer
on: (1) that their board is responsible
for running the show, (2) that Bankshares
as a stockholder is basically a service
organization, (3) that we are interested
in doing bigger and grander things and
most importantly to earn some money for
our stockholders. But, who knows really
how much impact philosophy has versus
the dollar?"
According to Flinn, this profit opportunity is less
likely to develop today. With all the bank acquisition
activity in Virginia some small bank stocks have appreciated
in price, eliminating the dramatic profit of four or five
years ago. Some stockbrokers have been buying up small bank
stocks because they felt that they were a likely merger candidate
or holding company partner, and this has pushed the stock
price up. So while there may be an exchange premium in some
acquisitions today there are not the tremendous profits of the
earlier years. This is more likely to be the case for the
smaller banks with management succession problems because
according to Flinn, it is difficult to get capable management
for banks with offices located in small rural areas.
Credit and funds mobility is an advantage of the
holding company . As explained by Flinn, holding companies,
like merged systems, have the capability of pooling lending
resources among affiliates to serve the growing credit require-
ments of industry. To facilitate the flow of funds through-
out their system, Bankshares had developed a loan participation
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procedure and encouraged its banks to pre-clear large loans
that need to be shared throughout the system. It was Flinn's
opinion that the use of rapid communication devices, central
credit files and charge cards, plus the efficient use of data
processing equipment will ultimately remove any advantages
branch systems now enjoyed in the area of credit mobility.
New services . Flinn stated that the holding company
could provide a greater range and depth of banking services
to the Virginia citizens than a typical unit bank. In addition,
the quality of the banking services could be improved. He
explained both of these benefits stemmed from the ability of
the holding company to employ specialists in areas such as
trusts, industrial accounts, and data processing. Examples
of the expanded services of Bankshares in the 1962-1966
period were: (1) Municipal Bond Department, (2) special con-
sultants for women, (3) Public Funds Section, (4) Professional
Services Program, (5) College Tuition Loan Program, (6) Com-
puterized Payroll Services Program, (7) One Check Payroll
Program, (8) Marketing Department, and (9) a credit card pro-
gram presently in the planning stage.
Flinn recognized that merged systems also are capable
of providing expanded services. He continued:
"A direct comparison, however, of
holding companies and merged systems is
difficult. This would depend on the
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service objectives of management
and the needs of each market area.
For example, First Virginia, operat-
ing primarily in Northern Virginia,
emphasizes consumer business. There-
fore, their service structure would
be quite different from, say, First
and Merchants, operating largely in
the Central and Tidewater Virginia
areas, which caters, in a fairly
balanced manner, to both consumer and
industrial accounts."
Disadvantages of Expansion by Holding Company
Flinn stated that there were only a few arguments in
favor of the merged form of expansion that were considered
by the founders of Bankshares in selecting the holding com-
pany route. These factors are summarized below.
-- Securities and Exchange Commission regulations.
-- More complex multiple corporate organization.
-- Subject to regulations of more than one Federal
Supervisory Authority.
-- Lack of a single corporate image in the marketing
context.
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation. Flinn
explained that at the time Bankshares was formed banking was
not subject to the requirements of the Securities Acts, e.g.,
registration and prospectus requirements, annual and periodic
reporting requirements, proxy and financial reporting require-
ments, and insider trading requirements. With the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964, banking was brought under the Acts
so that today banks, for the most part, are subject to the
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same securities rules as holding companies, and what differences
that exist are narrowing. The disadvantage Flinn pointed out
was that banks still deal exclusively with their respective
regulatory agency for securities regulations as well as other
matters, whereas holding companies report to the Securities
Exchange Commission as well as banking agencies.
More complex multiple corporate organization . In dis-
cussing this factor, Flinn explained that the merged form has
the advantage of having the most simple corporate structure,
i.e., one board of directors and one senior group of manage-
ment for one corporation. This type of structure simplifies
policy formulation and execution. Examples of the types of
problems which can be more easily avoided in the merged form
are: (1) diffused authority, (2) internal conflict at the
management level, and (3) administrative complications, i.e.,
separate records for each affiliate. However, Flinn said that
these disadvantages can be overcome because the range of manage-
ment control open to a holding company can be used to achieve
the same general results as under the merged form. Further,
the administrative problems of the more complex corporate
organization of the holding company are offset by other advan-
tages of the holding company form previously discussed.
Subject to regulations of more than one Federal Super-
visory Authority. Flinn saw this as a complicating factor,
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because supervisory agencies tend to see some things in a dif-
ferent way, and this can complicate policy. For example,
Flinn said that national banks were subject to requirements
of the Federal Reserve Act and the FDIC Act, as were all mem-
bers of the FED and the FDIC. National banks, however, were
regulated, only by the Comptroller, e.g., examinations, branches,
mergers, and "incidental powers" such as mortgage companies.
In addition to these factors there were minor differences
in regulatory policy with regard to capital requirements, loan
limits, etc. Furthermore, the Comptroller's ruling allowing
national banks to own a mortgage company, which involves the
question of banks owning stocks and of possible violation of
branching laws was seen by Flinn as a major difference, which
was disturbing to many people. In this case a holding company
could not operate a mortgage affiliate, but its national bank
affiliate could.
Lack of a single corporate image in the marketing con-
text. The identity factor, Flinn explained, works both for
and against the holding company. It is an advantage in some
local markets where the banking relationships tend to be
highly personal and the customer has a banking association
of a long-standing nature. On the other hand, the single
corporate image of a merged system or a holding company which
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uses a standard affiliate identification (i.e., Marine Mid-
land) tends to be an important marketing characteristic in
other areas and to other types of customers. For example,
the urban customer may be more attracted to a large branch
system for the uniformity of services he receives, i.e., his
account is good in any branch in the market area while in a
holding company each affiliate is a separate bank. This
separate identity problem of holding company affiliates, Flinn
continued, can be offset to a degree by having wire service
verification. In addition, Bankshares and some other holding
companies have developed an identifying corporate symbol for
use by each affiliate for market identification.
IV. SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN BANKSHARES' EXPANSION STRATEGY
Flinn discussed four significant factors in Bankshares 1
expansion strategy. These factors are identified in summary
form below.
— Expansion was directed toward growth
areas, with emphasis on the Virginia
urban corridor from Washington, D. C.
south to Richmond and east through
Williamsburg, Newport News, and Norfolk.
-- Acquisition strategy was to acquire v..
a leading bank in an area, if possible
a bank with deposits over $10 million.
— Emphasis was placed on local autonomy




Acquisition policy was to deal directly
with and through management and not the
shareholders of prospective affiliates.
Expansion was directed toward growth areas . Flinn
said that a growth area was defined as possessing above
average potential in population and industrial expansion.
Emphasis was placed on population growth because banking
growth comes along with people, and industry tends to move
where the labor supply is abundant. He said that the growth
area in Virginia for the past 10 years was in the urban cor-
ridor, south from Washington to Richmond then east through
Williamsburg to Newport News and Norfolk. Nearly 50 percent
of the population lived in that belt at the onset of Bank-
shares 1 operations in 1963.
Four of the original six affiliates were located in
this urban corridor, Flinn explained. Two banks were located
in the Washington metropolitan area, one in Richmond, and one
in Newport News. The fifth bank was in Lynchburg, a major
metropolitan area in Virginia. Lynchburg was seen as a key
city. It had good industry and above average growth poten-
tial. So, Flinn explained:
"Bankshares was interested in
going into other cities that were not
in the corridor in order to become state-
wide. Yet, we were not interested in
picking small country banks, because
they do not have growth potential in our





The sixth bank among the regional affiliates was in
Franklin, a small community south of Richmond. According to
Flinn, this bank was an exception to Bankshares ' growth stra-
tegy.
Speaking further about low growth areas, Flinn observed
that one major system in Virginia was merging banks through-
out the state in small rural communities
.
"I don't know what they see in
these areas. We have heard them say
that they can take a bank and operate
it so that it is going to earn so much
on total assets. We feel we can do the
same thing, but we are interested in
growth rather than just keeping a small
branch that is never going to amount to
anything .
"
Acquisition strategy was to acquire a leading bank in
an area , if possible a bank with deposits over $10 million .
According to Flinn, the first phase was based on putting to-
gether a group of banks in key locations in growth communities.
"At the outset we were particularly interested in getting the
leading bank in a community--one with a good reputation, good
management, and one which was well established. We wanted to
create a strong group." Yet, he continued by saying that the
strategy was to put together a package which was not too big
or too small, i.e., one which would get through the regulatory
maze. "We just made it," he emphasized. "Any greater size in
our original package would have probably been turned down. The




While Bankshares was interested in the largest bank in
an area, Flinn said that they knew practically speaking, they
could not get the largest bank because the Federal Reserve
would not approve such a combination. But he continued:
"Bankshares did get the largest bank
in Northern Virginia (First and Citizens
of Alexandria--$61 . 8 million in deposits),
the second largest in Richmond (State-
Planters--$220 . 3 million), and the second
largest in Newport News (Citizens and
Marine Jefferson-— $18 . 9 million) and
Lynchburg (First National Trust and
Savings--$33 . 6 million)."
However, after the initial organization of Bankshares,
Flinn said that the size of any subsequent acquisitions be-
came a more important consideration. He explained, "We did
not think that we could continue to acquire the dominant bank
in other communities because the regulatory authorities were
concerned over large bank combinations. The rules were chang-
ing, i.e., court cases and agency decisions. Other groups
were active, too." He said that Bankshares acquisition of
the largest bank in a community would be looked upon as
putting the smaller banks at a disadvantage. But if Bank-
shares proposed to acquire one of the smaller banks the
chances for approval would be greatly improved. However,
Bankshares generally was not interested in looking at smaller
banks, under $10 million in deposits. Flinn said:
"You have more problems with banks
under $10 million and have to spend more
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time v/orking with them. We have a
small staff whereas Virginia Com-
monwealth and First Virginia operate,
by and large, with a large holding
company staff. A larger staff allows
them to acquire more smaller banks."
Flinn added that given a choice (and others would probably
feel the same way) Bankshares preferred banks over $25 mil-
lion, since they can be staffed and equipped to take care of
day-to-day operations without detailed supervision. He con-
tinued:
"In such cases these banks run
themselves except for some of the
sophisticated services that the
holding company can give them, i.e.,





Bankshares placed emphasis on local autonomy and a
decentralized management philosophy in operation of affiliates .
According to Flinn, Bankshares 1 decentralized management philo-
sophy had been successful in attracting the well managed, pro-
fitable bank to affiliate with the holding company. In his
opinion the banker operating this type of bank generally was
a strong individual who did not want to give up any measure
of operating responsibility. Therefore, local autonomy stem-
ming from a cooperative management philosophy was very helpful
in attracting additional partners.
Banks interested in joining Bankshares were told that
the holding company retained central direction in the following
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areas: (1) changes in top management (the top two) and their
salaries; (2) dividend policy; (3) matters which could result
in a conflict of interest, and (4) purchase of fixed assets
or leasing new offices. Affiliates were authorized to spend
up to their depreciation for new assets, but anything more
required approval by the holding company. In this way, Flinn
explained, Bankshares coordinated real estate and purchases
of major assets throughout the system, i.e., Bankshares had
raised $12.5 million to meet affiliates' plans for expansion.
Bankshares' acquisition strategy has been to deal directly
with the bank management . "An acquisition cannot work well,"
Flinn explained, "without the full cooperation of the management
of the bank being acquired. Our philosophy as a holding com-
pany has been that the prospective affiliate's management was
to run the shop. If you don't have him on your side you might
as well forget the acquisition." Because of this factor, he
said that Bankshares made no effort to go around management
and talk to the big stockholders if it appeared management
was reluctant to join.
V. HIGHLIGHTS OF OPERATIONS DURING THE 1962-1966 PERIOD OF
EXPANSION BY HOLDING COMPANY
This section of the report contains statistical data
on the results of Bankshares 1 expansion during the 1962-1966

A-29
period. Table A-I is a chronological list of acquisitions,
and Table A-II is a summary of new marketing areas entered
and new services offered during the period of expansion.


















Jan. 1963 State-Planters of Commerce and
Trust, Richmond
Jan. 1963 First and Citizens National
Bank of Alexandria
Jan. 1963 First National Trust and Savings
Bank of Lynchburg
Jan. 1963 Citizens Marine Jefferson Bank,
Newport News
Jan. 196 3 The Vienna Trust Company, Vienna
Jan. 1963 Merchants and Farmers Bank of
Franklin
Oct. 1964 Citizens National Bank of Hampton
(merged into Citizens Marine
Jefferson Bank and name changed
to Citizens and Marine Bank)
May 1964 Shirlington Trust Company, Arlington
(merged into First and Citizens
National Bank)
Aug. 1965 Tri-County Bank, Mechanicsville
(merged into State-Planters)
Dec. 1965 Peninsula Bank and Trust Company,
Williamsburg
Oct. 1966 Rockbridge Bank and Trust Company,
Lexington
Oct. 1966 Spotswood Bank, Harrisonburg
Jan. 1967 Seaboard Citizens National Bank,
Norfolk (consolidated with Merchants
and Farmers Bank)
Total Deposits Added





















EXPANSION RESULTS: NEW MARKETING AREAS AND NEW SERVICES
Twenty New Marketing Areas
- Lynchburg - Virginia Beach
- Alexandria - Chesapeake
- Newport News - Suffolk
- Franklin - Hopewell
- Hampton - Holland
- Arlington - Richmond
- Hanover County - York County
- Lexington - Fairfax County
- Harrisonburg - Williamsburg
- Norfolk - Petersburg
>. Nine New Services
- Municipal Bond Department
- Special Women Consultants
- Public Funds Section
- Professional Service Program
- College Tuition Loan Program
- Computerized Payroll Services
- One Check Payroll Plan
- Marketing Department




UNITED VIRGINIA BANK SHARES INCORPORATED AND AFFILIATES
SIX YEAR CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL SUMMARY (Amounts in thousands, except Per Share data.)
EARNINGS SUMMARY 1966 1965 1964 1963
Interest on loans $ 31,750 $ 21,304 $ 16,643
Interest and dividends on securities ' . . 7,191 5,431 4,487
Other income 6,910 4,746 3,978
Total Operating Income 45,851 31,481 25,108
Interest on time deposits 13,448 8,642 6,022
Salaries and employee benefits 11,937 8,280 6,545
Other expenses . ... 9,405 6,399 5,315
Total Operating Expenses .... 34,790 23,321 17,882
Net operating earnings before taxes .... 11,061 8,160 7,226
Income taxes and minority interests :. . . 3,433 2,715 2,729
Consolidated Net Operating Earnings . . 7,628 5,445 4,497
Net security profits (losses) after taxes (1,946) (367) 22
Net loan losses before tax credit ,. . . 795 355 521
BALANCE SHEET SUMMARY (Daily Average Figures)
U. S. Government Securities $ 85,514 $ 79,066 $ 73,484
Municipals ... 94,943 67,321 49,784
Loans (gross, excluding Federal Funds sold). . .
(
497,774 349,388 274,527
Reserve for Loan Losses 8,334 5,100 3,733
Deposits
:
Demand * . . . 397,241 322,435 285,839
Time 338,730 231,970 172,370
Total 735,971 554,405 458,209
Stockholders' Equity .... 58,077 , 44,672 38,588
AVERAGE RATES EARNED AND PAID (Taxable Equivalent Basis)
U. S. Government Securities 4.80% 4.35% 4.20%
Municipal Securities 6.28 5.73 5.77
Total Securities 5.57 5.00 4.81
Loans ;. • . 6.30 6.10 6.06
Total Earning Assets 6.10 5.66 5.61
Total Time and Savings Deposits 3.97 3.73 3.49
RATIOS
Net Operating Earnings to Total Operating Income 16.6% 17.3% 17.9%
Net Operating Earnings to Average Stockholders' Equity . . 13.1 12.2 12.6
Net Loan Losses to Daily Average Loans • 0.16 0.10 0.19
Loans to Deposits ," Daily Average Basis 67.6 63.0 59.9
Year-end Capital Funds and Valuation Reserves to Daily
Average Deposits 9.8 9.9 10.5
PER SHARE
New Operating Earnings $3.49 $3.18 $2.91
Dividends 1.52 1/2 1.42 1/2 1.25
Number of Shares 2,186,434 1,711,869 1,546,910 1,474,610
Number of Stockholders 7,448 6,123 5,216 4,702
1962





































SOURCE: 1967 Annual Report for years 1963-1966; Secretary Treasurer United Virginia Bankshares for year 1962

APPENDIX B
THE BANK OF VIRGINIA
I . PURPOSE
This material was collected in connection with a study
of two banking systems in Virginia which chose different
methods of expanding their banking operations on a statewide
basis, as a result of the enactment of libralized branching
legislation in 1962. The two forms of expansion are direct
merger and holding company. This element of the study concerns
the development of historical information relating to the
issues which led to changes in the branching legislation in
Virginia in 1928, 1948 and 1962. Specifically it explores
the role of The Bank of Virginia in these developments.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BANK OF VIRGINIA
Prior to 1928 the banking legislation in Virginia per-
mitted banks to establish de novo branches in areas throughout
the state. However, The Bank of Virginia (then The Morris
Plan Bank of Richmond) was the only bank which had expanded
into the major population centers apart from its home office
in Richmond.
The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond was founded in 1922
1 & 2
by Thomas C. Boushall, who had been an officer of the
This report concerning the background on The Bank of
Case prepared, 1968, by Paul L. Foster, doctoral candi-
date. All rights reserved by the .Sponsors of the Graduate
School of Business Administration, University of Virginia.
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then National City Bank of New York. Interested in start-
ing a Morris Plan Bank in Richmond, he received a franchise
and financial backing from Arthur J. Morris, who was franchis-
ing the Morris Plan throughout the country. A Morris Plan
Bank was a financial institution which accepted as deposits
only savings accounts and which made only instalment loans to
individuals. This system of Morris Plan lending was devised
by Arthur J. Morris, who is still a director of The Bank of
Virginia. In 1910 when Mr. Morris opened the first Morris
Plan Bank in Norfolk the availability of credit to average
wage earning individuals was almost non-existent. The original
approach to the Morris Plan Bank was designed to fill the need
for credit facilities for wage earners throughout the United
States who were not receiving this service from commercial
banks of the day.
The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond opened in 1922. It
was established with a regular bank charter. It did not,
however, exercise its authority to take demand deposits or
Virginia is based on interviews with Mr. Thomas C. Boushall,
honorary Chairman of the Board and founder of The Bank of Vir-
ginia, and Mr. Frederick Deane, Jr., current President of The
Bank of Virginia. Paraphrased text and direct quotes are used
to summarize the interviews. This report contains no opinion,
editorial comment or analysis by the researcher.
o
The bank has had only two chief executive officers
since its founding in 1922. The current chief executive is
Mr. Herbert Moseley. He succeeded Mr. Boushall in 1959.
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provide other coiranercial services. Activities were limited
to savings accounts and instalment loans to individuals and
small businesses. Late in 1922 a branch opened in Petersburg,
and in 1925 another branch opened in Newport News, the latter
by merger with the Merchants and Mechanics Savings Association
In 1928 a Roanoke branch was opened, and that same year the
Morris Plan Bank of Norfolk was merged into the Morris Plan
Bank of Richmond as its Norfolk branch. The Morris Plan
Bank of Norfolk was the original Morris Plan Bank founded
by Arthur J. Morris in 1910 under the name of Fidelity Loan
and Trust Company.
The fact that only one bank in Virginia was expanding
statewide in the 1920' s was commented on by Boushall. This
was attributed to the attitudes of bankers at that time and
to the geographic divisions of the State. Bankers' attitudes,
the first factor, were described as being "steeped in tradi-
tion". For example, a typical comment of commercial bankers
to the chief executive of The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond
concerning branching was that it was poor banking practice
and an unnecessary risk to have someone else lend your money ,
i.e., in the branches in cities distant from Richmond. And
further it was said that lending to the consumer was a dan-
gerous practice since they were not a reliable or desirable
account and since it was likely that this type of loan would
have an unacceptably high default rate. On the branching
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issue, Boushall further commented that bankers failed to re-
cognize a branch was not someone else , but was an extension
of the main bank. Thus, the branching activities of The
Morris Plan Bank of Richmond and their entry into consumer
instalment loans went against the grain of the tradition of
commercial bankers in Virginia. These deviations, Boushall
said, were such an unusual step away from the norm that the
Morris Plan Bank of Richmond became an anathema to many bankers
in the State.
The second influencing factor discussed by Boushall
was that the geographic and economic division of Virginia con-
tributed to the lack of enthusiasm for statewide branching.
Virginia was divided into distinct economic and geographic
regions, for example: (1) Tidewater Virginia (Norfolk, Newport
News, Portsmouth) was maritime oriented, (2) Richmond was
tobacco oriented, and (3) Northern Virginia was closely as-
sociated with the Federal Government. Further, some areas
in Virginia had closer ties (and in some cases still do today)
with neighboring states, for example: (1) Bristol, Virginia,
in the far southwestern corner of the state, with Tennessee,
and (2) the isolated Eastern Shore of Virginia, with Maryland.
Therefore, Boushall reasoned that these areas shared few eco-
nomic, political or social ties and branching across geographic
boundaries was unattractive to the commercial bankers.

B-5
However, Boushall explained, to The Morris Plan Bank
of Richmond branching was considered an essential element of
strategy in serving their chosen field--consumer credit.
Therefore, branching across intra-state regional areas was
attractive so that the bank could serve the consumer who was
located in Virginia's major population centers.
In early 1928 the Virginia Bankers Association was pre-
paring to submit to the Virginia General Assembly a revision
to the existing banking code. This revision, Boushall ex-
plained, was to restrict the authority of banks to branch or
merge outside of the home area of the parent bank, and to limit
to 4 percent per annum the maximum amount of interest a bank
could pay on savings deposits. The Morris Plan Bank of Rich-
mond, a member of the Association, had not been advised of this
proposal, which was contrary to many of its basic policies.
The bank had been paying 5 percent interest since its founding
in 1922 and had made known its desires to open branches in
Roanoke and Norfolk, in addition to its existing branches.
According to Boushall, the commercial banks saw the 5 percent
savings rate as a threat to drain away their savings deposits.
During the 1928 session of the General Assembly the
Chairman of the Legislative Committee and the Secretary of
the Virginia Bankers Association called on the President of
The Morris Plan Bank of Richmond and suggested that if the
bank's representatives would support the proposed code change
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limiting savings interest to 4 percent, the Legislative Com-
mittee of the Association would undertake to have the code
amended specifically to permit branches in cities other than
that of a bank's head office, provided the cities would have
a minimum population of 50,0 00. This compromise was accepted
by the Morris Plan Bank, and it was subsequently incorporated
into the 192 8 banking code.
Boushall explained that an ironic twist to this power
play by the commercial banks was that The Morris Plan Bank of
Richmond wanted to reduce their 5 percent savings rate, yet
could not for fear of losing depositors. It so happened that
the bank was having a difficult time attracting savings even
though 5 percent was paid and most Richmond commercial banks
paid 3 percent and other areas 4 percent. A large segment of
the saving public shared the feeling that "something must be
wrong" if the prestigious commercial banks are paying out 3
to 4 percent and this new bank 5 percent. Thus, The Morris
Plan Bank of Richmond was looking for a way to solve the "5
percent rate problem" and, at the same time continue to expand
in the more populated areas of the State. Therefore, the com-
promise of rate reduction for limited branching proposed by
the Virginia Bankers Association was readi]y accepted.
Between 1929-1948 competition started to develop between
the other large banks in Richmond and elsewhere in the state
and The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia. During this period the
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commercial banks began to expand into the area of consumer
finance and, in turn, The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia into
commercial accounts. This competition was to become a signi-
ficant factor in subsequent banking legislation.
During the 1920 's and 1930' s the maverick Morris Plan
Bank of Virginia was not considered a competitor by the more
orthodox commercial banks because the commercial banks at
that time made very few personal loans. Generally speaking,
Deane said that in the eyes of commercial bankers The Morris
Plan Bank was considered nothing more than a high-class small
loan company. This attitude, he continued, was aggravated by
the fact that in the twenties and early thirties banks did not
consider it ethical to advertise for loans and the Morris Plan
banks engaged in extensive advertising. Deane explained,
"Morris Plan banks were characterized as sort of razzle-dazzle
promoters from the beginning, i.e., they gave away merchandise
to get accounts, etc. While these practices are acceptable
today the Morris Plan Banks were doing this at a time when it
was considered most improper." Deane reasoned that this practice
re-inforced the view of the commercial bankers in Virginia
that the small Morris Plan Bank of Richmond was not really a
bank at all, and certainly not in the same league with them.
As an aside, Boushall noted that there was no other Morris
Plan Bank in Virginia after the conversion of the Morris




As the economic climate changed in the depression so
did the policies of commercial banks in Virginia. Boushall
said that commercial banks were not making many loans because
the national economy was stagnant and commercial customers
were reluctant to borrow. The depression also affected con-
sumer lending, but not quite to the same extent, i.e., there
was relatively more demand for consumer credit than commercial
credit. Boushall recalled that consumer credit began to look
profitable to the commercial banks in Virginia since they started
to move into this area in the early 1930' s.
Before this time commercial banks had shown a general
lack of interest in the consumer business. For example, the
American Bank and Trust Company of Richmond opened a consumer
loan department in 1927. This action had a startling impact
3
on the banking community in Virginia and elsewhere. Yet,
Boushall said, two factors illustrated a continuing lack of
interest in consumer instalment loans by the American Bank
and Trust Company. First, after establishing the consumer
loan department it was located in the basement of its building.
And second, in 1933, when the bank did not reopen after
the bank holiday , "paper" from its consumer loan department
In addition, Boushall stated that the National City
Bank of New York (now the First National City Bank) came to
The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia to obtain the procedures and




was offered to The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia—the total
of this paper was approximately $116,000 after almost five
years of consumer credit business. This amount was negligible
when compared to The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia's $7-1/2
million. To further illustrate the general lack of interest
in consumer credit by commercial banks, Boushall recalled that
The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia, in 1937, held more consumer
instalment loans than all of Virginia's commercial banks and
finance companies combined. And yet another example was an
effort on the part of a New York correspondent bank to drop
the Morris Plan Bank of Virginia's $300,000 line of credit
unless the dangerous practice of auto loans and its planned new
4
office construction were stopped.
As commercial banks moved into consumer credit in the
1930 's, policy changes were initiated at The Morris Plan Bank
of Virginia to broaden the scope of services by expanding into
demand deposits and checking accounts. First, only checking
accounts of individuals were taken, then commercial checking
accounts. And just before World War II The Bank of Virginia
In 1928 The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia was the first
bank in the state to buy dealer automobile paper, and in 1935
the first to do extensive direct (over-the-counter) collateral
auto loans to consumers.
5Boushall noted that government insured FHA Home Improve-
ment Loans in 19 34 were a factor which brought Virginia's com-
mercial banks into the consumer area.
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entered into the commercial lending field in active competi-
tion with the other commercial banks. However, the war inter-
vened and not much progress was made. Thus, the active com-
mercial growth and development phase of The Morris Plan Bank
of Virginia did not start until 1945. On January 1, 1946 the
bank name was changed from The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia
to The Bank of Virginia in order to qualify more specifically
for this commercial accounts business.
By 1948 Boushall said that The Bank of Virginia was
successfully implementing its strategy of expanding into the
commercial area in direct competition with the commercial
banks. It was the only bank in the state which had developed
a branch system in cities with a population over 50,000, and
it had plans to expand into new areas when these areas met
the population provisions of the branching laws. For example,
it was expected that Alexandria would meet the 50,000 popula-
tion requirement after the 1950 Census, and negotiations with
a bank in Alexandria were initiated. This alerted other
banks to the continuing expansion plans of The Bank of Vir-
ginig
.
To this point in time Deane said that The Bank of Vir-
ginia had grown up "relatively unnoticed" by the other com-
mercial banks, i.e., because they had not felt that it was
a legitimate competitor, and because it was not until after
World War II that The Morris Plan Bank of Virginia became an
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active, aggressive competitor of commercial banks in the com-
mercial accounts area. However, by 1947 the bank had grown
from among the smallest in Virginia in 1922 to become the
sixth largest in 1947. Therefore, the expansion activities
of The Bank of Virginia were seen as a competitive threat to
other banks in Virginia who still were not interested in
branching. As a result of this situation the Virginia Bankers
Association, for the second time in 20 years, sponsored a
change to restrict branching, which the press reported was
aimed specifically at The Bank of Virginia. Restrictive branch-
ing legislation was passed in 1948 after a bitter fight in
the General Assembly.
There v/as another factor in the 1948 controversy which
Boushall said was a matter of concern to those who viewed the
activities of The Bank of Virginia with alarm. This was the
question of out-of-state control. Since its founding The
Bank of Virginia had been controlled by the holding company
established to franchise Morris Plan Banks throughout the
United States. As late as 1953, when the control of The Bank
of Virginia was sold, the holding company still owned 57 percent
This factor tended to increase the unfriendly feeling of the
other commercial banks in Virginia towards The Bank of
Boushall noted that editorial coverage in the press
favored the position of The Bank of Virginia by a margin of
2 2 to 0.
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Virginia. It was used by the opponents of The Bank of Vir-
ginia in the hearings on the 1948 legislation to illustrate
one of the "alleged dangers" of branching.
Over the period 1949-1962 several factors caused the
bankers in Virginia to re-evaluate the legislation restricting
expansion of the banking system. These factors were: (1) com-
petition from holding companies which were not regulated under
state law, and which were expanding throughout Virginia
, (2)
competition from out-of-state banks which had larger credit
lines to serve the growing needs of industry in Virginia, and
(3) the requirement to provide banking services in the fast
growing urban sections of the state. Spurred by these pres-
sures seven banks joined together in early 1961 to lift the
ban on branching. They formulated "The Richmond Plan" (later
known as "The Virginia Metropolitan Plan") which proposed
branching in metropolitan areas throughout the state. Boushall
recalled that these banks were: (1) First and Merchants National
Bank of Richmond, (2) State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trust
of Richmond, (3) Central National Bank of Richmond, (4) National
Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, (5) First National Exchange Bank
of Roanoke, (6) Peoples National Bank of Charlottesville,
(7) Shenandoah Valley National Bank. The Bank of Virginia




Prior to the convention of the Virginia Bankers Associa-
tion in June, 1961, sponsors of this plan visited bankers
throughout the state to generate support for legislative
changes. Their objective was to gain endorsement of the plan
at the convention for subsequent presentation to the General
Assembly in January 1962. But opposition to the plan was
strong, and during the Virginia Bankers Association convention,
in June 1962, the matter was referred for study to a special
committee (The Kramer Committee) . Boushall explained that it
was originally proposed that the Kramer Committee report to
a special convention of the Virginia Bankers Association in
November 1961 so that the Virginia Bankers Association could
bring the issue before the 1962 General Assembly. But this
special convention provision was voted down under a motion
by Mr. Harry Nichols, President of the Southern Bank of
Norfolk. Therefore, any Virginia Bankers Association sponsored
action to ease expansion restriction was delayed two and one
half years to January 1964, when the Virginia General Assembly
7 & 8
would again meet. Thus, the opponents to more liberal
7
This situation, Boushall said, resulted in The Bank
of Virginia's action to form a holding company as a means of
avoiding the expansion restrictions rather than wait another
three years for possible resolution of the branching issue.
o
The Virginia General Assembly meets every two years.

B-14
expansion provisions were successful in putting off final
resolution of the issue.
At the beginning of the 1962 General Assembly, while
the Kramer Committee was still formulating a position on
branch banking, the Buck-Holland Bill, which favored statewide
branching was introduced. Boushall said that the bill was a
complete surprise to the Virginia banking community. It came
about as the result of independent action of two legislators,
Senator Fred C. Buck and Delegate Shirley T. Holland. They
were presidents of relatively small banks in Virginia. Both
Buck and Holland acted on their own, independent of the study
being made by the Virginia Bankers Association. In particular,
Boushall said that Mr. Holland's motivation was based on the
recognition of long run needs of the State of Virginia, and
also to give banks a choice between merger and joining a hold-
ing company group.
The Buck-Holland Bill, which became effective on July 1,
1962 opened a new era of banking in Virginia. The bankers in
Virginia interested in statewide expansion now had three methods
to achieve their objective:
1. Expansion by merger.
2. Expansion by holding company.
3. Expansion by both holding company and merger.

APPENDIX C
FIRST AND MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK
I . PURPOSE
This material was collected in connection with a study
of two banking systems in Virginia which chose different
methods of expanding their banking operations on a statewide
basis, as a result of the enactment of liberalized branching
legislation in 1962. It is based on interviews with Mr. John
Green, Vice President and Mr. C. Coleman McGehee , Executive
Vice President of First and Merchants National Bank. The in-
formation is presented in the form of paraphrased text and
direct quotes. It contains no opinion, editorial comment, or
analysis by the researcher.
This part of the study concerns the experiences of
First and Merchants National Bank of Richmond (hereafter called
First and Merchants) which chose to expand by direct merger.
The focus of this information is on: (1) the central issues in
management's selection of the most appropriate form of expan-
sion, i.e., the significant characteristics considered by First
and Merchants to be advantages of expansion by holding com-
pany, and (2) significant factors in First and Merchants' ex-
pansion strategy.
Case prepared, 1968, by Paul L. Foster, doctoral candi-
date. All rights reserved by the Sponsors of the Graduate School




The passage by the Virginia General Assembly of the
Buck-Holland Bill in 1962 gave First and Merchants and other
Virginia banks significantly greater opportunities for expan-
sion. After the 1962 legislation, statewide expansion could
be undertaken by: (1) holding company affiliation, (2) merger,
or (3) a combination of the two. Before that time, holding
company affiliation was the only alternative available for
expanding banking operations beyond the general locality of
the home office.
Prior to 1962, First and Merchants had contemplated
expansion under the Virginia Metropolitan Plan, a plan to
allow merger between banks in metropolitan areas. However,
the plan did not gain sufficient support of Virginia bankers
to be proposed as an amendment to the state banking codes in
the 1962 General Assembly. One reason for the failure of
-Virginia bankers to support the Virginia Metropolitan Plan
was advanced by Green, a member of a group appointed to gen-
erate support for the plan throughout the state. He indicated
that the plan was sponsored primarily by the larger banks in
Richmond. But to be accepted as a resolution by the Virginia
Bankers Association it needed support of the large number of
small banks in the state. This support was hard to gain be-
cause of dangers which the small banks felt to be inherent in
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statewide branching systems. The small bankers were reluctant
to .give up marketing area protection enjoyed under the 1948
legislation, regardless of the broader economic benefits to
the state.
First and Merchants, at that point, considered the
holding company route, but the surprise passage of the Buck-
Holland Bill gave First and Merchants an opportunity to re-
consider its expansion plans. As explained by an officer of
First and Merchants:
"We were actively studying the for-
mation of a holding company and had re-
tained the services of experts in the
field. Our planning for a holding com-
pany had moved right along , but we feel
fortunate, from our standpoint, that the
Buck-Holland legislation got into the
mill in time for us to take advantage of
it. That is to say, we had not gone so
far that we could not scrap our plans
for a holding company, and embark on a
program for expansion by merger, as
authorized under the 1962 legislation.
On this same subject, we believe
(we do not know) that if some of the
others had not gone so far with their
commitments for the holding company
form, they would have changed their
plans also. But, we feel some had
gone so far that they just could not
back up and they had to go ahead with
their commitments."
III. IDENTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FACTORS CONSIDERED




Advantages of Expansion by Merger
Nine significant factors considered by First and Mer-
chants' management to be advantages of expansion by merger, as
contrasted to or different from expansion by holding company,
were cited by Green. These factors are listed below:
-- The merged form of banking organization provides
a basis for better organizational control than
does the holding company form.
-- Expansion by merger provides a better solution to
the problem of management succession.
-- Merger provides for greater mobility of funds.
-- Merger provides for greater diversification of
risk.
' -- Merger provides for increased lines of credit to a
single customer.
-- Merger provides for greater financial flexibility.
-- Merger creates larger individual banking units which
are better able to attract industry to Virginia's
growing industrial communities.
-- Merger provides for greater community services.
-- Merger provides for economies in operation.
The merged form of banking organization provides a
basis for better organizational control than does the holding
company form. Green stated that the merged organizational
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form has only one policy group, its board of directors, and
one group of senior management to execute policy. Therefore,
it is more likely that potential problems in policy develop-
ment and execution can be avoided, and coordination to achieve
"unity of purpose" can be more readily attained than in an
organization with more than one policy group. In addition,
one group of senior management to carry out the policies of
a single board tends to reduce the time and effort required
of management at the local level on policy matters--this , then,
gives the local management more time to devote to business
development and service to the customer.
Green contrasted the single board of directors of the
merged organization to the holding company, in which each
bank, being a separate corporate entity, has its own board.
It was his comment that when the policies of the boards of
each holding company affiliate vary according to the indivi-
dual desires or thoughts of these individual groups of manage-
ment, then the unity necessary to operate effectively a large
banking organization is hard to achieve.
Expansion by merger provides a better solution to the
problem of management succession . "Management succession is
one of the critical issues facing the banking industry today,"
Green stressed, "particularly as the problem concerns smaller
banks." He cited three general reasons why expansion by merger
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provides a better solution to this problem than does expansion
by the holding company method: (1) the merged form requires
relatively fewer management personnel at the policy development
and operating levels, (2) larger individual banking institutions
are in a better position to attract and hold young management
talent, and (3) flexibility in movement of management personnel
in merged organizations is greater.
Green stated that the management succession problem
that confronts each institution today, particularly smaller
and medium size banks, cannot be over emphasized. Under the
holding company affiliation, in which separate corporate
identity is maintained, the need of management at all levels
still exists. Each separate bank will continue to experience
difficulty attracting and holding personnel. This problem is
less serious in a merged system since only one organization is
involved. Thus, he said that there tends to be more efficient
allocation of banking's scarest resource—management personnel.
According to Green, the larger the single institution
the greater the attractiveness to the younger person. He
illustrated this in several ways. For example, he noted the
-
sentiments of the Chief Officer of a bank in a remote, outlying
area on the problem of recruiting and training programs. Green
recalled this officer said:
"How can I conceivably attract any-
body to come here and live? As far as
profits of the bank are concerned and
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because of lack of loan demand it is dif-
ficult to pay a beginning salary to attract
good young management. And, furthermore,
what is really available here in the com-
munity to attract permanent management?
There is nothing here, except what has
existed back through the century. Young
qualified and educated people are inter-
ested in going where they can grow and
where they do not have a definite ceiling
placed on their abilities. They do not
want to come here."
Green continued by saying that the same problem applies to
many locations in Virginia. However, when a location such as
that described is part of a large organization like First and
Merchants, a young man would be more willing to take an assign-
ment as branch manager since he knows that top management is
evaluating him, and that this is a training ground or stepping-
stone to bigger things. It is not a lifetime job.
According to Green the merged form has an advantage
over the holding company in terms of flexibility in movement
of management personnel. He explained that in a holding com-
pany each individual bank is responsible for maintaining and
managing it's own personnel, and management transfers can re-
sult in a situation where a conflict of interests arises be-
tween two corporate identities and two boards of directors.
In a merged system there is less of a tendency for conflicts
to arise because the man is a member of one organization in
the eyes of the personnel committee, the President, the
Chairman of the Board, and the senior executive staff. He
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can more easily be moved within the organization. It was
Green's opinion that the holding company as the prime organi-
zation, cannot achieve this flexibility in movement of manage-
ment.
Merger provides for greater mobility of funds . Illus-
trating this point, Green said that funds required in one area
can be supplied from another, thereby circumventing the need
of participation among several organizations, as in a holding
company. In this particular connection (and this point was
emphasizad) it is possible for a branch in a high loan area
to have 100 percent or better of its deposits invested in
loans--this could not be done in an independent unit bank or
holding company affiliate.
Green noted that a holding company competitor in the
same area, through participation, could (in theory) place the
same amount of loans. "But," he stated, "this does not work
too well in practice since participation must go through the
separate boards of directors of a holding company, and each
may not react the same way. The extension of credit is per-
sonal judgment--it is not an exact science by any manner of
means." Further he said, "While the holding company could
say what will be done in a certain situation, the board of
directors of an affiliate is still required by law to exer-
cise independent judgment, or be subject to legal action."
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Merger provides for greater diversification of risk .
According to Green, the pooling of funds in a merged system
provides for greater diversification in the loan portfolio
and investment account.
Merger provides for increased lines of credit to a
single customer . Green illustrated this point by the fact
that First and Merchants, in 1962, could lend one customer
approximately $1-1/2 million, because the ability to lend
to one borrower was restricted by capital structure. And in
order to lend $5 million in 1962 it required nine banks to
participate. Today, First and Merchants, alone, can manage
$3-1/2 million to one borrower; and just a few large Virginia
banks are needed to lend $5 million.
In the absence of the merger law, the only way capital
structure could have been increased would have been by retained
earnings or the sale of additional stock. It was Green's
•strong opinion that First and Merchants' capital funds would
have been much less had not mergers taken place. He also
stated that First and Merchants is still not the size desired,
either in capital or deposits.
Merger provides for greater financial flexibility . Green
noted that a group of independent banks are separate entities-
independent organizations versus one. When capital is needed
it is generally needed in aggregate. He reasoned that if there
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is one capital account, it is much more easily controlled and
manipulated than if the account were in many independent units.
So, for that reason, merger is definitely an advantage, argued
Green.
"A merged organization is not restricted to selling
equity," Green said. "It can sell debt instruments or pre-
ferred stock." In fact, he thought that a merged organization
probably would have a little more of an advantage when selling
equity because, in the case of First and Merchants, it would
be known all over the state of Virginia, and has been known
all over the state of Virginia, for one reason or another,
for 102 years. He said:
"To buy First and Merchants National
Bank stock there is acceptability of the
equity and debt instruments at the local
community and this would be much greater
than it would be for a holding company
that does not identify to any bank. Today
there is a problem, so the bankers say, in
the identification of a holding company
with a bank in the community, i.e., people
in the community tend to get mixed up.
However, this does not apply to a sophisti-
cated investor, but to the man on the
street , it does .
"
Therefore, he reasoned a merged organization might have a
little advantage over a holding company in the sale of equity
or the sale of debt instruments to raise capital. For example,
in floating an issue much would depend upon the area in which
this equity or debt structure was to be held. If it were to
be held in Richmond probably the name First and Merchants
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would be more readily accepted than the name United Virginia
Bahkshares, a holding company. However, that would not be
true for the name of First and Merchants versus the State-
Planters, the lead bank in the holding company. But the name
of State-Planters does not appear since its stock is owned
by United Virginia Bankshares.
In addition, Green observed that it is the peculiarity
of local citizens to want to own bank stock. But, they want
to own, in particular, local bank stock, instead of many of the
local industrial corporations. Therefore, he reasoned that
a local bank name is a more valuable asset in this environment
than a holding company name.
Merger creates larger individual banking units which
are better able to attract industry to Virginia' s growing
industrial communities . "Industry is more naturally drawn to
the larger financial organizations which can better serve some
•of their needs," stated Green. Although he said that holding
company advocates would say the same is applicable to their
group, the argument is much more difficult to see and the
details much more involved to handle. He believed, "There
is a natural attraction for large industry to go with the
larger financial organizations, because they know from experi-
ence that they can be better served." The attractions of the
larger banking organizations to industry are: (1) larger credit




Merger provide s for greater community services .
"A large merged organization brings to
the local community specialization in many
fields, including specialized banking ser-
vices and loans plus a wide variety of trust
services, not otherwise available. In other
words, it makes available at the local level
the full facilities of the larger institution,
as each branch office can perform any and
all services just as though it were the
main office . This is something that de-
finitely can not be done to the same de-
gree in a holding company organization."
In addition, Green stated, "Direct contact with the specialist
in the bank of your choice, as in a merged organization, ap-
pears to give the customer more confidence than in the holding
company where the specialized services may be performed by a
bank of another name, or the holding company."
1 Merger provides for economies in operations
.
Green cited
several arguments in favor of merger which lead to operating
economies, such as: (1) concentrating purchasing power for
supplies and other items, (2) grouping the insurance coverage,
(3) more efficient use of automatic data processing equipment,
and (4) improved administration of personnel policies. How-
ever, he noted that these savings can be offset by the cost
associated with new services, improved quality of existing
services and other factors. For example, Green explained
that the size of the merging bank, measured by total deposits,
is a consideration in mergers. A smaller bank usually can
be integrated into the system with greater ease, i.e., merger
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with a larger bank tends to involve problems involving func-
tions and personnel in the merged bank normally centralized in
the home office. For example, in talking about the problems
of duplicate or excess personnel after a merger, Green said:
"Let me say that the hoped for economies
have not been as realistic as we had thought
they would be, and we have not experienced
them yet. We hope to in the future, but I
think v/e would make a very serious mistake
if we tried to achieve economies through a
negative approach. I consider reducing the
merged staff by arbitrary laying-off or
just saying you do not have a job because
we eliminated your position to be a terrible
mistake to make at the local scene.
In no case have we dispensed with
personnel services as a result of merger.
Normal attrition has taken care of this
problem. That has been a policy long
before to the passage of the merger law."
i
Disadvantages of Expansion by Merger
Only three main arguments favoring the holding company
form of expansion were considered significant factors by First
and Merchants in weighing its alternatives to expand by merger
or by holding company. These factors are listed below.
— Loss of the merged bank's name is a disadvantage
of expansion by merger.
— The change in status of the merged bank's




-- Restrictions against de novo branching in the area
of the merged bank are a disadvantage of expansion
by merger.
Loss of the merged bank ' s name is a disadvantage of
expansion by merger . According to Green, "It is surprising
how important an existing bank's name can be to the bank's
management. In many instances bank management does not want
the name to disappear, and under the holding company route the
name can be continued." The counter argument against reten-
tion of the local bank's name, he said is that the First and
Merchants National Bank (which is over 100 years old) has
served the state of Virginia many, many years, and in most
cases far more years than the local banks.
In further discussions, C. Coleman McGehee, Executive
Vice-President, pointed out an additional counter argument,
which he felt more than offsets the identity advantage alleged
to accrue to a holding company. In exchanging the stock of
the local bank for the stock of the holding company, the local
stockholder in the affiliated bank's area is given the stock
of the holding company which may be, as an example, United
Virginia Bankshares. Thus, the name of the stock of the local
bank which has been picked up as a part of the holding com-
pany system is replaced in the eyes of the stockholder. If
this same bank had been merged into First and Merchants, the
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local stockholders would then have First and Merchants stock,
and the name of the local bank would be First and Merchants.
Consequently, the local stockholder identifies with a local
bank as opposed to a holding company which may be located in
some other area. McGehee said that he feels the local associa-
tion caused by the tie of the stockholders to a local bank is
stronger and provides just as much motivation and local iden-
tity to stockholders of a merged system as does the retention
of the name for a bank which joins a holding company.
In addition, McGehee said a survey of the Tidewater
area was made after two years of operation of a merged bank to
find out if the depositors knew that they were dealing with
First and Merchants as opposed to the local bank. According
to McGehee, this survey showed 80 percent of the old depositors
who had been doing business with the unit bank associated with
First and Merchants. Therefore, he felt this showed excellent
acceptance of the merging bank's image in the local community.
The change in status of the merged bank ' s board of
directors is a disadvantage of merger . Another argument in
favor of the holding company, cited by Green, is continuation
of the local board of directors as contrasted to the need in
mergers to substitute an advisory board. In First and Mer-
chants there is only one board of directors. An area advisory
board has been substituted in merged banks, using the same

C-16
group of men. Green stated that experience with advisory
boards has been especially good because the directors are
used as they were previously, i.e., for their advice and
knowledge of the community and its affairs. The only signi-
ficant difference noted by Green was that area advisory board
members do not have any real legal liability.
Restrictions against de novo branching in the area of
the merged bank are a disadvantage of expansion by merger .
Probably the most valid argument under the existing law in
favor of the holding company, according to Green, is the ability
of the local affiliated bank to continue to branch as compared
to the frozen situation after merger takes place. For example,
he cited Lynchburg as a situation where First and Merchants
has five branches, but cannot have any more--yet Lynchburg is
growing. On the other hand, a holding company affiliate in
Lynchburg can branch wherever it can justify the need.
In the future he hoped--and, of course, there is no
way of forecasting future events~~that this difference will
be eliminated. He said that legislation is needed that will
enable merged systems to branch, not d£ novo statewide (although
that may come) , but at least to the same extent that a hold-
ing company member can now branch.
IV. IDENTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE KEY FACTORS IN
FIRST AND MERCHANTS' MERGER STRATEGY
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McGehee and Green discussed five significant factors
in the merger strategy of First and Merchants. These factors
are listed below and are subsequently discussed as they v/ere
related to the researcher.
— First and Merchants ' expansion plan was to
merge only into areas where the growth rate
of the area will keep pace or exceed the
growth rate of the system as a whole.
— An objective in merger was to avoid dilu-
tion of book value and earnings but give
"fair value".
— Strategy was flexible because future mergers
may be difficult due to increasing competition
for the remaining banks available for merger
and due to the attitude of the regulatory
agencies.
-- To offset de novo branching restrictions in
the merged area, merger partners with branch
offices are preferred.
-- To offset the loss of the merged bank's board
of directors an Area Advisory Board is es-
tablished.
First and Merchants ' expansion plan was to merge only
into areas where the growth rate of the area will keep pace
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or exceed the growth rate of the system as a whole . As re-
lated by Green this was to be accomplished by expansion through
merger, primarily in urban and industrial areas throughout
Virginia which have above average growth potential. He said
that planned expansion was based upon knowledge of these areas
throughout the state. For example, it was known that the
Northern Virginia, Virginia Beach-Norfolk, and the Newport
News-Hampton areas were among the fastest growing sections of
the state. In addition, areas such as Alexandria, Winchester,
Harrisonburg, Arlington, Fairfax, Staunton, Waynesboro, Roanoke,
Bristol, Lynchburg, Martinsville, Danville, were initially
considered for expansion since it was felt that the industrial
growth potential in these areas was more assured than it would
have been in Williamsburg, for instance, (although tourism
there was almost an industry in itself) , or in smaller rural
communities. First and Merchants, Green noted, has not been
successful in getting into the Washington metropolitan area,
other than in Leesburg which is removed from the immediate
pattern, and a facility operation in the Fairfax-Arlington
area, which is confined to the Pentagon.
Merger partners were looked at from the standpoint of
what could be foreseen as future development in their areas.
Based on this factor, Green said:
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"More opportunities to merge were
turned down than have actually merged--
about three to one . With some of the
people that we have known for many, many
years, the hardest decision to make was
to say no, if according to our analysis,
the areas that they represented did not
have the required growth potential. Banks
like these generally wanted: (1) to share
in the future growth and earnings of the
First and Merchants system, (2) to solve
a management succession problem, or (3) to
obtain more marketability for stockholders
shares from the merger."
Green explained that growth was an important factor
because if the growth rate of a particular area did not keep
pace with the rest of the system, then the future earnings
of First and Merchants 1 own stockholders would be diluted,
even if fair value was given for fair value. Therefore, he
continued, "If the growth potential of a given community was
not going to be as good or better than the rest of the First
and Merchants' system there was no basis for merger." It has
followed that this has kept First and Merchants out of the
rural communities, i.e., the real rural communities where
the dominant foundation was agriculture. As a consequence,
Green described First and Merchants' merger strategy as having
very high degree of selectivity. He said, "Others have gone
about merger in a different fashion. First and Merchants
used a rifle to shoot at the map of the state and others used
a shotgun." According to Green, "First and Merchants believes
that this strategy is sound, however, there are others who
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still contend it is foolish to turn down a merger because
the State of Virginia is going to grow, and if you can merge,
merge .
"
An objective in merger was to avoid dilution of book
value and earnings but give " fair value " . First and Mer-
chants wanted to avoid an immediate effect on stockholders
of diluting the book value in a merger. But, Green said:
"Immediate dilution was not as
important as the greater effect on the
earnings in the future. For example, if
the merged area did not grow as much as
the system area in future years then even
an exchange of fair values would produce
an earnings drag on the system and a pre-
mium would have a greater effect."
Strategy was flexible because future mergers may be
more difficult due to increasing competition for the remaining
banks available for merger and due to the attitude of regulatory
agencies . In five years seven mergers have been consumated--
Newport News, Lynchburg, Staunton, Waynesboro, Leesburg, Vir-
ginia Beach, and Chesapeake. The last merger was in June,
1966. According to Green, the pace of mergers was slow. Re-
cent decisions of the Justice Department, primarily the
action not to grant the formation of Allied Bankshares, re-
sulted in the feeling that any combination of consequence in
Virginia is not going to be approved. Therefore, Green believed
that it will be more difficult to accomplish in Virginia what
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has been accomplished in North Carolina in terms of building
large statewide systems. The Justice Department attack has
been on bigness and potential bigness. The Federal Reserve
Board and the Justice Department have been concerned with what
they called a tendency toward monopoly.
Green reasoned that the current attitude of the Justice
Department may have an impact on the future strategy for
mergers. First and Merchants may not be able to be as dis-
criminating as in the past, yet on the other hand, it may be
required to be even more discriminating. It was his opinion
that if the policy of a high degree of selectivity is continued
there will be a slow down in mergers because of the present
stand of the regulatory authorities. However, if selectivity
is not continued then First and Merchants will have to change
policy to coincide with that of some of the other expanding
systems who have gone at the merger question with less regard
to future growth potential. In any event, Green explained
that opportunities would continue to exist for mergers because
the regulatory agencies concern for size will not exclude the
many small banks in the state who want to (and many times need
to) join a system.
To offset de novo branching restrictions in the merged
area, merger partners with branch offices are preferred .
McGehee pointed out that the de novo branching disadvantage
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of merged systems was a fault of the 1962 legislation. Once
a bank is merged in a community additional branches can not
be established. The only branches authorized are the branches
which existed at the time of the merger. On the other hand,
a holding company affiliated bank can continue to establish
branches in its own community. First and Merchants has tried
to offset this disadvantage by merging with banks that have
extensive branches.
To o ffset the loss of the merged bank ' s board of
directors an Area Advisory Board is established . Green, in
mentioning the value of a board of directors to a banking com-
munity, stated that First and Merchants' policy was to retain
the valuable services of board members as an advisory board,
"These members have continued to serve with essentially the
same enthusiam and effectiveness as before." As stated in the
1963 Annual Report:
"Advisory boards play an important
role in the management and operation of
the system, and their particular knowledge
of local conditions, their experience in
the business life of their own communities,
and their often-demonstrated interest in
the program of the bank are of inestimable
value.
"
V. HIGHLIGHTS OF FIRST AND MERCHANTS' OPERATIONS DURING THE
1962-1966 PERIOD OF EXPANSION BY MERGER
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This section of the report contains statistical data
on the results of First and Merchants expansion during the
1962-1966 period. Table C-I is a chronological list of mergers,
and Table C-II is a summary of new marketing areas entered and
new services offered during the period of expansion. Table





FIRST AND MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK
LIST OF MERGERS
Merged Bank Banking






Mergers During the Period of Re-
strictive Branching Legislation
Jan. 195 9 Savings and Trust Company of Richmond
Dec. 1959 First National Bank of Ashland
Dec. 1961 Petersburg Savings and American
Trust Company
Mergers During the Period of Liber-
alized Branching Legislation
Sept. 1962 Augusta National Bank of Staunton
Oct. 19 62 First National Bank of Nevzport News
Jan. 1963 Peoples National Bank and Trust Com-
pany of Lynchburg
July 1964 First National of Waynesboro
Sept. 1965 Loudoun National Bank of Leesburg
Jan. 1966 Bank of Virginia Beach
June 1966 Bank of Chesapeake
Total Deposits Added by Merger
Total Banking Offices Added by Merger
* Trust Service Added in this area.
SOURCE OF DATA: 19 62 Annual Reports.















FIRST AND MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK
EXPANSION RESULTS: NEW MARKETING AREAS AND NEW SERVICES
1. Twelve New Marketing Areas
- Staunton - Big Island - Norfolk
- Newport News - Waynesboro - Chesapeake
- Fort Eustis - Leesburg - Portsmouth
- Lynchburg - Virginia Beach - Bedford
2. Seven New Services
- 1962 & 1963 Data Processing for customer
services, accounting and other operations
- 1963 New Car Dealer Division
- 1963 Real Estate Division
- 1963 Marketing Division for banking services
- 1964 Revised and broadened the bank employee
benefit plans
- 1966 Specialized and professional service to
business for pension or profit sharing plans
- 1966 Planning implementation of national credit
card service.




TEN YEAR RECORD FIRST AND MERCHANTS NATIONAL BANK
i
DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962
(Average Figures)
Demand Deposits. . $290,252 $276,047 $259,485 $246,716 $197,514
Time Deposits - . . . 210,753 177,939 146,027 127,134 80,737
Total Deposits* 501,005 453,986 405,512 373,850 278,251
Loans ( Excluding Federal Funds Sold) 315,077 272,924 235,777 209,538 141,414
Securities ' 132,631 125,090 122,112 121,625 98,952
Capital Funds. . 43,485 39,822 37,966 35,790 26,858
Reserves 8,134 7,548 6,576 5,860 4,799
Operating Revenue $ 30,024 $ 25,037 $ 21,905 $ 19,097 $ 13,468
Operating Expenses . . ' 21,606 17,983 15,235 13,301 8,644
Net Operating Earnings Before Taxes '. . 8,418 7,054 6,670 5,796 4,824
Income Taxes Applicable to Operations. ;........... 2,946 2,586 2,709 2,433 2,095
Net Operating Earnings 5,472 4,468 3,961 3,363 2,729
Dividends Paid--Cash 2,423 1,978 1,850 1,824 1,319
PER SHARE DATA (ADJUSTED)
:
Average Shares Outstanding 1,512,725 1,383,053 1,352,519 1,326,101 1,004,328
Book Value—Year End $ 28.82 $ 28.91 $ . 28.11 $ 27.26 $ 26.14
Net Operating Earnings Before Taxes ' 5.56 5.10 4.93 4.37 4.80
Income Taxes Applicable to Operations •. 1.94 1.87 2.00 1.83 2.08
Net Operating* Earnings 3.62 3.23 2.93 2.54 2.72
Dividends 1.60 1.42 1/2 1.36 1.36 1.27
OTHER SIGNIFICANT STATISTICS
Loans as % of Deposits (Daily Average Basis) . . , . 62.9 60.2 58.1 56.0 50.8
Time Deposits as % of Total Deposits (Daily Average Basis) . . 42.1 39.2 36.0 34.0 29.0
Gross Earnings Rate on Loans ' 6.31 5.80 5.78 5.70 5.48
Gross Earnings Rate on Securities (Fully Taxable Basis], . . . 5.40 4.79 4.46 4.05 3.79
Net Operating Earnings (Pre-Tax) as % of Gross Income.,. ... 28.0 28.2 30.4 30.4 35.8
Net Operating Earnings (After-Tax) as % of Gross Incomi. ... 18.2 17.8 18.1 17.6 20.3
Net Operating Earnings as % of Average Capital .Funds 12.6 11.2 10.4 9.4 10.2
Net Operating Earnings as % of Average Deposits 1.1 1.0 1.0 .9 1.0
Profit (Loss) on Sale of Securities—After Taxes ($1,394,274) $ 35,617 ($334,496) $32,438 $538,872
Number of Offices at Year-End '. . 56 42 39 37 28
* Deposits acquired at the time of various mergers were in 1959, $16,296,125; in 1961, $20,204,679; in 1962, $55,058,083;
in 1963, $32,758,035; in 1964, $11,022,885; in 1965, $9,726,729; in 1966, $35,300,525.
SOURCE: 196 6 Annual Report

APPENDIX D
BRANCHING PROVISIONS OF THE 1928 LEGISLATION
(EXCERPTS FROM THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 1942, CHAPTER 16 4A)
414 9 (14) When branch banks may be authorized; branches
already established; how operated; penalties. --No bank or
trust company heretofore or hereafter incorporated under the
laws of this State shall be authorized to engage in business
in more than one place, except that, (a) in its discretion the
State Corporation Commission may authorize banks having paid-
up and unimpaired capital and surplus of fifty thousand dollars
or over to establish branches within the limits of the city,
town, or village in which the parent bank is located.
(b) The State Corporation Commission may, in its dis-
cretion, also authorize banks located in any city to establish
branches within other cities having a population of not less
than fifty thousand inhabitants.
(c) This section shall not be construed to prohibit the
merger of banks in the same or adjoining counties or of banks
located within a distance of twenty-five miles of a parent
bank and the operation by the merged company, of such banks,
nor to prohibit the sale of any bank to, and the purchase
thereof by, any other bank in the same or adjoining counties
or within a distance of twenty-five miles and the operation
of such banks by the purchasing bank, provided the approval
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of the State Corporation Commission is first had, and pro-
vided, further that at the time of such merger or purchase,
each of the banks involved shall have been in actual operation
for a period of two years or more, except that in any case in
which the State Corporation Commission is satisfied that the
public interest demands, on account of emergency conditions,
that a merger or sale be effected, it may enter an order to
such effect permitting such merger or sale, notwithstanding
that the banks involved or one or more of them, have not been
in actual operation for two or more years. The term "adjoining
counties", where more than two are involved, shall be construed
to mean counties each of which shall adjoin the county in which
the parent bank is located.
(d) This section, however, shall not apply to branch
banks already established.
(e) No branch bank heretofore or hereafter established
shall be operated or advertised under any other name than that
of the identical name of the home bank, unless permission be
first had and obtained from the State Corporation Commission,
and unless such different name shall contain or have added
thereto language clearly indicating that it is a branch bank
and of which bank it is a branch.
Any bank or trust company violating the provisions of
this section shall be liable to a fine of one thousand dollars,
to be imposed and judgment entered therefor by the State Cor-





TWENTY LARGEST BANKS IN VIRGINIA DECEMBER 31, 1947
BANK NAME DEPOSITS
1. First and Merchants National Bank, Richmond
2. State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trust,
Richmond
3. National Bank and Commerce, Norfolk
4. Central National Bank, Richmond
5. First National Exchange, Roanoke
6. The Bank of Virginia, Richmond
7. Seaboard Citizens National Bank, Norfolk
8. First National Bank, Newport News
9. Bank of Commerce and Trust, Richmond
10. Peoples National Bank, Charlottesville
11. Colonial American National Bank, Roanoke
12. First National Bank, Danville
13. American National Bank, Portsmouth
14. First National Bank, Lynchburg
15. Southern Bank and Trust Company, Richmond
16. Mountain Trust Bank, Roanoke
17. American National Bank and Trust Company,
Danville
18. Arlington Trust Company, Inc., Arlington
19. Southern Bank of Norfolk, Norfolk



































NOTE: Data from unpublished statistics, "Virginia Banking
Survey For Years of 1947, 1961-1966," Bureau of Popu-
lation and Economic Research, Graduate School of Business














1962 963 1964 1965 1966








3" FIRST AND MERCHAr'TS
4- UNITED VIRGINIA BANKSHARES
5- VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH
6-VIRGINIA NATIONAL
NOTE: Data from Bureau of Population and Economic Research, "Virginia Banking Survey For Years of 19^7<
196l THROUGH I966", UNPUBLISHED STATISTICS (CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA: BUREAU OF POPULATION AND





HOLDING COMPANIES AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES OPERATING
IN VIRGINIA AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1961
Financial General
Alexandria National Bank, Alexandria $ 33,935,229
Shenandoah Valley National Bank, Winchester 13,826,507
Arlington Trust Company, Inc., Arlington 47,018,161
Clarendon Trust Company, Arlington 25,251,056
TOTAL $120,030,953
First Virginia
National Bank of Manassas $ 5,483,313
First National Bank of Purcellville
,
Purcellville 4,154,098
Old Dominion National Bank of Fairfax,
Annandale 8,429,377
Old Dominion Bank, Arlington 46,785,749
Falls Church Bank, Falls Church 24 ,556,884
TOTAL $ 89,409,421
TOTAL HOLDING COMPANY DEPOSITS $209,439,374
TOTAL STATE DEPOSITS $3,552,314,000
% HOLDING CO. DEPOSITS OF STATE DEPOSITS 5.9%
NOTE: Data from unpublished statistics, "Virginia Banking
Survey For Years 1947, 1961-1966," Bureau of Population
and Economic Research, Graduate School of Business




HOLDING COMPANIES AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES OPERATING
IN VIRGINIA AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1966
Financial General Corporation, Washington, D. C.
Alexandria National Bank, Alexandria $ 51,498,619
Arlington Trust Company, Inc., Arlington 76,658,323
Clarendon Trust Company, Arlington 48,836,380
Peoples Bank of Buena Vista, Inc., Buena Vista 2,731,933
Valley National Bank, Harrisonburg 12,523,177
Republic Bank & Trust Company, Herndon 1,280,580
The Peoples National Bank of Leesburg, Leesburg 13,761,492
The First National Bank of Lexington, Lexington 4,781,091
The Round Hill National Bank, Round Hill 5,926,481
The Shenandoah Valley National Bank of
Winchester, Winchester 17 , 317 , 754
TOTAL $235,315,830
The First Virginia Corporation, Arlington
Mount Vernon National Bank and Trust Company
of Fairfax County, Annandale $ 65,398,057
Old Dominion Bank, Arlington 93,672,035
Falls Church Bank, Falls Church 32,824,383
The National Bank of Manassas, Manassas 10,619,767
Peoples' Bank, Mount Jackson 4,723,345
Southern Bank of Norfolk, Norfolk 41,606,142
First National Bank of Purcellville , Purcellville 6,195,856
Bank of New River Valley, Radford 6,427,414
First Valley National Bank, Rich Creek 4,689,608
Richmond National Bank, Richmond 16,265,590
Staunton Industrial Bank, Staunton 5,825,510
Massanutten Bank of Shenandoah Valley, National
Association, Strasburg 13,246, 757
TOTAL $301,494,464
Virginia Commonwealth Bankshares , Inc., Richmond
Washington Trust Bank, Bristol $ 13,928,083
The Bank of Central Virginia, Lynchburg 2,409,468
Bank of Warwick, Newport News 26,214,252
The Peoples National Bank of Pulaski, Pulaski 7,764,888
The Bank of Virginia, Richmond 234,201,957
The Bank of Salem, Salem 15,668,494






United Virginia Bankshares Inc., Richmond
First and Citizens National Bank, Alexandria $114,341,983
Spotswood Bank, Harrisonburg 15,934,055
Rockbridge Bank & Trust Company, Lexington 9,819,685
First National Trust and Savings Bank of
Lynchburg, Lynchburg 145,946,682
Citizens and Marine Bank, Newport News 54,549,559
Merchants and Farmers Bank of Franklin,
Franklin 7,603,217
State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trusts,
Richmond 341,038,058
The Vienna Trust Company, Vienna 27,363,341
Peninsula Bank and Trust Company, Williamsburg 23 , 673 , 768
$640,270,348
TOTAL HOLDING COMPANY DEPOSITS $1,499,386,614
TOTAL STATE DEPOSITS $5,325,334,500
PERCENTAGE HOLDING COMPANY DEPOSITS
OF STATE DEPOSITS 28.1
NOTE: Data from 1966 Annual Report of the Bureau of Banking,
State Corporation Commission, Commonwealth of Virginia;
Bureau of Population and Economic Research, "Virginia
Banking Survey For Years of 1947, 1961 through 1966,"
unpublished statistics (Charlottesville, Virginia:
Bureau of Population and Economic Research, Graduate





TEN LARGEST BANKING ORGANIZATIONS IN VIRGINIA DECEMBER 31, 19 6 6
1. United Virginia Bankshares, Inc., Richmond $ 640,270,348
2. Virginia National Bank, Norfolk 536,086,579
3. First and Merchants National Bank, Richmond 535,156,910
4. Virginia Commonwealth Bankshares, Inc.,
Richmond 322,305,972
5. First Virginia Corporation, Arlington 301,494,464
6. First National Exchange Bank, Roanoke 300,278,779
7. Financial General Corporation, Washington,
D. C. 235,315,830*
8. Central National Bank, Richmond 168,170,865
9. Lynchburg National Bank and Trust, Lynchburg 128,176,433
10. Seaboard Citizens National Bank, Norfolk 110,506 ,405
TOTAL $3,277,762,585
STATE TOTAL $5,32 5,334,000
PERCENTAGE OF STATE TOTAL
Largest Five 43.8
Largest Ten 61.5
* Includes only Virginia Banks
NOTE: Data from unpublished statistics, "Virginia Banking Survey
For Years of 1947, 1961-1966," Bureau of Population and
Economic Research, Graduate School of Business Adminis-




GROWTH OF BANKS, BRANCHES, AND TOTAL FACILITIES
IN VIRGINIA, 1948-1966
No. cif No. of Net Year - ly Change Total
Banks at Branches at Facilities
Year Year End Year End Banks Branches at Year End
1948 314 96 + 8 410
1949 312 109 -2 + 13 421
1950 313 114 + 1 + 5 427
1951 315 120 +2 +6 435
1952 315 128 + 8 443
1953 316 144 + 1 + 16 410
1954 316 157 + 13 473
1955 316 176 + 19 492
1956 312 199 -4 + 23 511
1957 313 217 + 1 + 18 530
1958 312 234 -3 + 17 546
1959 309 255 -4 +21 564
1960 305 284 -3 + 29 589
1961 302 320 -6 + 36 622
1962 292 367 -10 + 47 659
1963 280 430 -12 +63 710
1964 277 486 -3 + 56 763
1965 262 558 -15 + 72 823
1966 251 612 -11 + 54 863
NOTE: Data from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, "Number of Commercial Banks and Branches by
States, FDIC, 1936-1963." "Supplement to Federal
Reserve Board Number of Commercial Banks and Branches





GROWTH OF BANKS, BRANCHES, AND TOTAL FACILITIES
IN U. S. , 1948-1966
No. of No. of Net Yea.rly Change Total
Banks at Branches at Facilities
Year Year End Year End Banks Branches At Year End
1948 14,221 4,431 -13 +194 18,652
1949 14,205 4,665 -16 +234 18,870
1950 14,164 4,945 -41 +280 18,109
1951 14,132 5,264 -32 +319 19,396
1952 14,088 5,587 -44 +323 19,675
1953 14,024 5,957 -64 +370 19,981
1954 13,881 6,433 -143 +486 20,324
1955 13,756 7,062 -125 +619 20,818
1956 13,680 7,740 -76 +678 21,420
1957 13,607 8,372 -73 +632 22,079
1958 13,504 9,068 -67 +696 22,572
1959 13,486 9,790 -54 +722 23,276
1960 13,484 10,619 -2 + 829 24,103
1961 13,444 11,499 -40 + 880 24,943
1962 13,439 12,492 -5 + 922 25,931
1963 13,582 13,652 + 143 +1,161 26,234
1964 13,775 14,771 +193 +1,119 28,546
1965 13,818 15,918 + 43 +1,147 29,736
1966 13,785 17,087 -33 +1,169 30,872
NOTE: Data from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, "Number of Commercial Banks and Branches by
States, FDIC, 1936-1963." "Supplement to Federal
Reserve Board Number of Commercial Banks and Branches
by States,
1966."


























Virginia National Bank, Norfolk $
First and Merchants National Bank, Richmond
State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trust,
Richmond
First National Exchange, Roanoke
The Bank of Virginia, Richmond
Central National Bank, Richmond
Lynchburg National Bank and Trust Company,
Lynchburg
First and Citizens National Bank, Alexandria
Seaboard Citizens National Bank, Norfolk
Old Dominion Bank, Arlington
Arlington Trust Company, Inc., Arlingjlton
Mount Vernon National Bank and Trust Company
,
Annandale
Southern Bank and Trust Company, Richmond
Colonial American National Bank, Roanoke
National Bank and Trust Company, Charlottesville
Citizens and Marine Bank, Newport News
Alexandria National Bank, Alexandria
Clarendon Trust Company, Arlington
Mountain Trust Bank, Roanoke














































































NOTE: Data from unpublished statistics, "Virginia Banking
Survey For Years of 1947, 1961-1966," Bureau of
Population and Economic Research, Graduate School of


























First and Merchants National Bank, Richmond
State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trust,
Richmond
National Bank and Commerce, Norfolk
The Bank of Virginia, Richmond
Central National Bank, Richmond
First National Exchange, Roanoke
Peoples National Bank, Charlottesville
Seaboard Citizens National Bank, Norfolk
First and Citizens National Bank, Alexandria
Arlington Trust Company, Inc., Arlington
Old Dominion Bank, Arlington
First National Bank, Newport News
Colonial American National Bank, Roanoke
Southern Bank and Trust Company, Richmond
Lynchburg National Bank and Trust Company,
Lynchburg
First National Bank, Lynchburg
Mountain Trust Bank, Roanoke
Alexandria National Bank
National Bank and Trust, Charlottesville








































































NOTE: Data from unpublished statistics, "Virginia Banking
Survey For Years of 1947, 1961-1966," Bureau of
Population and Economic Research, Graduate School of
Business Administration, University of Virginia.

APPENDIX F
BRANCHING PROVISIONS OF THE 1948 LEGISLATION
(EXCERPTS FROM THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 1950)
6-26. When branch banks may be authorized; branches
already established. --No bank or trust company heretofore or
hereafter incorporated under the laws of this state shall be
authorized to engage in business in more than one place, ex-
cept that the State Corporation Commission, when satisfied
that public convenience and necessity will thereby be served,
may authorize banks having paid-up and unimpaired capital and
surplus of fifty thousand dollars or over to establish branches
within the limits of the city, town or village in which the
parent bank is located.
This section shall not apply to branch banks established
prior to June twenty-ninth, nineteen hundred forty-eight, nor
to branches theretofore authorized by the Commission but not
yet opened.
6-27. Operation of branches after merger or purchase.
--The provisions of the preceding section shall not be con-
strued to prohibit the merger of banks in the same or adjoin-
ing counties or of banks located within a distance of twenty-
five miles of a parent bank and the operation by the merged
company of such banks, nor to prohibit the sale of any bank
to, and the purchase thereof by, any other bank in the same

F-2
or adjoining counties or within a distance of twenty-five
miles and the operation of such banks by the purchasing bank
provided that the State Corporation Commission shall be of
the opinion and shall first determine that public convenience
and necessity will be served by such operation, and provided
further that, at the time of such merger or purchase, each
of the banks involved shall have been in actual operation for
a period of five years or more. But in any case in which the
Commission is satisfied that the public interest demands, on
account of emergency conditions, that a merger or sale be
effected, it may enter an order to such effect permitting such
merger or sale, notwithstanding that the banks involved, or
one or more of them, have not been in actual operation for five
or more years. The term "adjoining counties", where more than
two are involved, shall be construed to mean counties each of




THE VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN PLAN
to meet the growing industrial and banking needs
of the Commonwealth while safeguarding the traditional
independence and service of Virginia's county banks.
HOW ONE SMALL OVERSIGHT
in the 1948 Statutes
IS CREATING TWO BIG DANGERS
Excellent as they are, the Virginia Banking Statutes
of 194 8 do not allow for the reality of growing metropolitan
areas. As a result, they hamper and often block the urgently
needed development of true metropolitan and intermetropolitan
banking
.
Metropolitan areas are defined here as cities of not
less than 15,000 population and the area within five miles of
the corporate limits of such cities.
This one, easily remedied oversight is creating two
important threats to the state's economy. It puts a brake on
industrial growth. It opens the door to out-of-state competi-
tion by banks with larger lending limits than even the largest
Virginia banks can offer under present legislation.
A NEEDED ADDITION . . . THE METROPOLITAN CONCEPT
Especially during the past dozen years, close-knit
metropolitan areas have developed in Virginia. They may be
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in the 30,000 population bracket, like Winchester. Or they
may be a complex of larger cities, like the ports around
Hampton Roads, increasingly woven together by a web of bridges
and tunnels. Or, like Richmond, Hopewell, Colonial Heights
and Petersburg, strung together like adjacent beads on the
busy thread of the Turnpike.
The characteristic of these metropolitan areas is that,
regardless of the political "city limits" that criss-cross
and divide them, each area forms an increasingly integrated
economic entity. In the past decade, almost 89% of Virginia's
population growth has been concentrated in these metropolitan
areas ... a total of 573,000 new residents. Similarly, 82%
of Virginia businesses with a net worth of $1,000,000 or more
are concentrated in these areas. The two create a mounting
pressure for true metropolitan area banking . . . with larger
loan capacity.
HOW DO VIRGINIA'S LARGEST BANKS COMPARE
WITH THOSE ELSEWHERE?
Twenty-one states with smaller populations have one or
more banks larger than any in Virginia. Only four of the
twelve Federal Reserve Districts have larger banking resources
than the Fifth District. Yet every other Federal Reserve City
has one or more banks larger than Richmond's largest. With
the exception of West Virginia, every state bordering Virginia,
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as well as the District of Columbia, has at least one bank
larger than the largest in Virginia.
SMALL CREDIT LINES, AN OBSTACLE TO NEW INDUSTRY
Large industries need large credit lines. The biggest
bank in Virginia can offer only $1,550,000. Or consider this:
Richmond has four of the six largest banks in the state. Yet
all four combined can offer an industry no more than $4,950,000
By contrast, in any of 15 North Carolina cities, an industry
can obtain $5,000,000 from a single bank.
There is considerable evidence that such inadequate
banking service hinders industrial development in Virginia.
While the Old Dominion has done a "pretty good" job in attract-
ing new industries in some areas, and achieved a rate of in-
dustrial growth somewhat above the national average, it has
fallen behind its neighbors. In today's competition for in-
dustry, "pretty good" just isn't good enough. Between 1948
and 1958, Virginia's dollar growth in per capita value added
by manufacture was 25% less than that of North Carolina. The
latter state has nearly 50% more manufacturing concerns per
capita, and nearly 60% more employees engaged in industry per
capita. And in both categories, Virginia fell below at least
four other states in its area.

G-4
THE OPEN DOOR TO OUTSIDE BANKING COMPETITION
Equally serious from the standpoint of Virginia's
financial community, the comparative smallness of the state's
largest banks invites out-of-state banking. Scores of Vir-
ginia's new or expanding industries now go outside its borders
to get the credit lines they need. In other words, when the
state has attracted new or bigger industries, much of the
benefit to the banking community is channeled away by the
limitations of Virginia's metropolitan banks.
CAN VIRGINIA MEET THE CHALLENGE?
Virginia has a strong tradition of doing business locally
Its non-metropolitan banks provide excellent service for their
counties and communities. They are protected by the Banking
Statutes of 1948.
At the same time, the development of growing metro-
politan areas and industry's need for larger credit lines are
building up relentless pressure for bigger metropolitan banks.
Can Virginia make possible such banks? This is precisely the
purpose of the Virginia Metropolitan Plan.
HOW TO FIT THE METROPOLITAN AREA CONCEPT
INTO PRESENT LAWS
The 1948 Statutes permit the merger of banks five or
more years old only if their head offices are within 25 miles
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of each other, or lie within the same city limits, or within
the same or adjoining counties.
The Virginia Plan would amend this to permit merger
between banks with head offices in any metropolitan area.
The 1948 Statutes restrict a bank's branches to the
same city or the same county in which its head office is
located.
The Virginia Plan would amend this to permit a bank
with its head office in a metropolitan area to establish and
operate branches in any other metropolitan area in which it
had one or more branches. In other words, when banks in two
metropolitan areas merged, they would not be penalized by
having a main office in only one. They would still be able
to establish branches in both metropolitan areas.
To meet the realities of present day suburbanism, the
Virginia Plan would also amend the present laws to permit a
city bank to have branches within five miles of its city
limits . . . and county banks to have branches in adjacent
cities
.
HOW THE VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN PLAN BENEFITS
THE STATE AND ALL ITS BANKS
Under the Virginia Plan, metropolitan banks would be
able to merge and achieve the larger credit limits essential
to serve and attract modern industry. At the same time, they
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would be able to provide service to their city customers with
homes or businesses in the nearby suburbs.
County banks adjacent to cities could retain the full
banking business of county residents with city jobs or busi-
nesses .
Non-metropolitan and county banks would keep the pro-
tection afforded by the 1948 Bank Statutes. They would benefit
from the greater impetus to Virginia industry and from the
stronger correspondent relationships provided by larger metro-
politan area banks.
The Virginia Metropolitan Plan offers a way by which
the Old Dominion can go forward financially and industrially
in its own traditions.
TODAY'S LAWS AND THE VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN PLAN
194 8 STATUTES
MERGERS — Provided both banks have been in existence five
years, mergers are permitted
— if the banks' main offices are within 25
miles of each other, or
— if the banks' main offices are in the same
or adjoining counties or in the same city.
BRANCHES — Can be established if they are within the county
or city of the bank's main office.
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THE VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN PLAN
MERGERS -- Retain provisions of the 1948 Statutes and add
permission to merge
— if each bank's main office is located in
any metropolitan area.
BRANCHES — Retain provisions of the 1948 Statutes and add
that branches can be established
--by a metropolitan area bank in any other
metropolitan area provided such bank already
has a branch in the area.
--by a city bank within five miles of its
city limits.
--by a county bank within any city adjacent
to the county of its main office.

APPENDIX H
BRANCHING PROVISIONS OF THE 1962 LEGISLATION
(EXCERPTS FROM THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 19 5 AND THE
19 64 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT)
6-26. When branch banks may be authorized; branches
already established. --No bank or trust company heretofore
or hereafter incorporated under the laws of this State shall
.be authorized to engage in business in more than one place,
except that the State Corporation Commission, when satisfied
that public convenience and necessity will thereby be served,
may authorize banks having paid-up and unimpaired capital and
surplus of fifty thousand dollars or over to establish branches
within the limits of the city, town or county in which the
parent bank is located or to establish branches elsewhere by
merger with banks located in any other county, city or town.
This section shall not be construed to prohibit the
operation of existing branch banks heretofore established.
The term "parent bank" shall be construed to mean the
bank or banking office at which the principal functions of
the bank are conducted. The location of a parent bank or of
a branch bank may be moved if the State Corporation Commission
determines that public convenience and necessity will be
served by such move; but the location of a parent bank or of
a branch bank may not be moved beyond the limits of the city,




6-27. Operation of branches after merger or purchase.
--The preceding section (6-26) shall be construed to allow the
merger of banks and the operation by the merged company of such
banks, and to allow the sale of any bank to, and the purchase
thereof through merger by, any other bank and the operation
of such banks by the merged bank, provided that the State Cor-
poration Commission shall be of the opinion and shall first
determine that public convenience and necessity will be served
by such operation, and provided further that, at the time of
such merger the banks involved shall have been in actual
operation for a period of five years or more. But in any case
in which the Commission is satisfied that the public interest
demands, on account of emergency conditions, that a merger be
effected, it may enter an order to such effect permitting such
merger notwithstanding that the banks involved, or one or more
of them, have not been in actual operation for five or more
years
.
6-27.1. When public necessity need not be proved on
application for certificate of authority under 6-31. --(a)
When an application is made to the State Corporation Commission
by a bank pursuant to 6-31 for a certificate of authority to
commence business in a political subdivision it shall not be
necessary to prove the requirements of the paragraph numbered
(4) of 6-31 or, under 6-31 to prove the public necessity for
banking or additional banking facilities in the community where
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the bank is proposed to be located when all of the banks
located in such political subdivision are owned or controlled
(1) by "bank holding companies" or (2) when all of the banks
located in that political subdivision are owned or controlled
by "merged banks" or (3) when all of the banks located in
such political subdivision are owned or controlled by "bank
holding companies" and "merged banks".
(b) "Merged bank " means any bank which has acquired
another bank under the provisions of 6-26 and 6-27 which has
its principal office in one political subdivision and a branch
in another political subdivision.
(c) "Bank holding company" means any company (1) which
directly or indirectly owns, controls or holds with power to
vote, twenty-five per centum or more of the voting shares of
each of two or more banks or of a company which is or becomes
a bank holding company by virtue of this section, or (2) which
controls in any manner the election of a majority of the
directors of each of two or more banks, or (3) for the benefit
of whose shareholders or members twenty-five per centum or
more of the voting shares of each of two or more banks or a
banking holding company is held by trustees; and for the pur-
pose of this section, any successor to any such company shall
be deemed to be a bank holding company from the date as of
which such successor co-company becomes a bank holding com-
pany. Notwithstanding the foregoing, (A) no bank shall be a
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bank holding company by virtue of its ownership or control of
shares in a fiduciary capacity, except where such shares are
held for the benefit of the shareholders of such banks, (B)
no company shall be a bank holding company by virtue of its
ownership or control of its shares acquired by it in con-
nection with its underwriting of securities and which are
held only for such period of time as will permit the sale
thereof upon a reasonable basis, (C) no company formed for
the sole purpose of participating in a proxy solicitation
shall be a bank holding company by virtue of its control of
voting rights or shares acquired in the course of such solici-
tation, and (D) no company shall be a bank holding company if
at least eighty per centum of its total assets are composed
of holdings in the field of agriculture.
6-27.2 Establishment of branch banks in contiguous
counties or cities. --Notwithstanding the limitations of 6-26
and 6-27, the State Corporation Commission may, when satisfied
that public convenience and necessity will thereby be served,
authorize the establishment of branch banks in cities contiguous
to the county or city in which the parent bank is located, and
the establishment of branch banks in counties contiguous to
the city in which the parent bank is located. Establishment
of such branches may be by merger, consolidation, purchase of
assets or creation of a new branch; but if the parent bank is
located in a city such branches in the contiguous county may
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